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Foreword 
 
My initial interest in the 2008 War surfaced during a seminar at the University of 
Wollongong, Australia. My tutor, Dr. Konstantin Sheiko, held a seminar detailing the war and 
its significance within international politics. At the end of the seminar we analyzed a news 
clip aired on Fox News America on August 8
th
 2008.
1
 In this news clip, Fox News interviews 
two South Ossetian civilians, a twelve year old girl and her aunt. The news anchor asks the 
girl what happened during the outbreak of the war. The girl, claiming to have been present at 
a South Ossetian restaurant at the time, reports on an aerial bombardment of her home town 
by Georgian troops. She continues extending her gratitude to Russian troops for her rescue. 
Her aunt elaborates that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili is solely to blame for the 
outbreak of the war, and holds him responsible for over two thousand South Ossetian 
casualties. Upon hearing this statement Fox News immediately cuts to commercial. Following 
a short break, the news anchor grants the aunt thirty seconds to finish her thought. After 
continuing for a few second she is interrupted once again. 
 
This four minute interview intrigued me to investigate the war in more detail. Although 
subtle, the cover up in this interview is significant in a number of ways and raises some 
important questions; what interest does Fox News America have in relations to the 2008 War? 
Why was this interview censored in a country which prides itself with a free press and 
freedom of speech? And more importantly, who is pulling the strings in the news coverage of 
international political events? Fox News America is renowned for its right-wing approach to 
news coverage, and thus presents an extreme case of media bias. Regardless, media bias is not 
an uncommon phenomenon in modern society. Preliminary reading of studies concerning the 
2008 War confirmed my suspicions by detailing information campaigns from both Georgian 
and Russian sides, governed deliberately to shed favorable light on their own engagement in 
the war. After a consultation with Dr Stephen Brown I decided to write a thesis discerning the 
role of media in the 2008 War, specializing on the Norwegian media coverage. Finally, my 
supervisor, Ola Svein Stugu, provided the much needed guidance for my project. 
 
                                                 
1
 The full interview is available online: see Nikolai Orlov, Fox News - Cover up - Georgia Russia War, [online 
video] (25 May. 2011), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKASUchWf_U>, accessed 11 Nov. 2012. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In August 2008 a war broke out in the South Caucasus. Georgian armed forces initiated a 
bombardment of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7, attacking Russian 
peacekeepers in the process. Soon to follow was an overwhelming and disproportionate 
response by the Russian 58
th
 Army involving an estimate of 40 000 battle troops. The war, 
although limited in scope and length, took the world by surprise, as Russian operations 
continued beyond the boundaries of South Ossetia. Over the next days a two-prone attack was 
engaged from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia proper. 
Halted only by a hastily sketched out ceasefire agreement on August 12, the Russia-Georgian 
War ended as suddenly as it had started.  
 
In the sphere of international media another war was underway, an information war.
2
 Both 
during the conflict and in its aftermath, Georgian and Russian intelligence promoted their 
reasons behind the outbreak of the war, and assigned responsibility for the loss of human life.
3
 
This inevitably created confusion among news correspondents and journalists reporting on the 
conflict. The desire to swiftly disclose the conflict‟s origins to the public came at the expense 
of thorough investigative journalism. As a result, the reports often represented a bias towards 
one side of the conflict, while excluding the other parties‟ point of view. In the aftermath of 
the war, academics and journalists alike have investigated the media coverage of the 2008 
War in conjunction with the events on the ground in an attempt to uncover the truth about the 
conflict. 
 
This thesis follows a similar rationale. The research problem is the following: How was the 
Russia-Georgian War framed in the Norwegian print-press in August 2008?  
 
Underlying this question is the aim to investigate to what extent the aforementioned 
information war affected the coverage in the Norwegian print-press. In the event of an 
information war, the media is subjected to divergent reports from the actors of a conflict. In 
                                                 
2
 P. A. Goble, ‘Defining Victory and Defeat: The Information War between Russia and Georgia’ in S.E. Cornell, & 
S.F. Starr, The Guns of August 2008 Russia’s War in Georgia, (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 181 
3
 J.V.Wertsch & Z.Karumidze, ’Spinning the past: Russian and Georgian accounts of the war of August 2008’, 
Memory Studies, vol. 2, issue 3, (2009), 378. 
2 
 
their production of news, the media has to make conscious decisions as to which reports they 
should include and which reports should be dismissed. The final product, presented in the 
form of a news story, is thus the outcome of selective procedures by news institutions and 
journalists. As an inevitable result, the news stories contain fragments of the parties‟ original 
reports, causing certain frames to enter the news texts. As such, studies that investigate frames 
in the news can measure the impact of information wars on media output.  
 
This study employs the concept of framing as presented by Entman.
4
 In its most fundamental 
sense, framing refers to the way in which an issue is portrayed.
5
 Specifically, framing refers to 
“the different interpretations of the same phenomenon”.6 The concept of framing is engraved 
in the way we make sense of the world around us. In the event of a collision between two 
cars, the drivers will often have diverging explanations as to what went wrong. Each driver 
will promote certain aspects of the incident, while simultaneously excluding others. Through 
either conscious or unconscious decisions they will frame the event according to their own 
agenda or perspective. This also holds true in other disputes, even within the realm of 
international relations. In the context of the Russia-Georgian War, the conflicting parties 
framed the war according to national self-interest. This produced conflicting information, 
which the media had to dissect in order to produce news stories. Inevitably this caused certain 
frames to penetrate the news texts.  As such, this thesis examines how this phenomenon 
manifests in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the Russia-Georgian War.  
 
In pursuit of this goal, this thesis employs news framing analysis as an approach to news 
discourse, one that serves as the basis of several successful studies that scrutinize the role of 
the media in military conflicts.
7 
The strength of this approach lies in the process of identifying 
various frames in news texts. These can be frames originating from parties of a conflict or 
                                                 
4
 R. Entman, ‘Framing towards clarification of a fractured paradigm’, Journal of Communcation, vol. 43, issue 4, 
(1993), 52 
5
 J.N. Druckman, ‘Foreword’ in  P. D’Angelo & J.A. Kuypers (eds.), Doing News Framing Analysis Empirical and 
Theoretical Perspectives (New York, Routledge, 2010), xiii 
6
 J.N. Druckman in D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010, xiii 
7
 See R. Ottosen. ‘The Norwegian Media Image of the War in Afghanistan: Peacekeeping or Aggression?’, 
Nordicom Review, vol. 26, issue 1, (2005); D.V. Dmitrova & J.Strömback, ’Foreign policy and the framing of the 
2003 Iraq War in elite Swedish and US newspapers’, Media, War and Conflict, vol. 1, issue 1, (2008), 203-220; 
K.Sharif & F.U. Yousafzai, ‘War or Peace Framing? An Analyses of the Pakistani Press Coverage on War on 
Terror’, Journal of Development Communication, vol. 22, issue 1, (2011), 56-71; H. Semetko.. & P.M. 
Valkenburg, ‘Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News’, Journalism of 
Communication, vol. 50, issue 2, (2000), 93-109. 
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other frames that shape the news coverage. From a top-down perspective, this approach can 
examine the frames used by the parties of the Russia-Georgian War. Subsequently, these 
frames are employed in the analysis of news texts. Thus if a frame from the top level is 
reflected in the news, it indicates a successful frame. A high frequency of certain frames 
indicates a dominant perspective in the coverage. As such, the approach grants an in-depth 
look at how framing affects news coverage. 
 
Overall this thesis sets out to investigate how the Russia-Georgian War was portrayed in the 
Norwegian print-press in August 2008. In pursuit of this goal, four newspapers were selected 
to represent the range of the Norwegian print-press, namely Aftenposten, Klassekampen, Dag 
og Tid and Dagbladet. Granted that an analysis of all Norwegian newspapers is 
insurmountable for this study, these newspapers were chosen to represent different political 
inclinations within the Norwegian print-press - Aftenposten is a daily published newspaper 
oriented towards liberal conservatives – Klassekampen is published daily and represents left-
wing inclinations – Dag og Tid is a weekly published, independent newspaper – Dagbladet is 
a daily published, tabloid newspaper renowned for its radical views on politics. Accordingly, 
the analysis of these newspapers will comprise a broad view of the Norwegian print-press 
coverage as a whole. 
 
This study analyzes 286 news articles across four newspapers. Considering the magnitude of 
the sample, a strict methodological approach is required. News framing analysis provides the 
researcher with a systematic framework for examining large samples of news texts across 
various media sources. This is advantageous since it guides the lens of investigation to 
specific aspects of the news.  By examining source origin, source class, publication date, 
framing and genre, the approach can highlight similarities and differences between news 
stories. Moreover, the approach provides an overview of the sample, by examining coverage 
and framing over time. Thus possible shifts in the coverage are easier to detect for the analyst. 
In this thesis the approach will be employed within a study of history. As such, an integral 
part of this thesis is to evaluate the capability of news framing analysis to examine historical 
aspects of news coverage.  
 
In order to make qualified assessments of complex military conflicts, such as the Russia-
Georgian War, the researcher needs to be well versed in the subject under scrutiny. In this 
4 
 
thesis it is crucial, as it provides the necessary understanding to authenticate the information 
in the news coverage. During the 2008 War, the parties employed history in specific ways to 
justify their political interests. From the very outset of the war, references to the past were 
used to legitimize actions in the present. Georgia claimed that South Ossetia had been an 
integral part of Georgian sovereignty since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
8
 According to 
Georgia, this legitimized its intervention in South Ossetia on August 7. Conversely, South 
Ossetia stated that it had been an independent and sovereign state since 1991.
9
 In this regard, 
the Georgian incursion should be considered a violation of international law.   
 
Lastly, Russia claimed that the people of South Ossetia were Russian citizens.
10
  From this 
point of view, the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali amounted to an attack on Russian citizens, 
thus forcing Russia to intervene to protect its people. Moreover, Russia paralleled the 
Georgian attack on South Ossetia to the Serbian attack on Kosovo in the nineties.
11
 In 1999, 
NATO initiated a „humanitarian intervention‟ to stop a Serbian genocide of Kosovo 
Albanians.
12
 By employing the Kosovo analogy, Russia attempted to legitimize its own 
intervention in Georgia to stop a present day Slobodan Milosevic in Mikheil Saakashvili.
13
 
Furthermore, the Kosovo parallel revealed an international dispute between Russia and 
NATO based on grievances from the early nineties to the present.
14
 
 
These different narratives stimulated historical debates concerning the validity of the parties‟ 
claims. In turn, this produced academic studies which investigate the historical dimension of 
the conflict.
15
 Specifically, these studies examine the long history of Georgia and its relations 
to Russia, in an attempt to disclose the origins of the 2008 War. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the studies will be addressed in a historical section, which will serve as the theoretical 
                                                 
8
 European Union, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), vol. 3, 
(September 2009), 8 
9
 IIFFMCG, vol. 3, 2009, 503 
10
 ibid, 337 
11
 C.A. Nielsen, ’The Kosovo precedent and the rhetorical deployment of former Yugoslav analogies in the cases 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1-2, (March-June 2009), 
171. 
12
 Nielsen, 2009, 172 
13
 Goble in Cornell & Starr, 2009, 187. 
14
 R.D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook The World: Georgia, Russia, and the future of the West, (St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 2010), 217 
15
 See Cornell & Starr, 2009; C. King, The Ghost of Freedom A History of the Caucasus, (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2008); T. De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010); 
P. Gahrton, Georgia Pawn in the New Great Game, (New York, Pluto Press, 2010); Asmus, 2010 
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backbone for the news framing analysis. This section addresses the historical background of 
the Georgian nation, and the intricate relationship between the parties of the conflict, namely 
Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. One of the central themes in this section is the 
relationship between Russia and Georgia, on the one hand, and Russia and NATO on the 
other. The purpose of this section is to present the prominent debates in this regard, and how 
they relate to the conflict in 2008. 
 
Against this historical backdrop the information in the news stories will be analyzed. The 
research model in this study was designed on the basis of prominent studies within the field of 
framing analysis.
16
 This involves a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
news articles published across four newspapers. The analyses were guided by research 
questions, designed to illuminate specific aspects of the Norwegian war coverage. These 
questions scrutinize the newspapers‟ use of sources, framing and history. In the quantitative 
analysis the news articles were categorized according to genres, publication dates and use of 
in-text sources. In turn, the results of the quantitative analysis were coupled with a qualitative 
analysis determining the framing in specific news stories. Frames found in the sample, were 
aggregated under frame categories. Each category was designed to encompass clusters of 
similar frames in the sample. The aim of these analyses is to present an overview of how the 
Norwegian print-press covered the Russia-Georgian War over August 2008, and to discuss the 
results in relation to the historical backdrop. 
 
In its coverage of the Russia-Georgian War, the Norwegian media raised debates concerning 
the security arrangements of Norway vis-à-vis its Russian neighbor. These debates paralleled 
the Russian incursion in South Ossetia to a potential military attack on Norway. In this thesis, 
these debates were arranged under a designated frame category - Norwegian Angle. 
Specifically, this thesis examines how these frames affect the Norwegian print-press coverage 
of Russia‟s engagements in Georgia. 
 
The results of this study can contribute to general understanding of the Norwegian news 
media‟s stance towards the Russia-Georgian War. Furthermore, this thesis will investigate the 
                                                 
16
 See P. D’Angelo & J.A. Kuypers (eds.), Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives 
(New York, Routledge, 2010); Entman, 1993; Z. Pan & G.M. Kosichi, ‘Framing Analysis: An Approach to News 
Discourse’, Political Communcation, vol. 10 (1993), 55-75.; S.D. Reese, et al, Framing Public Life: Perspectives on 
media and our understanding of the social world, (London, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003) 
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divergence between Norwegian newspapers in their coverage of the 2008 War. As mentioned 
earlier the newspapers were selected on the basis of representing various political alignments. 
This study scrutinizes to what extent political inclination affects the framing of news. 
Furthermore, the results will represent a critical view of the conduct of Norwegian news 
media in their coverage of the Russia-Georgian War, in particular, and war reporting in 
general.  
 
Ultimately this study scrutinizes the acquisition of knowledge in modern society. One of the 
central themes of this thesis is the process of knowledge accumulation between academic 
scholars and journalists. In academic studies, this process is developed over time on the basis 
of extensive reading of academic source materials, which are in turn arranged according to a 
preplanned track of arguments and discussions. In journalistic practices, this process is vastly 
different, and critically limited by time. This thesis poses the question of how journalistic 
practices affect the assessment of complex conflicts, such as the Russia-Georgian War. 
 
This study sheds new light on the professional conduct of journalists, who hold a great deal of 
influential power in modern society. From the selection of sources to the production of news, 
journalists possess the tools to determine the agendas of tomorrow. As such, academic studies 
that scrutinize the credibility of journalistic practices are not only important, they are 
necessary. Moreover, they challenge the notion of the press as a mediator of knowledge.  
 
Previous studies 
Similar studies have scrutinized the media‟s portrayal of military conflicts in the last decades. 
These studies reveal the intentional use of media as an instrument of modern warfare, 
employed to shed favorable light on parties to a conflict.
17
 Moreover, they scrutinize 
journalistic practices in regards to objectivity. They attest that journalistic objectivity is by 
                                                 
17
 See H. Luostarinen & R. Ottosen, ’The Changing Role of the Media in Conflicts. From the Cold War to the Net 
Age’, in Willem Kemph & Heikki Luostarinen (eds.), Journalism and the New World Order Vol. II – Studying War 
and the Media (Goteborg University, Nordicom 2002), 39-59; J.Lynch & A. McGoldrick, Peace Journalism, 
(Stroud, Hawkthorn Press, 2005); D.McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, 6th Ed, (London, Sage Publications, 
2010). 
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default inconceivable, and that some degree of subjectivity is unavoidable.
18
 In the modern 
era every major political conflict has a media factor.
19
  
 
Rune Ottosen has conducted two studies investigating the Norwegian media coverage of the 
2001 War in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. His studies conclude that Norwegian 
journalists largely favored the Norwegian participation in both conflicts by framing their 
involvement as “good-doers”.20 In addition, his studies criticize the Norwegian liberal and 
tabloid press‟ imprudent adoption of American perspectives in their coverage. Through a 
similar lens, this study will examine to what extent this phenomenon influences the 
Norwegian print-press coverage of the Russia-Georgian War. The majority of American 
newspapers sided with the Georgian perspective; proclaiming Russia as the main aggressor.
21
  
 
In relation to the 2008 War, several studies have investigated the media aspect of the 
conflict.
22
 These studies reveal that the media was subjected to diverging information from 
the conflicting parties, which in turn affected the news coverage. Goble (2009) points out in 
his study that both Georgian and Russian intelligence conducted information campaigns in 
order to promote their national political agenda in the international media.
23
 This involved a 
systematic operation of misinformation by both parties promoting and excluding certain 
aspects of the war in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the public.
24
  
 
In a study by Tønnesen (2012), the Russian print-press coverage of the war was examined in 
conjunction with the national political agenda.
25
 The official Russian version argues that 
Russia was forced to intervene in South Ossetia on behalf of Russian citizens and to aid its 
                                                 
18
 See B. McNair, The Sociology of Journalism. (London, Hodder Arnold, 1998); H. de Burg, Making Journalists: 
Diverse Models, Global Issues. (New York, Routledge, 2005)  
19
 Goble in Cornell & Starr, 2009, 182 
20
 See Ottosen, 2005; R. Ottosen, VG, Saddam og Vi, (Kristiansand, IJ Forlaget, 2009) 
21
 See H. Heinrich & K. Tanaev, ’Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War’, Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, issue 3, (summer 2009), 244-259. 
22
 See Goble, 2009; Heinrich & Tanaev, 2009; H. Tønnessen & P. Kolstø. ’Journalistic Identities and War 
Reporting: Coverage of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War in the Russian Press’, Scando-Slavica, vol. 58, issue 1, 
(2012), 101-121; Wertsch & Karumidze, 2009; A.K. Niedermaier, Countdown to War in Georgia: Russia’s Foreign 
Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, (United States, Minneapolis, East 
View Press, 2008); M. Akhvlediani, ‘The fatal flaw: the media and the Russian invasion of Georgia’, Small Wars 
& Insurgencies, vol. 20, no. 2, (June 2009), 363-390. 
23
 See Goble in Cornell & Starr, 2009. 
24
 See ibid 
25
 See Tønnessen & Kolstø, 2012 
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peacekeepers. Tønnesen concludes that the Russian print-press coverage largely aligned with 
the national political agenda, especially in Rossijskaja gazeta.
26
 Heinrich & Tanaev (2009) 
supports Tønnesen‟s conclusions in a study contrasting the print-press coverage between 
Georgian, Russian and Western sources. The Georgian Messenger opposed the Rossijskaja 
gazeta, while supporting the Georgian position. In terms of Western sources, newspapers such 
as The New York Times, The Washington Post, Handelsblatt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Le 
Monde, and Der Standard aligned more closely with the Georgian official version; 
proclaiming Russia as the main aggressor.
27
 These studies affirm the success of the Georgian 
information campaign in Western news media. The following thesis will supplement these 
studies by examining to what extent the Norwegian print-press follows the same direction.  
 
Source material 
This thesis builds upon both primary and secondary source material written in English and 
Norwegian. Important to note is the absence of source material written in Russian, Georgian, 
Abkhaz or Ossetian, which are crucial in acquiring a thorough understanding of this subject. 
Thus the section discerning the historical background of the 2008 War will be based mainly 
on secondary source material. On the basis of these sources, a historical context for the 
conflict will be established. The secondary sources are mainly books of history and politics as 
well as peer-reviewed articles published in internationally recognized journals. 
 
In addition this thesis utilizes primary source material such as the Independent International 
Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (or EU report), interviews, official speeches 
and other official documents translated to English. Throughout this section, prominent debates 
concerning the establishment of the Georgian state and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia will be addressed. Given limited length and scope, it is not the purpose of this 
study to delve deep into historical debates concerning the 2008 War. A vast amount of 
extensive and highly detailed studies investigate the ethnic, political, cultural and historical 
origins of the conflicts in the South Caucasus.
28
 Instead, this study sets out to establish a 
literary overview of prominent debates outlined in earlier studies.  
                                                 
26
 Tønnessen & Kolstø. 2012, 119. 
27
 Heinrich & Tanaev, 2009, 257. 
28
 See J. Wheatley, From National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet 
Union, (Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005); King, 2008; De Waal, 2010; Asmus, 2010, S.E. Cornell, 
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The media analyses were based on primary source material. The sample data consisted of 
news stories published in August 2008 in four Norwegian newspapers. The newspapers were 
accessed through the digital database ATEKST.
29
  
 
Roadmap of the thesis: 
In the second chapter, I will define the terms used throughout this thesis, many of which are 
either culturally or historically charged and denote multiple meanings. Accordingly the 
second chapter will clarify my own understanding and intended use of these terms.  
 
Following this section, the historical background is outlined in chapter three. Here, the origins 
of the Georgian nation and the establishment of its autonomous entities of South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia and Adjara are examined. Russia plays a pivotal role in regards to the 
administrative structure of the Georgian state, first during Soviet times, from 1921 to 1991, 
and second in the post-Soviet era, from 1991 to the present. Moreover, this section will deal 
with the historical narratives employed by the parties in the 2008 War. The quarrel over 
Kosovo is here important, as it produced an extensive academic debate in the aftermath of the 
war. The legitimacy of the Kosovo parallel and its relevance to the 2008 War is dealt with 
specifically at the end of chapter three. 
 
Chapter four will present the methodological framework for the media analysis. Important 
here is the concept of framing and its relation to media coverage. After defining fundamental 
concepts, I explain the design process and rationale behind the research model in this thesis.  
 
In chapter five, the results of the analyses are presented conjoined with a thorough discussion 
of the Norwegian print press coverage. The analyses were guided by specific research 
questions, which examine the various newspapers‟ use of sources, history and framing. The 
findings from the quantitative analysis will be presented using tables and statistics, followed 
by a detailed approach in the qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis will reveal the 
                                                                                                                                                        
’Autonomy and Conflict: Ethno-territoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus: Cases in Georgia’. 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 61. (Uppsala, 2002), 1-247; Cornell & Starr, 2009. 
29
 ATEKST is a Scandinavian digital online database used to access media output from newspapers, magazines 
and journals. Search results can be aggregated in PDF formats and downloaded for research purposes. 
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presence of media frames in news texts. The findings of both the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis are compared across the four newspapers in the sample, to accentuate differences and 
similarities. This comparison will examine to what extent political inclination affects the 
coverage of news. Furthermore, this section will scrutinize how history was employed in the 
print press coverage. This entails examining news stories concerning the historical dimension 
of the conflict. These stories are discussed in conjunction with the historical findings in 
chapter three. 
 
  
11 
 
Chapter 2: Terms and Boundaries 
 
Before assessing the intricate relationship between the actors of the 2008 War it is important 
to clearly define the different terms in use throughout this thesis. As a novice scholar of 
Georgian and Caucasian history, one bears a high risk of offending people by heedlessly 
adopting culturally and historically charged concepts. As such this section will outline my 
understanding of the different terms.  
 
Firstly we must define the culturally ambiguous term the Caucasus. The Caucasus region 
traditionally refers to the geographical region surrounding the Greater Caucasus chain 
stretching from the Black Sea in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east. In modern years the 
Caucasus term has often been interlinked with the South Caucasus, referring to the region 
south of the Greater Caucasus chain. In this thesis I use the term South Caucasus in the 
modern sense referring to the geographical areas including Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.
30
 The South Caucasus region has historically speaking been a crossroads between 
numerous empires. This has brought together cultural influences from both the Christian and 
Muslim world as well as remnants from the Ottoman, Persian, and Tsarist empires. As a result 
the people inhabiting the region are both culturally and historically diversified. The region is 
home to around ten main nationalities including Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, 
Ossetians, Abkhaz, Kurds, Talysh and Lezgins, most of which speak languages that are not 
mutually understandable.
31
 Inherently this brings about tremendous challenges for any scholar 
attempting to dissect the very complicated relationship between the populace inhabiting the 
region.  
 
The modern state of Georgia is located south of the Great Caucasian chain which also draws 
its northern border to Russia. Georgia stretches from the Black Sea in the west to Azerbaijan 
in the east and borders to Armenia and Turkey in the south. It is home to approximately 4.7 
million people. Its two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are located in the 
west and central-north of the country. 
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In relation to the 2008 War scholars encounter a number of issues related to terminology. The 
term South Ossetia originates from a Soviet territory within present day Georgia called the 
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, which was established in 1922, as part of the 
Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republics. Today the term refers to a territory in 
central northern Georgia. 
 
 
Picture 1: The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, the Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic and the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic established in 1922.
32
 
 
Georgian scholars denounce the term South Ossetia altogether arguing that the term is a 
Soviet remnant and that the autonomy of the region was revoked in 1990.
33
 In effect this 
integrated South Ossetia under Georgian sovereignty. Georgians instead refer to the area 
using the term Tskhinvali region or Inner Kartli. The dispute over the territorial boundaries of 
Georgia and South Ossetia further influences the remembrance of the 2008 War. In Georgian 
literature the War in 2008 is often referred to as the Russia-Georgian War or the 2008 War 
against Russia. The Russian government denounce the term Russia-Georgian War.
34
 Instead 
Russia refers to the region as South Ossetia, and the War in 2008 as the South-Ossetian-
Georgian War or the South Ossetian War. These terms leave Russia out of the conflict and 
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were used deliberately to shed a more favorable light on the Russian involvement.
35
 In this 
thesis I use the terms 2008 War and Russia-Georgian War interchangeably. Although it can 
be argued that the war began as a local conflict between Georgian and South Ossetian 
separatist forces, the escalation of the conflict revealed its two main protagonists; namely 
Russia and Georgia. These terms are also most prevalent in the academic literature, which 
serves as the foundation for this thesis. 
 
The quarrel over South Ossetia‟s autonomy played a crucial role both during and in the 
aftermath of the 2008 war. According to Georgia, the South Ossetian autonomy was revoked 
in 1990 leading into the South Ossetian War from 1991-92. Although a joint peacekeeping 
operation was established at the end of the conflict, the dispute over where the Georgian 
national territory ends and the South Ossetian territory begins remained unresolved. Georgia 
lost control of South Ossetia during the South Ossetian War, and has failed to regain foothold 
in the region ever since. Conversely South Ossetian separatists claim they have been an 
independent region separated from Georgia ever since 1922. They argue that they were 
granted autonomy under Soviet rule. This contention brought about much confusion during 
the outbreak of the 2008 war. During the bombardment of Tskhinvali on the eve of August 7, 
Georgia claimed it was reinstating constitutional order within one of its national regions. 
Russia regarded the attack as an act of aggression on an independent region. This geopolitical 
disarray manifested itself in the media coverage as well. International news correspondents 
were walking on the razor‟s edge when reporting on whether Russia had invaded Georgia by 
entering South Ossetia. Russia‟s passing through the Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia on 
August 8
 
was obscure in terms of international boundaries, a confusion that Moscow exploited 
to full effect.
36
 The E.U. report, published in the aftermath of the war, concludes that both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were part of Georgian national territory and thus restricted by 
law not to secede from Georgia.
37
 These discussions will be dealt with in further detail at a 
later stage in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: Historical Background  
 
The Russia-Georgian War marked the reemergence of frozen conflicts in the Caucasus. In 
order to understand the complex nature of these conflicts, one must take into account the 
historical relationship between Georgia and Russia on the one hand, and Georgia‟s relations 
to South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. The 2008 War has been considered by many to 
be the culmination of a gradually deteriorating relationship between Georgia and Russia, one 
that has its origins prior to Mikheil Saakashvili and the Rose Revolution.
38
 The purpose of 
this chapter is to assess the intricate relationship between the parties involved in the Russia-
Georgian War. To achieve this goal one must examine the origins of these conflicts, and how 
the events of the past shape the debates of the present. This chapter examines the historical 
background of Georgia in general and its relations to South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia in 
particular. The purpose of this section is twofold: First, it sets out to establish a historical 
background of the conflict. Second, it will present prominent debates dealing with the 
geopolitical questions of the war, involving questions of autonomy, statehood and historical 
analogies. These debates are further reflected in the news coverage of August 2008.  
 
Literature review 
Before attempting to construct an historical background for the 2008 War, we must first 
address the sources this thesis builds upon. Important to note here is that the author is limited 
to studying sources written in English. This is significant, as it restricts the study to 
predominantly Western sources. Russian, South Ossetian, Abkhazian, Georgian and other 
non-English sources are only accessible through translated or internationally published 
documents. However, the aim of this study is to investigate the Norwegian media‟s 
representation of the conflict. As such, the absence of non-Western sources is permissible. 
One of the few English studies published from the Russian side is East View Press‟ 
„Countdown to War in Georgia, Russia‟s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia‟. South Ossetian and Abkhazian perspectives are reflected in a 
report released by the European Union. How this composition of source material affects the 
assessment of this crisis is difficult to evaluate. Regardless, it should be mentioned as some 
views may be absent from the analysis to follow.     
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History of the Caucasus 
Two works were employed throughout this thesis to assess the history of the nations in the 
Caucasus. Thomas De Waal‟s „The Caucasus: An Introduction‟ and Charles King‟s „The 
Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus‟ serve as suitable vantage points for any study 
concerning the Caucasian nations.
39
 These books will serve as reference works for the 
historical and geopolitical arrangements of the Caucasus region. De Waal‟s book is especially 
strong in regards to the Caucasus‟ transitional phase from Tsarist and Soviet rule to the 
modern era. Throughout this period, the peoples of the Caucasus have been subjected to 
administrative changes and geographical alternations. In this thesis, King‟s sections on 
Georgian independence from 1918 to 1921 and Soviet Georgia from 1922 to 1991 are of 
particular interest. The complex administrative network of Soviet Georgia with its 
autonomous entities is a decisive factor for the state of affairs in August 2008.    
 
Georgia’s ancient history 
During the 2008 War, one of the central debates concerned the viability of the Georgian state. 
This stimulated a discussion of the historical origins of the Georgian nation. As this thesis is a 
study of how history is represented in the media, it sets out to examine the genesis of Georgia 
as a nation. An integral part of this goal is to investigate what Georgia constitutes in terms of 
history. Valery Silogava and Kakha Shengelia‟s „History of Georgia‟ traces Georgian history 
back to the birth of the Georgian Kingdoms in the 7
th
 century B.C., bringing together 
historical debates from numerous scholars within its covers.
40
 This book will serve as a 
reference work for the historical background of the Georgia from the 7
th
 century B.C. to the 
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th
 Century A.D. Considering that the focal point of this thesis is the 2008 War, this section 
will be limited to a brief overview of predominate events.  
 
Georgia’s western aspirations 
Ronald D. Asmus‟ „A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the future of 
the West‟ presents a detailed account of the events leading up to the Russia-Georgian War. 41  
Over the course of his book Asmus presents personal recollections of events and 
developments leading up to the war. Asmus was personally present in Tbilisi on several 
occasions prior to the war. His work provides an in-depth look at the decision making 
processes, battles and actors involved in the 2008 War. His study raises important questions 
about the future relations between Russia and the West, such as Russia‟s future relations to 
NATO. He concludes that the outbreak of war was partly due to a gradually deteriorating 
relationship between NATO and Russia. The relationship was further exacerbated by the 
West‟s recognition of Kosovo in early 2008.    
 
For the purpose of this thesis, Asmus‟ work will be utilized as a historical framework. Asmus 
presents important arguments concerning the events leading into the war and the diplomatic 
efforts during the conflict. His book largely reflects the Georgian viewpoint, concluding that 
Russia was prepared to use armed forces to prevent Georgia from joining NATO. However, 
Asmus also points out that the act of aggression must be assigned to Georgia, through their 
shelling of Tskhinvali on 7 August. 
  
Georgia from independence to Rose Revolution 
Jonathan Wheatley‟s “Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution” explores the 
transformation of Georgia from a member of the U.S.S.R to modern democratic statehood.
 42
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In particular Wheatley discusses the success and failure of the Rose Revolution in 2003, and 
Georgia‟s establishment of democratic institutions. Along with it came aspirations towards 
integration with NATO and the EU. Many scholars argue that Saakashvili‟s presidency 
represents a breaking point in Georgian history, as the country dramatically shifts westwards, 
with closer ties, especially to the US.
43
 Wheatley points out that Saakashvili‟s part in 
Georgia‟s transition should not be underestimated. Furthermore he explores how nationalism 
and democracy was combined in the case of the Georgian state. His study tracks the 
development of the Georgian regime from independence in 1991 to the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution in 2004. He poses the question if the Rose Revolution marks a regime-change or if 
it represents a mere transition from Shevardnadze‟s presidency.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, Wheatley‟s study will be employed in analyzing the historical 
events leading up to the Rose Revolution. His book also sheds new light on important 
developments within Georgia, and its relations to its autonomous entities in Adjara, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Furthermore Wheatley presents important arguments as to why the 
Georgian state ultimately failed to bring about unity among its diversified population. These 
arguments are important when examining the origins of the frozen conflicts. Russia‟s part in 
destabilizing these regions played a significant role in the conflicts between Georgia and its 
autonomous entities. Wheatley concludes that Russian policy prevented Georgia from 
establishing the necessary stability to constitute a viable state.
44
 This was achieved by 
exploiting internal factors within Georgia and supporting the separatist regimes in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. 
 
The European Union - Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia (IIFFMCG) 
On 2 December 2008 the EU initiated an independent fact finding mission to investigate the 
events of the Russia-Georgian War. The crisis was subject to extensive information 
campaigns resulting in the release of diverging information from Russian and Georgian 
intelligence. This called to question the credibility of both sides and a desire to uncover the 
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truth of what occurred in August 2008. As a result the EU Council of Ministers deployed a 
fact-finding mission in Georgia with the aim to: 
 
Investigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia, including with 
regard to international law (footnote: including the Helsinki Final Act), humanitarian 
law and human rights, and the accusations made in that context (footnote: 
including allegations of war crimes).
45
 
 
The report of this mission was published in September 2009 and provides an excellent source 
for academics researching the Russia-Georgian War. Although the report is unable to draw a 
complete picture of the war, it does reveal flaws in contemporary reports. Specifically it 
reveals erroneous claims made by both Russia and Georgia during the war. These involve 
claims of genocide, military movements on the ground, war crimes and violation of human 
rights and international law. In addition the report includes an elaborate historical account of 
the origins of the conflict. These sections provide a thorough analysis of the shared history of 
Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Important debates concerning ethno-political 
questions are addressed throughout the report, dealing with the origins of the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian people, as well as political developments in the modern Georgian state. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis the IIFFMCG report will act as a reference work in which to 
validate the credibility of news articles as well as political statements by government official 
from the parties involved. The media portion of the thesis will be dealt with specifically in 
chapter five. The print-press coverage of the War includes statements from political leaders as 
well as military officials on the ground. Allegations of war crimes and violation of 
international law are here central themes. In addition the IIFFMCG report will be employed as 
a historical reference work throughout this chapter. 
 
The Guns of August 2008 – Russia’s War in Georgia 
This book, edited by Svante E. Cornell and Stephen Fredrick Starr, includes a collection of 
studies dealing with the Russia-Georgian War.
46
 The strength of this work is the presence of 
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various views and perspectives of the causes of the war, and how the conflict factors into the 
geopolitical climate in the Caucasus region. Paul A. Goble‟s article „Defining Victory and 
Defeat: The Information War Between Russia and Georgia‟, is particularly useful for this 
thesis. Here Goble addresses the deceitful nature of the war, and how both parties engaged in 
misinformation campaigns to garner support in the public sphere. In addition Thornike 
Gordadze‟s article discerning the Russian-Georgian relations in the 1990s is of interest, as it 
accounts for the primary causes for the exacerbating relationship between Moscow and 
Tbilisi. 
 
 The origins of the Georgian nation  
The rich history of Georgia is a product of its geographical position. Located in the South 
Caucasus the country has historically been at a crossroads between the world‟s major empires; 
between East and West, the Christian and the Muslim world and between Europe and Asia. Its 
borders have been redrawn by kings and conquerors since before the Roman Empire. Present 
day Georgia stretches from the Black Sea in the west and borders to Dagestan and Azerbaijan 
in the east. However at the height of its power the Georgian borders reached as far as the 
Caspian Sea.
47
 This section will examine the transition of Georgia from fragmented kingdoms 
to modern statehood.  Considering that the Russia-Georgian War is the focal point of this 
thesis, the section pertaining Georgia‟s ancient history will be brief.48  
 
The origins of Georgia‟s territorial configuration can be traced back to the 5th century. 
However, the earliest historical remnants trace human presence in the Caucasus back 800 000 
years.
49
 The territory of present day Georgia was once comprised of two large Georgian 
monarchies; namely the Egrisi and Kartli Kingdoms. Egrisi, located in the western parts of 
present day Georgia (including the territories of present day Abkhazia), emerged between the 
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7
th
 and 6
th
 century BC.
50
 Kartli, or Iberia as it was commonly referred to, emerged after the 
death of Alexander the Great around the 3
rd
 century BC. Georgian historians credit the 
enigmatic Farnavazi for the liberation and creation of the Kartli Kingdom.
51
 He is also known 
for establishing Mtskheta, the ancient capital of Georgia, located northwest of present day 
Tbilisi. Both Egrisi and Kartli were heathen kingdoms, worshiping pagan gods. 
 
At the beginning of the 3
rd
 century BC, the conquest of the Roman Empire had reached the 
borders of Egrisi and Kartli. In the year 65 B.C. the legendary Roman Commander Gneus 
Magnus Pompey initiated an invasion of Kartli and later Egrisi. Soon both kingdoms were 
subjugated as vassals of Rome.
52
 During the 3
rd
 century A.D. the kingdom of Kartli expanded 
its borders to the southwest reaching into present day Turkey and establishing a shoreline to 
the Black Sea.
53
 The Georgian kingdoms thrived as vassals of Rome. Feudalism developed 
over the course of the next century „facilitated by the development of production equipment, 
political strengthening of Georgia and its appearance on the international scene‟.54 
 
Much of Georgia‟s national identity has been credited to the establishment of the Georgian 
church. Christianity was officially instituted as the national religion of Karti in 337, following 
the religious conference in Nicaea in 325. Georgian historians hold the introduction of 
Christianity as paramount to the establishment of the Georgian nation, as it consolidated 
power in Kartli and facilitated processes of feudalism.
55
 In addition the Georgian church 
represented a much needed continuity throughout the nation‟s history, enduring centuries of 
subjugation under foreign power. 
 
By the end of the 3
rd
 century the Persian Empire began its invasion of the Caucasus, 
subjugating Armenia and the kingdom of Kartli by 370. The Roman Empire was at the time 
shifting its power eastward to Constantinople, mainly caused by the fall of Rome in the 4
th
 
century. As a result the Kingdom of Egrisi was transformed to a vassal of the emerging 
Byzantine Empire.
56
 In the beginning of the 5
th
 century the king of Georgia, Vakhtang 
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Gorgasali assumed control of Kartli. Vakhtang is a proud figure in Georgian history, credited 
for his military prowess against the Persian Empire and for the founding of Tbilisi. Vakhtang 
was ultimately defeated by the Persians, but he is remembered as a national hero by 
Georgians. A monument of Vakhtang can still be found in the heart of Tbilisi, 
commemorating his deeds for the Georgian nation. 
 
Over the course of the next centuries the Byzantine and Persian Empire grappled over the 
supremacy of the Caucasus, leading to numerous engagements between Egrisi and Kartli. At 
the turn of the 7
th
 century the Persian Empire was declining, and in its place a new power 
emerged; the Arabs. By 630 the Arab invasion of Trascaucasia began, leading to a rapid 
succession of well organized military campaigns.
57
 By the end of the 8
th
 century the Arabs 
had conquered the Byzantine Empire in Armenia, Kartli and parts of Egrisi, claiming taxation 
from its people and subduing its major cities, including Tbilisi.
58
 The Arabs assumed 
complete control in the power centers of Kartli, but faced opposition in the highlands from the 
local population. The Kingdom of Kartli was subjected to Muslim rule until the late 10
th
 
century.  
 
The unification of Georgia was a long and strenuous path which was strongly opposed by 
both the Byzantine Empire and the Arab state. In the late 10
th
 century the plan for a 
consolidation of the Georgian kingdoms was set into motion, initiated mainly by the Georgian 
king David Kuropalates.
59
 Over the course of the next century the kings of Georgia combined 
their monarchies under one banner. The 11
th
 century marked the beginning of the Golden Age 
of Georgia, initiated by its most diligent leader king David IV, or David the Builder. His 
conquest of Tbilisi in 1122 was a pivotal moment of Georgian unification, effectively 
liberating the city from over 400 years of Muslim occupation.
60
 In the following years the 
Kingdom of Georgia reached the pinnacle of its power in the Caucasus, its dominance 
reaching westwards into modern day Dagestan, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea littoral, as 
well as south and east into present day Turkey, Armenia and northern Iran.
61
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Picture 2: The Kingdom of Georgia at the height of its power (1184-1230), present day Georgia 
outlined in red.
62
 
The Golden Age continued throughout the 12
th
 and early 13
th
 century until the arrival of the 
Mongols. The Mongolian hordes were first encountered in the southern parts of the Kingdom 
of Georgia in 1225.
63
 Soon the Mongols established complete sovereignty over Georgia, and 
dominated the country for over a century. Following the Mongol era, the Kingdom of Georgia 
was put under tremendous strain from outside assailants, ultimately leading to its 
disintegration in the late 15
th
 century.
64
 This lead to the fragmentation of Georgia into three 
smaller kingdoms;  the Kingdom of Kartli,  covering the territories of central Georgia 
including present day South Ossetia and Tbilisi; the Kingdom of Kakheti covering eastern 
Georgia and the Kingdom of Emereti covering western Georgia including present day 
Abkhazia.
65
 The regions of Kartli and Kakheti in present day Georgia are the historical 
remnants of these ancient monarchies. 
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Between the 16
th
 and 18
th
 century the Kingdoms of Georgia were contested by the Persian and 
Ottoman Empire, resulting in an infringement of territories to the southwest, south, and 
southeast. The majority of these territories were claimed during two important events; first the 
southern territories of the Kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti were lost to the Shah-Abbas I in 
1605; and second, the Georgian territories to the southwest were subdued by the Ottomans in 
the peace treaty of 1639.
66
 By the time the Russian Empire crossed the Greater Caucasian 
Chain in the late 18
th
 century the Georgian Kingdoms were merely a shadow of their former 
glory. 
 
Georgia was incorporated in the Russian Empire in 1801, following an annexation by Tsar 
Paul I.
67
 In effect the Russian Empire abolished the Kingdoms of Kartli, Kakheti and Emereti, 
and transformed them into Russian colonies.
68
 It is interesting to examine the different 
narratives relating to the first Russian rule over Georgia. Russia regards the annexation of 
Georgia as a “humanitarian mission”, aiding its Christian neighbors against an Islamic 
threat.
69
 Many Georgians, on the other hand, focus on the negative outcomes of the Tsarist 
rule, with regards to the dissolution of the Georgian church, socioeconomic oppression of its 
people and a general “Russification” of its country.70 These issues lead to numerous uprisings 
in Georgia against the colonial power. One of the beneficiary outcomes of the Tsarist rule was 
the provision of border security against the Ottoman and Persian Empires.   
 
Establishment of the modern Georgian nation  
Historically speaking, the first Georgian nation was established in 1918.
71
 Although the first 
Georgian monarchies of Kartli and Egrisi can be regarded as the genesis of the Georgian 
nation, they failed to establish complete sovereignty within their borders. The first instance of 
a united Georgian Kingdom occurred in the 11
th
 century. The first Georgian state came into 
being in 1918. Although short lived, the first Georgian nation is remembered as an important 
period in Georgian history, as the country‟s first experience as a modern democratic state.72  
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The Russian Empire was brought to its knees during two revolutions in the early 20
th
 century; 
first, through the 1905 establishment of the first Russian parliament, the Duma; and second, 
through the 1917 revolution and the end of the Tsarist rule.
73
 At the time the two opposing 
factions of the revolutionary movement, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, contested over 
the control of the parliament. When the Bolsheviks ultimately assumed control in Petrograd, 
the Mensheviks withdrew to the Caucasus. The Mensheviks, comprised of many ethnic 
Georgians, declared the independence of Georgia the following year.   
 
In the years to come the Mensheviks drafted the constitution of Georgia which was finalized 
in 1921. Georgia‟s strive for independence, however, was not realized without complications. 
In the east, the former principality of Abkhazia declared its intent to secede from Georgia and 
establish a sovereign state of Abkhazia. In 1918 however, the two parties reached a settlement 
granting Abkhazia partial autonomy under the sovereignty of Georgia.
74
 In 1918 the 
government of Georgia experienced another set of uprisings along the Georgian Military 
Highway, a path leading north of present day Tbilisi into North Ossetia along the Aragvi 
Gorge.
75
 These uprisings were initiated by Bolshevik rebels opposing the newly established 
Georgian government. By the end of the year the Georgian government had successfully 
brought these instabilities to a close, unfortunately the Bolshevik uprising had only just 
begun. 
 
Soviet Georgia  
The Bolshevik annexation of the South Caucasus began in the early 1920s. Joseph Stalin 
addressed the economic and strategic importance of the Caucasus in the following manner: 
“The important meaning of the Caucasus […] is determined not only by the fact that it is a 
source of raw materials, fuel and food supplies but by its position between Europe and Asia 
and in particular between Russia and Turkey.”76 Indeed these prospects would play an 
important role throughout the Soviet Era and to some extent in the 21
st
 century. The 
Bolshevik incursion began in Azerbaijan, capturing Baku by early 1920, before reaching west 
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to Armenia and finally north to Georgia by the end of the year. By 1921 the Bolsheviks had 
seized power in Georgia and assumed complete control over the South Caucasus. In 1922 
Georgia was imbedded in a Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR).  
 
The interesting design of the TSFSR produced a complex administrative network in the South 
Caucasus. Autonomous entities were established within the larger entity of the TSFSR. 
Within, three Soviet Republics were founded; namely Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
77
 
These enjoyed the benefits of establishing their own government, parliaments and 
administrative structures.
78
 Within these Soviet Republics particular regions were granted 
autonomous status. In the case of Georgia, local autonomy was granted to Abkhazia and 
Adjara, as autonomous republics, and to South Ossetia within an autonomous district (or 
Russian „oblast‟). These entities were tied to the centralized Soviet Republic of Georgia. The 
granting of local autonomy to these entities was based mainly on economic and ethnic 
considerations.  
 
The Bolshevik consolidation of the South Caucasus has been source of scholarly debate due 
to the volatile climate it produced in the post-Soviet era. In terms of territorial division the 
Caucasus followed the blueprint of the Soviet system, based primarily on ethnic principles. 
These principles were built out of Stalin‟s understanding of nations. According to Stalin a 
nation distinguished itself “…from races, tribes, linguistic groups or people who simply 
inhabited the same territory.”79 A nation was something that had evolved over time and was 
relatively stable. Stalin believed that multiple ethnicities could reside within the same nation 
given appropriate measures of self-determination.
80
 By recognizing larger pools of ethnicities 
and granting autonomy to the region in which they resided, one could create modern classless 
nations. Translated to the Caucasus, this modern nation was the TSFSR, with its Soviet 
Republics. Ultimately all the different republics of the Soviet Union would fuse into a single 
Soviet people.
81
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It is also important to address the internal entities within Soviet Georgia, namely Abkhazia, 
Adjara and South Ossetia.
82
 The territorial borders of these areas were drawn on the basis of 
ethnicity, economy and border security. Abkhazia, located in the northwest, was granted the 
status of Socialist Soviet Republic in 1922 tied by a treatise to Georgia. 
83
 Its status was later 
abolished in 1931, reducing Abkhazia to an autonomous republic on the same level as Adjara. 
The territory was determined based on the borders of the Principality of Abkhazia, which was 
annexed by the Russian Empire in 1810.
84
  
 
The territorial boundaries of Abkhazia have been changed throughout Georgian history ever 
since the Kingdom of Egrisi emerged between the 7
th
 and 6
th
 century B.C. Its modern borders 
were defined by the establishment of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic (A.S.S.R).
85
 
Historically the Abkhaz consider the territory between the Greater Caucasian chain and the 
Black Sea to be their homeland. It reaches from the Psou River in the north-west and the 
Inguri River in the south-east. The A.S.S.R. was founded mainly on the basis of the ethnic 
origin of the Abkhaz people. Abkhazia had also been central to the Bolshevik incursion 
against the Mensheviks of Georgia. King (2008) points out that the A.S.S.R. “created a buffer 
along what had recently been a hotly contested territory”.86   
 
Adjara, located in the southwest, represented a peculiar case of border formation. The region, 
inhabiting a large Muslim population, was conquered by the Russian Empire from the 
Ottomans in 1878.
87
 The security of Adjara was a pressing concern for Turkey prior to the 
formation of TSFSR. An agreement between Soviet Russia and Turkey granted autonomous 
status to the region of Adjara located within the TSFSR, thus ensuring added security for its 
Muslim population.
88
  
 
South Ossetia, located in central-northern Georgia, was granted the status of autonomous 
oblast. This granted local autonomy to the region albeit not on the same level as an 
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autonomous republic. The borders of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast were drawn on 
the basis of ethnic contours, establishing a regional territory for the South Ossetian people. 
Similar to Adjara and Abkhazia, the governance of South Ossetia was tied to the centralized 
power in Tbilisi.   
 
1936 marked the dissolution of the TSFSR entity; its territories were divided among the 
Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In effect this transformed the three 
into independent Soviet Republics, i.e. the largest constituent units of the Soviet Union. 
Although the TSFSR was absolved, the autonomous entities within Georgia endured. It is 
important to address the problematic transformation of Georgia to the post-Soviet era. The 
administrative structure of the Soviet state was fundamentally different from the dynamics of 
a modern state. Within Soviet Georgia the autonomous entities within Georgia were tied to 
the larger entities of the Soviet Republics. These were constituents of the larger Soviet Union. 
Thus the administration of these sub-entities was tied to the Soviet umbrella. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, this administrative network was dismissed. In its place the 
former Soviet Republics were faced with the challenge of forming new states and with it a 
new governance. When the Soviet administration ceased to exist, it resulted in an abundance 
of administrative issues in the Caucasus, especially within the autonomous entities. This was 
the legacy of the TSFSR.   
 
The transformation of Georgia to a modern state suffered from issues of governance.  With 
the Soviet umbrella absolved, the fate of the autonomous entities within Georgia had to be 
decided. During the Soviet era these entities had enjoyed partial autonomy. Facing the 
challenges of forging a new Georgian nation, the autonomous status of these regions became a 
pressing concern. Questions of autonomy soon evolved into questions of unity within the 
modern state of Georgia. The coming rulers of the country sought different paths to address 
the Georgian national identity problem, often involving the use of military power. King 
(2008) points out that the “politics of disintegration produced violence in these areas, not the 
other way around”.89  
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Georgian independence  
The Soviet rule in Georgia came to an abrupt end on 9 April 1991, two years to the date after 
Soviet forces brutally shut down a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi. The event, resulting in 
19 deaths and hundreds of wounded, is regarded by many Georgians as a painful memory of 
Soviet oppression, which in turn fuelled Georgian national awakening.
90
 Building on this 
sentiment, Zviad Gamsakhurdia succeeded in gaining the support of the Georgian people in 
the 1991 election. During the first years of independence, ethnopolitical challenges came to 
the forefront. Gamsakhurdia envisioned a reunited Georgia, restored to its former pre-Soviet 
glory. To achieve this goal he set out to secure Georgia‟s national integrity. Gamsakhurdia‟s 
nationalist campaign, coined “Georgia for the Georgians” was a central part of this vision.91 
Although the campaign was designed to bring about the modern Georgian state, the sentiment 
ignored that Georgia as a nation never had been mono-ethnic. As former American journalist 
Thomas Goltz points out; “Georgia had never been a unitary or mono-ethnic state. (…) A full 
thirty percent of the population in Georgia, in fact, regarded themselves as less than full 
members of that state”.92  
 
Gamsakhurdia‟s campaign furthermore stripped several minorities of the self-determination 
advantages they had enjoyed under Soviet rule. These involved perks such as university 
placement and job quotas.
93
 These issues were central to the dismay and hostility articulated 
within the various regions of Georgia in the early nineties, especially in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Gahrton (2010) supports this argument by pointing out that the Abkhaz, despite being 
the minority in Abkhazia, assumed a significant number of administrative roles and high 
office seats in the late 20
th
 century.
94
 The Georgian claim for reintegrating Abkhazia was 
destined to involve a reorganization of these appointments.  Furthermore the Gamsakhurdia 
Campaign left several minorities feeling alienated from the Georgian state. Asmus (2010) 
argues that the campaign ultimately achieved the contrary of its intention, by driving a wedge 
between Georgians and its regional minorities.
95
 His argument is further supported by Nielsen 
(2009), who concludes in his study that Gamsakhurdia permanently damaged the relationship 
between the Georgian state and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian minorities. Ethnicity certainly 
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factored into the hostilities between Georgia and its autonomous entities. King (2008) opposes 
this view however, by arguing that the disputes over Georgia‟s autonomous entities were 
fundamentally based on the control over territory rather than about deep ethnic grievances or 
historical debates of origin. Had the borders of Soviet Russia been drawn differently, many of 
these conflicts may never have materialized. These borders formations came to play a crucial 
role under Gamsakhurdia, leading to violent encounters in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in the early nineties. 
 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the question of autonomy 
In their coverage of the 2008 War the international news media often addressed Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as two sides of the same coin. However the historical review shows that there is 
a distinction between the regions in terms of history, geography and populace.
96
 This section 
will address each region in turn and consider the key issues and debates in relation to Georgia. 
Gamsakhurdia‟s unsuccessful military encounters in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had 
dramatic effects on the relationship between Georgia and its autonomous entities. Its legacy 
played a pivotal role in the 2008 War. 
 
The South Ossetian War (1991-1992) 
South Ossetia is a region located in central northern Georgia, just northwest of the capital 
Tbilisi. The region borders to Russia and the region of North Ossetia in the north (which is in 
Russia). Economically South Ossetia is not as prosperous as its neighbor to the north, with its 
main source of income deriving from agriculture. In 1989 the region was home to about 
100 000 people, out of which 70% were ethnic South Ossetians.
97
 In terms of ethnicity the 
Ossetians are not native Georgians, but descendants of Persian origins tracing back a thousand 
years.
98
 Specifically, the Ossetians are descendent from a nation comprising of an ancient 
people called the Alans.
99
 Georgian historians claim that the Ossetians homeland is north of 
the Great Caucasian Chain, and that they migrated south at the beginning of the 18
th
 
century.
100
 In spite of this, Gamsakhurdia referred to the South Ossetians as “ungrateful guests 
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of Georgia”.101 Sammut (1996) argues that Gamsakhurdia‟s nationalist agenda at times came 
at the expense several minority groups.
102
 This agenda was all too clear in the Georgian 
language program launched in 1989, authorizing Georgian as the official language of conduct 
in all public spheres of society.
103
 Cornell (2002) supports this view and points out that the 
program was detrimental to people inhabiting regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
where the predominant languages were Abkhaz and Ossetian.
104
 These languages are not 
mutually understandable with Georgian.  
 
The South Ossetian Crisis span out in 1991 as the South Ossetians declared their unification 
with North Ossetia, and in turn with the Russian Federation.
105
 A series of rallies were held in 
Tskhinvali, assembled by the separatist movement Ademon Nykhas. These rallies were 
designed to garner support against the Georgian nationalist movement. The conflict heated up 
as several thousand Georgian troops entered the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on 
January 5th.
106
 A counter offensive was soon initiated as South Ossetian troops, with North 
Ossetian and Russian support, came into the fray. Georgian troops were soon forced to 
withdraw to the hills surrounding Tskhinvali. In June the following year, Boris Yeltsin and 
Eduard Shevardnadze signed a ceasefire agreement that effectively halted the conflict on the 
ground. The agreement stated that the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast should be divided 
equally between Georgian and Ossetian forces.
107
 As mentioned earlier the autonomous oblast 
was a territorial remnant from Soviet times. Formulated in the ceasefire agreement, the peace 
was to be secured by a joint peacekeeping force with Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian and 
North Ossetian troops.  
 
By the end of the year the Organization of Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) 
engaged in a monitoring role of the peacekeeping force. The OSCE operation has later been 
criticized to be overly passive in its monitoring of the Russian led peacekeeping operation in 
South Ossetia. In particular, the peacekeeping operation has been criticized for administrative 
deficiencies. The foundation of any peacekeeping operation is that all parties are present 
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during meetings and negotiations. Matsabaridze (2012) points out that Russia, South Ossetia 
and North Ossetia assembled numerous times concerning the peacekeeping operation, without 
consulting Georgia.
108
 As a result important information bypassed Georgia all together. These 
shortcomings came to play an important role in 2008.  
 
The Abkhaz War (1992-1994) 
Abkhazia is located in Western Georgia, bordering to the Black Sea in the west and Russia in 
the north. During Soviet times the Abkhaz region enjoyed partial autonomy, with Abkhaz 
elites retaining benefits of self-determination. The Abkhaz themselves were a minority in the 
region, amounting for about twenty percent of the population, whilst Georgians made up 
about fifty percent. The predominant language in Abkhazia was Georgian, due to the large 
concentration of Georgians inhabiting the region. The Abkhaz on the other hand speak 
Abkhaz. As Georgian and Abkhaz are not mutually understandable, the cultural difference 
was (and still is) significant. According to Cornell (2009) the Gamsakhurdia language 
program, which introduced Georgian as the official language of communication, had dramatic 
consequences for the average Abkhaz.
109
  
 
In contrast to the South Ossetians, the Abkhaz people were regarded as native to their region. 
As such, many Abkhaz regarded self-determination as not only a privilege, but a legal right. 
With Georgia striving for independence following the breakup of the U.S.S.R., the Abkhaz 
feared the marginalization of their power within the region. Ghamsakhurdia‟s aspiration to 
restore Georgian to its pre-Soviet glory was destined to involve Abkhazia, as it was an 
integral part of their national territory. However, Gamsakhurdia never questioned the 
autonomous status of Abkhazia; instead he advocated an agreement granting 70 % of the seats 
in the Abkhaz parliament to Georgian elites.
110
 In effect Tbilisi would assume control over the 
region. According to Cornell (2002), these issues soon evolved into an ethnopolitical conflict, 
with a minority; the Abkhaz, opposing a vast majority; the Georgians.
111
  The desire to break 
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free of their Georgian bonds and declare independence was promoted by the separatist 
movement, spearheaded by Abkhaz elites serving in high offices of the local government.
112
  
 
In the summer of 1992, Abkhazia was suddenly and abruptly attacked by Georgia in an 
attempt to reclaim the region under Georgian sovereignty. The attack was a response to 
Abkhazia declaring independence from Georgia. In a swift move Georgian forces occupied 
the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi.
113
 Georgian victory was however short lived, as Russian and 
North Caucasian forces came to assist the Abkhaz in their peril. Outnumbered, the Georgian 
forces were forced to retreat. The Abkhaz War came to a close when then Chairman of the 
Georgian state Eduard Shevardnadze brokered a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia in late 
1993.
114
 The agreement, mediated by the Russian Federation, established a peacekeeping 
force monitoring the borders between Georgia and Abkhazia.  In exchange Georgia joined the 
Russian led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
115
 As a result Georgian forces 
retreated out of Abkhazia. The withdrawal was followed by the expulsion of about 230 000 
ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, reducing the pre-war population in Abkhazia from 500 000 
to 200 000 after the war.
116
 The ceasefire agreement also established a security zone outside 
of Abkhazia extending twelve kilometers into both Abkhazia and Georgia proper.
117
 By the 
end of the war over ten thousand people had lost their lives.
118
  
 
Frozen conflicts 
In the aftermath of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian War, scholars have scrutinized the primary 
causes for the conflicts. Cornell (2002) points out that the divergence between the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians on one hand and Georgians on the other has its roots from the Soviet Era, if 
not earlier. The Abkhaz sided with the Bolsheviks in the revolution of 1921, and enjoyed 
partial autonomy under Soviet rule within its Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.
119
 Georgian 
historians claim the South Ossetians have their roots in North Ossetia, in present day 
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Russia.
120
 Ossetian historians on the other hand, regard the Ossetian homeland to be both 
south and north of the Great Caucasian chain.
121
 This can also explain why the Ossetians were 
involved in several uprisings during the Bolshevik Revolutions, as they opposed a territorial 
division of Osssetia set by the modern Georgian state.
122
 According to Cornell both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia established strong ties to Russia under the Soviet rule:  
 
Whereas the Abkhazian nobility had still been somewhat linked to Georgia 
before the revolution, the new, Communist leadership was linked to Moscow and not to 
Georgia. In South Ossetia, which hadn‟t had any nobility of its own, the Communist elite 
was, just like in Abkhazia, oriented mainly toward Moscow. This was natural, given the 
historical link between Ossetia and Russia.
123 
 
Both regions had thus established strong ties to Russia. However it can be discussed to what 
extent the South Ossetian War was driven out of an ethnopolitical dispute. Matsaberidze 
(2012) points out that the ethnic conflict between South Ossetians and Georgians was an 
artificial construct.
124
  During the South Ossetian conflict many South Ossetians emigrated 
from Georgia, but at the same time equal numbers changed their surnames and became full-
fledged Georgians.
125
 In addition cross marriages between South Ossetians and Georgians 
were not uncommon. Thus the conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia can be regarded 
as a governmental dispute between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. King (2008) supports this 
argument claiming that the ethnic dimension emerged in the aftermath, as opposed to the 
prelude to the wars.
126
 All of this points to the complex nature of the conflicts in the early 
nineties.  
  
In the late nineties both Abkhazia and South Ossetia became a breeding ground for criminal 
activities, such as racketeering, extortion, drug trafficking and corruption. Despite the 
establishment of peacekeeping missions conducted by the UN (in Abkhazia) and the OSCE 
(in South Ossetia) the regions had yet to stabilize.
127
 The lack of success of these 
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peacekeeping missions has been considered by many to be related to Russian influence in the 
regions. A central aspect of any peacekeeping operation is that the peacekeeping force must 
remain neutral to the conflict at hand. As Asmus (2010) points out, the peacekeeping 
operations in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were dominated by Russian forces, itself a 
party of both conflicts.
128
 This fundamental flaw would play a crucial role in the Russia-
Georgian War 16 years later. Gordadze (2009) argues that Moscow had a hand in the 
instabilities of these regions ever since the Georgian independence. This was achieved 
through active support of the separatist regimes.
129
 The peacekeeping missions by the UN and 
OSCE paradoxically allowed the Russian peacekeeping forces to maintain the instability in 
these regions.  
 
Both peacekeeping missions were largely governed by Russia, with predominantly Russian 
troops constituting the peacekeeping force on the ground. The UN and OSCE operations in 
many ways funded continued Russian military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
According to Gordadze (2009), these operations might otherwise be too costly for Russia to 
sustain on their own.
130
 Gahrton (2010) opposes this view of the Russian peacekeeping force. 
Furthermore he claims that it is overly simplistic to claim that the Russian peacekeeping force 
was subject to the will of a handful of Russian political elites. In support of this argument 
Gahrton notes that the Russian Federation in fact upheld its CIS sanctions against Abkhazia 
up until 2008.
131
 Nevertheless the instability of these regions effectively weakened the 
Georgian state, and in turn crippled Georgia from joining the EU or NATO. The debates 
concerning the viability of the peacekeeping operations were critical at the outset of the 2008 
War.  
 
Shevardnadze and Russian-Georgian relations 
Shevardnadze was appointed president of Georgia in 1995. During his presidency 
Shevardnadze succeeded in establishing closer relations with the West. In turn this caused 
Europe to reconsider the future benefits of the Caucasus region in respect to Euro-Atlantic 
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Alliance. The South-Caucasus could potentially serve as a bridge between Europe and Central 
Asia in terms of energy transportation.
132
 With this in mind the future of Georgia as a 
potential energy partner soon became a priority for the West.
133
 A project named the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) was set in motion in the early nineties to provide energy 
transportation from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Tbilisi.
134
 The pipeline would transport large 
quantities of crude oil from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Europe, effectively 
circumventing both Russia and Iran. The BTC partners include Azerbaijan, Norway, Great 
Britain, Georgia, Turkey and the US.
135
 In addition a BP led project of constructing the South 
Caucasian Pipeline (SCP) was finished in 2006, transporting Gas from Azerbaijan through a 
similar route.
136
 
 
It is important to note the political significance of these developments. Russia is a major crude 
oil and gas supplier to Europe and is thus reliant on its economic yields. As such it is 
understandable why Moscow opposed the construction of both pipelines. With the future 
energy needs of Europe steadily increasing, its reliance on Russian energy supplies would 
increase accordingly. However, the construction of these pipelines provided Europe with 
more legroom in its supply chain. With Europe less reliant on Russian markets, Moscow 
could potentially have less leverage on the political scene. The trade relationship goes both 
ways, however, as Berdikeeva (2008) points out: “Russia is as much dependent on the 
European Markets as the EU is dependent on Russian Energy”.137 Although the establishment 
of alternative routes of energy has been established, Berdikeeva concludes that Russia is 
likely to remain the key supplier of crude oil and gas to Europe in the foreseeable future.
138
 
The quarrel over energy can explain the geopolitical significance of Georgia for the West, and 
why its future security was an increasing concern for the Atlantic Alliance. Although the 
economic aspect surely was a contributing element in the 2008 War, it should not be regarded 
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as the most decisive factor. Gahrton (2010), argues that the economic aspect was but one of 
many causes of the war.
139
  
 
In 1994 Shevardnadze signed a treaty of friendship with the Russian Federation.
140
 According 
to the treaty Russia would help to secure Georgia‟s borders and assist in the training of the 
Georgian military. As part of the agreement four Russian military bases were established on 
Georgian soil; “in Batumi (Adjara), in Gudauta (Abkhazia), in Akhalkalaki (region of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti), and in Vaziani (near Tbilisi)”.141 Over the course of his presidency 
Shevardnadze relied heavily on Russian support to resolve regional security issues within 
Georgia. Shevardnadze has later been criticized for leaving the fate of Georgian national 
security in the hands of Moscow, thus impeding Georgia‟s desire to establish de facto 
sovereignty within its borders.   
 
In theory the Russian presence had the potential to stabilize Georgia; in practice the Russian 
support was not as beneficial as many would think. Continued instability in the country 
loomed as separatist forces, in regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thwarted Georgia 
from stabilizing. Gordadze (2009) argues that these separatist forces were not only supported 
by the Russian government, but actively funded by armaments, supplies, and military forces 
emanating from Moscow.
142
 Reoccurring hostilities during the early nineties involved ethnic 
cleansing and mass killings in Abkhazia during the Abkhaz War in 1992-94. In addition 
separatist regimes gained foothold in both South Ossetia and Adjara. Despite the large 
military presence of Russian troops within Georgia, little was done to prevent these 
insurgencies. Gordadze claims that on the contrary, as part of a post-Cold War policy in the 
post-Soviet space, Moscow actively promoted policies that would destabilize or weaken these 
newly formed states.
143
 
 
With a weakened state, these former provinces would be dependent on Russian aid to settle its 
domestic security disputes. Thus, Georgian ties to Russia would be secured in the future. In 
addition, Moscow could control its former provinces without interference by the international 
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community, in a region where the West had no particular interest. The focus of the West, 
however, was about to shift to the Caucasus. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the U.S. was 
heavily engaged in combating what was later known as Global Terrorism. Russia, too, was 
threatened from within its borders in the Second Chechen war in 1999. With an increasing 
concern about Islamic fundamentalism and the War on Terrorism, Russia engaged in 
combating terrorism in Chechnya along the same lines as the U.S. operation in Afghanistan.  
 
In its response to the hostilities in Chechnya, Russia requested access to Georgian airfields 
along the Chechen border, much as it had in the First Chechen War.
144
 The Georgian 
collaboration was however declining, as the Russian military presence on its soil had reaped 
few benefits over the years. After Georgia refused to grant Russia access, Moscow responded 
with claims of Georgian affiliation with Chechen terrorists. In short, Moscow accused 
Georgia of not only supporting the Chechen offensive, but facilitating terrorist activities by 
allowing transportation of Islamic fundamentalists through its territory in the Pankisi 
Gorge.
145
  
 
The call to question Georgia‟s role in the conflict eventually reached the international scene. 
With rising concerns of alleged terrorist activities in Georgia, it was up to the international 
community to respond.  Shevardnadze turned a public disaster into success by inviting the 
U.S. to alleviate Georgia‟s security issues.146 In 2002 the U.S. established a training program 
for Counter-Terrorist Security within Georgia.
147
 The program, known as the Georgian Train 
and Equip Program (GTEP), involved deployment of qualified U.S. military personnel on 
Georgian soil, instructing Georgian troops how to handle terrorist threats domestically and 
internationally.
148
 Although Russia resented the notion, it could not protest publicly as a result 
of its former claims. Paradoxically, Russia‟s allegations against Georgia resulted in a 
substantial American military presence in close proximity to its own borders. 
 
With the U.S. physically present on the ground in Georgia, its relations to the West was 
gaining ground. U.S. foreign aid increased over the course of 2002, and by the end of the year 
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American aid constituted more than two-thirds of Georgia‟s military budget.149 According to 
Gordadze, Moscow perceived this development as a sign of Shevardnadze becoming 
increasingly pro-American and that he now constituted an arch-enemy to Russia.
150
 
Shevardnadze‟s reign was however reaching its end. 
 
The Rose Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili  
Although Georgia‟s Western aspirations can be traced back to Shevardnadze, the Rose 
Revolution is renowned for making the most dramatic change. By the time the roses had 
blossomed in Tbilisi‟s Freedom Square, the belief in democratization in the Caucasus gained 
strength. The peaceful revolution had achieved what was regarded by many to be impossible 
in the Caucasus; to topple an unwanted leader by the use of peaceful democratic processes. It 
also landed a significant blow to the Russian ideology concerning liberal democracies. In 
accordance with Kremlin ideologists such as Vladislav Surkov and Gleb Pavlovsky, any 
establishment of liberal democracies outside the “Euro-Atlantic” zone could never develop 
naturally. As such, if liberal democracies were to develop in areas, such as the South 
Caucasus, it had to be enforced as part of a Western ploy.
151
  
 
Accordingly, Gordadze (2009) suggests that it is not surprising that Moscow, in the aftermath 
of the revolution, claimed that the Rose Revolution was a movement funded and supported by 
Western NGOs inside Georgia. The Kremlin ideology also explains why Moscow regarded it 
as such a travesty should the Rose Revolution come to fruition.
152
 Its last ditch effort to 
embrace the once resented Eduard Shevardnadze and Adjaran leader Aslan Abashidze against 
the National Movement in the 2003 election attests to Moscow‟s desperation. The Russian 
efforts were unfortunately in vain, as the desire for regime change swept across the country.  
 
Shevardnadze‟s presidency had been successful in terms of international relations. Internally 
however Georgia faced issues in terms of the economy, national security and corruption.
153
 
By the end of 2002 the Georgian people were ready for a regime change, after enduring two 
presidencies of former communist leaders. During the 2003 elections large scale protests took 
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place, spearheaded by the leader of the National Movement, Mikheil Saakashvili. Among the 
most famous of these protests was the rally in Tbilisi‟s Freedom Square in November 2003, 
where a crowd of fifty to a hundred thousand protesters assembled. Saakashvili addressed the 
crowd demanding Shevardnadze‟s resignation. The next day Shevardnadze announced he 
would voluntarily leave office.
154
 The revolution was a success, placing the previously 
insignificant nation of Georgia on the political maps of the West. An abundance of media 
coverage followed the events, turning the eyes of the world to Tbilisi. Saakashvili‟s role in the 
Rose Revolution should not be underestimated. Wheatley (2005) accounts Saakashvili as the 
single most decisive factor in the Rose Revolution. He argues that although other prominent 
politicians, such as Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, contributed greatly to the revolution, 
it was the determination of Saakashvili that eventually won the day.
155
 Saakashvili‟s 
insistence on Shevardnadze leaving office was imperative in this regard.
156
  
 
Georgia’s western aspirations 
Over the course of Saakashvili‟s first term in office, the nation gradually turned to the West 
for future political advices. Saakashvili, in many regards, provided the country with a political 
figure the West could relate to. He was a charismatic leader, fluent in both English and 
French, and had studied law at the University of Columbia. Washington, above all else, was 
largely in favor of integrating Georgia within NATO and eventually, the EU. The Bush 
Administration had deep diplomatic relations with Georgia, and George W. Bush was 
considered by many to be a personal friend of Saakashvili. The Georgian President desired to 
use his Western connections to close the distance between Georgia and Europe, and 
eventually become an integral part of NATO and the EU. In order to do so however, he 
needed to convince Europe that Georgia was a viable asset to its coalitions.  
 
The main concern from Europe‟s point of view was the viability of the Georgian state and its 
democracy. Although progress was made during the Rose Revolution, Georgia had yet to 
establish de facto sovereignty within its borders. Georgia‟s autonomous entities in Adjara, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were a critical factor in this regard. The autonomous region of 
Adjara was however transitioned back to Georgian sovereignty in the 2004 Adjara Crisis. 
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Saakashvili had succeeded in returning the province by non-violent means. The resolve, 
famously coined the Second Bloodless Revolution, was a decisive victory for Saakashvili. He 
had proven once again that he was willing and able to change the status quo of his country 
without resorting to violence. His efforts did not go unnoticed, as the international community 
recognized the country‟s use of non-violent democratic processes to bring about much needed 
change. Paris and Munich, on the other hand were not yet convinced. The main concern from 
both fronts was Georgia‟s inability to resolve the frozen conflicts in the breakaway regions of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
157
 These age old conflicts had been a thorn in Georgia‟s side 
ever since independence. Georgia had to settle the problems within its own borders before 
reaching out for Western integration.  
 
The August 2008 War 
On August 7
th
 2008, war broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia. Following months of 
political tension Georgian forces initiated a bombardment of the town of Tskhinvali in South 
Ossetia. According to Georgia, it responded to South Ossetian separatist forces‟ shelling of 
Georgian villages days earlier. During the assault on Tskhinvali, Russian peacekeeping forces 
were attacked, upon which they returned fire. On Friday morning, August 8
th
, Georgian forces 
had assumed complete control of Tskhinvali and the surrounding hills. Tbilisi stated that the 
government of Georgia was reinstating constitutional order in the Tskhinvali region. On 
August 8, the Russian 58
th
 army, at the time undertaking military exercises in North Ossetia, 
entered South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel, a passageway connecting North Ossetia to 
South Ossetia through the Caucasus Mountains. Russian authorities claimed it had received 
reports of genocide against South Ossetian civilians, and was engaging on the basis of 
humanitarian intervention. Over the course of August 8, Russian forces had Georgian 
positions in Tskhinvali under siege. Severely outnumbered, the Georgian forces retreated to 
the town of Gori outside the territory of South Ossetia. During the next day Georgian forces 
reported on extensive bombardment campaigns by the Russian Federation against Georgian 
towns and villages. By August 9
th
 the town of Gori had been reduced to ruins and occupied by 
Russian forces. In the days to follow a two-prone attack was initiated by the Russian 
Federation into Georgian territory; from the west, Abkhaz and Russian military forces crossed 
the Inguri River into Georgia proper; from the north, the Russian 58
th
 army launched a full-
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scale attack deep into Georgian territory, occupying towns and villages only an hour away 
from Tbilisi, and initiating aerial attacks onto the capital itself. On August 12
th
 the fighting 
came to a halt, as Russia and Georgia signed a ceasefire agreement initiated by French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy. Although short in length, the Russia-Georgian War caused a 
substantial loss of human lives. When the smoke had settled the war had claimed over 850 
lives, not to mention the over 100 000 internally displaced persons.
158
 To this day many of 
these IDPs have not been able to return to their homes.  
 
Conflicting narratives 
In the aftermath of the war, the parties involved promoted different narratives as to why the 
conflict materialized in August 2008. As an integral part of the IIFFMCG, the governments of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia were requested to submit their version of the 
story. Reflected in the IIFMCG report, each side promoted diverging arguments concerning 
the origins of the conflict.   
 
The government of South Ossetia proclaims that the Republic of South Ossetia seceded from 
Georgia during the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thus forming a sovereign and 
independent state.
159
 In their view, Gamsakhurdia‟s campaign became the foundation for 
Georgia‟s future policies against its autonomous entities. These policies ruled out any 
possibility of South Ossetia integrating with Georgia. In addition the South Ossetian 
Government regards the U.S.-Georgian military operation, „Immediate Response‟, to be the 
final iteration of a planned military operation against South Ossetia.
160
 These allegations are 
in sharp contrast with the conclusions of the IIFFMCG report, which describe „Immediate 
Response‟ as “a regular exercise (…) with no hostile intent”.161  
 
In contrast to the South Ossetian narrative, the Government of Georgia proclaims that South 
Ossetia was an integral part of Georgian sovereignty after the Soviet dissolution. Georgia 
regards the Russian invasion as the final step of a long planned stratagem to subdue the 
Georgian state. These allegations are directed against Russia‟s policies vis-à-vis South Ossetia 
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and Abkhazia since the early nineties. According to Georgia, Russia had abused its role as 
peacekeeper; initiated a long term ethnic cleansing of native Georgians from South Ossetia; 
and “manufactured” Russian citizens to protect in South Ossetia through its illegal 
distribution of Russian passports.
162
 With regards to the „passportification‟ plead, the 
IIFFMCG states that the printing and distribution of passports in South Ossetia and the 
subsequent “protection of Russian citizens” claim was in fact preplanned by Moscow.163 
 
The Russian Federation regards the „South Ossetian-Georgian‟ conflict as the product of an 
unprovoked Georgian attack against the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian 
peacekeepers.
164
 In its military response, the Russian Federation invoked the rights of self-
defense as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
165
 According to Russia, Georgia‟s 
“criminal attempt” to conquer South Ossetia by military means cannot be justified under any 
circumstances. The extensive Russian military response was directed strictly for self-
defensive purposes, in the protection of “Russian peacekeepers and other Russian 
nationals.”166 Russia concludes that by attacking South Ossetia, the Saakashvili 
Administration has diminished any chance of restoring Georgia‟s territorial integrity.  
 
Above all else, these narratives reflect the disagreement between the parties of the 2008 War. 
Moreover, these narratives are influenced by the critique and debates which surfaced in the 
aftermath of the 2008 War. The South Ossetian Autonomy and the administrative structure of 
post-Soviet Georgia has been a source of extensive academic debate. These debates are also 
mirrored in the South Ossetian narrative, which proclaims South Ossetia as a sovereign and 
independence state at the time of the Georgian incursion. With regards to the Georgian 
narrative, Russia is held responsible for both the attack in 2008 and the destabilization of the 
Georgian state throughout the nineties. These allegations are directed towards a villainous and 
treacherous Russia, intended to undermine the Georgian nation. Entirely absent from the 
Georgian narrative is the initial shelling of Tskhinvali on August 7. This is interesting as there 
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was a consensus among scholars to assign the first act of aggression to Georgia.
167
 Lastly, the 
Russian narrative focuses on the legal basis of the Russian military engagement into Georgia. 
It highlights the justification of Russia‟s use of force in terms of international law. During the 
2008 War, the Russian attack was subject to widespread condemnations from the international 
community. In response, the Russian narrative accentuates the legal ground for Russia‟s 
counter attack. 
 
Georgia, NATO and the Kosovo Precedent 
In many ways the August 2008 War served as the catalyst for an ongoing international 
security crisis, years in the making. On the ground level the 2008 war was fought between 
Georgia on one side, and the Russian Federation and the separatist forces of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia on the other. In the grand game of international relations however, it was also a 
war concerning the security arrangements of post-Cold War Europe. Scholars such as Asmus 
(2010), Blank (2009) and Gahrton (2010) argue that Georgia served as a pawn in a much 
larger game of international politics.
168
 It is important to focus on these issues as they are the 
grounds on which both Georgia and Russia engaged in the information wars during August 
2008.
169
 Each side had its own incentive and goal going into the conflict. This section assesses 
the debates concerning NATO expansion in the post-Cold War era and how this relates to the 
Russia-Georgian War. The purpose of this section is to focus on key developments in NATO-
Russia relations, and to provide an international context for the conflict. 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, NATO 
suffered from an identity crisis; with its main adversary defeated the coalition had arguably 
achieved its goal of a secure Europe. However, the expansion throughout the 1990s extended 
the function of the organization from its former defensive posture.
170
 With several former 
members of the USSR joining NATO, many in Moscow perceived the expansion as anti-
Russian in essence. The expansion is generally divided into different phases; the first wave, 
taking place in the late nineties, invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the 
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coalition; the second, included the Baltic States; Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia as well as 
Bulgaria, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia and finally the third wave, with the inclusion of 
Albania and Croatia in 2009.
171
 The expansion of NATO confirmed the fears of many in 
Moscow; this was a modern version of the containment policy conducted throughout the Cold 
War. With NATO assembling along its borders Russia felt threatened. Its influence in central 
and eastern Europe was declining.  
 
In relation to the Russia-Georgian War the Kosovo Crisis became a significant event. The 
1999 NATO operation in Kosovo had detrimental effects on NATO-Russian relations. A 
decade later the scars of Kosovo would play a decisive role in Russia‟s intervention in 
Georgia. In order to comprehend the importance of Kosovo, one must consider the historical 
relationship between Serbia and Russia. Serbia, along with its neighboring countries of the 
former republic of Yugoslavia, is home to a substantial Slavic population.
172
 Kosovo was 
subjugated by Serbia following a decisive victory over the Ottoman Empire in the First 
Balkan War in 1914.
173
 Soon to follow the Kingdom of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia formed 
Yugoslavia in 1918, later known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Nielsen (2009) notes that in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, Kosovo was subjugated under Serbian rule and 
enjoyed limited autonomy until 1974.
174
 In 1974 a constitution expanded the rights of many 
districts of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. By 1989, the newly elected leader of the Serbian 
League of Communists Slobodan Milosevic, revoked these rights and stripped the autonomy 
of Kosovo. The resolve produced a repressive political climate within Serbia, eventually 
resulting in the creation of separatist groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
175
 
Mounting hostilities followed in the mid nineties between Serbian forces and Kosovo 
Albanians.  
 
After failing to reach an agreement between the parties the conflict soon escalated. Kosovo 
Albanian claims of genocide carried out by the Serbian army called for an international 
response to the crisis. With the UN Security Council unable to reach a consensus for a 
military intervention, NATO decided to act unilaterally to halt the alleged genocide of 
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Kosovo Albanians. The operation, legitimized by NATO as a „humanitarian intervention‟, 
involved an aerial bombardment campaign lasting 74 days, claiming the lives of many ethnic 
Serbs.
176
  
 
The bypassing of the UN Security Council effectively negated any possibility of a Russian 
veto of the operation. Asmus (2010) argues that the decision to intervene unilaterally in 
Kosovo without the participation of Russia was perceived in Moscow as a sign of “American 
expansionism under the guise of a new doctrine of humanitarian interventionism”.177 Indeed, 
the term „humanitarian intervention‟, came to play a crucial role in future NATO operations in 
Afghanistan in 2001 and later in Iraq in 2003. The legitimacy of the Kosovo operation has 
been source to extensive critique over the years, and is considered by many to be illegitimate 
in essence.
178
 It came as no surprise then that Russia relied so heavily on the Kosovo analogy, 
in justifying its own „humanitarian intervention‟ in Georgia in 2008. By referencing the 
intervention in Kosovo, Russia claimed that its intervention in South Ossetia was a necessity 
in the protection of Russian and South Ossetian civilians, who allegedly were being 
slaughtered by a present day Slobodan Milosevic in Mikheil Saakashvili.
179
  
 
Seven weeks prior to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the U.S. in collaboration with the 
E.U. recognized Kosovo as an independent state, ignoring Russian warnings that such a 
decision would have ramifications involving the South Caucasus region.
180
 Asmus (2010) 
argues that the West‟s failure to carefully consider the consequences of recognizing Kosovo 
had detrimental effects for Georgia.
181
 Kosovo was an especially emotional case for Russia, 
still agonized by NATO‟s operation in 1999. In addition the recognition of Kosovo was in 
violation of the 1999 UN resolution 1244, stating that Kosovo should remain under Serbian 
sovereignty.
182
 Despite of this, Kosovo announced its independence on February 17, followed 
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by international recognition by the U.S. and several key E.U. members. President Putin 
responded declaring that the international recognition of Kosovo landed a fatal blow to the 
whole system of international relations.
183
 The references to Kosovo were all too clear on 
August 26, when South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared independence from the Georgian 
state.
184
 The Russian response to the Kosovo recognition can further be exemplified by a 
meeting between President Putin and President Saakashvili on February 23 in 2008; 
 
There is an urgent need to react to what has happened in Europe on Kosovo. We (Russia) are 
currently thinking how to deal with this problem. You shall remember that we are under huge 
pressure from the republics of the Northern Caucasus, and we have to answer to their 
solidarity for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (…) You know we have to answer the West on 
Kosovo. And we are very sorry but you are going to be part of that answer.
185
 
 
The statement above leaves little room for interpretation; the recognition of Kosovo had 
consequences for Georgia‟s territorial integrity. 
 
Legitimacy of the Kosovo analogy 
The dispute over Kosovo culminated in academic debates of whether the Kosovo precedent 
was a valid argument for Russia‟s intervention in Georgia. Hafkin (2009) concludes that 
although the NATO operation in Kosovo might have been designed to intervene on the basis 
of humanitarian necessity, the operation was limited to dropping bombs. Furthermore he 
questions to what extent an aerial operation could improve the conditions for the Kosovars on 
the ground.
186
 In a study by Nielsen (2009) the cases of Kosovo on one hand and South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, are compared in an attempt to draw similarities and 
differences between the two. Nielsen concludes that both Serbia and Georgia have 
experienced similar cases of political oppression, but that the differences far exceed the 
similarities.
187
 Asmus (2010) further supports this view and adds that the Kosovo analogy was 
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deployed by Russia as a payback for old grievances against the West for its intervention 
against ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.
188
  
 
Humanitarian intervention is by default a very controversial matter, the deployment of 
humanitarian intervention in international conflicts has been source to extensive literary 
debate. Central to these debates is questions concerning the selective deployment of the term 
in regards to humanitarian crises, such as Rwanda in 1994.
189
 According to the findings of the 
European Union Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
(IIFFMCG) there are several issues with the Russian Federations deployment of the Kosovo 
analogy in regards to the Georgian conflict. Firstly, Russia strongly opposed any justification 
of the operation in Kosovo on the basis of humanitarian intervention. According to Russia, 
humanitarian intervention was an invalid vindication for military action. As such, the 
IFFMCG concludes that Russia could not rely on the term to justify its own intervention in 
Georgia.
190
 Furthermore a humanitarian intervention can only be commanded by an impartial 
party. Considering that Russia was highly involved in the political and security arrangements 
in Georgia, as well as the peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a 
humanitarian intervention by Russia in Georgia is not legitimate under any circumstances.
191
  
 
Secondly, Russia claimed that it was forced to intervene in South Ossetia in protection of its 
own citizens. In a speech following the outbreak of the war, President Medvedev stated that 
“Georgian troops have committed what amounts to an act of aggression against Russian 
peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia”, he continued stating that 
“Civilians, women, children and old people are dying, and the majority of them are citizens of 
the Russian Federation”.192 The IIFFMCG notes that Russia distributed large quantities of 
Russian passports to South Ossetian and Abkhazians alike. This „passportification‟ was 
illegitimate and in violation with the Georgian Constitution which does not allow dual 
citizenship.
193
 Thus the IIFFMCG rendered the Russian argument concerning the protection 
of its own citizen invalid. On the other hand, the response to the killing of Russian 
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peacekeepers was legitimized. However, international law clearly states that such a military 
response must be strictly for defensive purposes, and amount to a proportionate response to 
the attack.
194
 In this regard, the first phase of the Russian response (i.e. the deployment of 
armed forces to protect Russian peacekeepers) was legitimate. The continued military 
engagement in the second phase of the conflict (i.e. the Russian/South Ossetian/Abkhazian 
advance into Georgia proper) is rendered by the IIFFMCG to be beyond “the reasonable 
limits of defense”.195 This also holds true for the extensive Russian military deployment in 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Black Sea.
196
  
 
Thirdly, the Russian Federation claimed that it was intervening in Georgia to stop the 
genocide of South Ossetians by Georgian troops. According to the findings of the IFFMCG, 
the alleged genocide did not take place. Russian death tolls exceeded two thousand deaths in 
the interlude to the war, a majority of these being South Ossetian civilians.
197
 The factual 
number of civilian casualties on South Ossetian side was approximately 162.
198
   
 
Summary 
Throughout this chapter the historical relationship between the actors of the 2008 War has 
been addressed. Although the Georgian state emerged in 1918, the country holds a rich 
history tracing back as far as the 7
th
 century B.C, and the subsequent Golden Age in the late 
12
th
 century A.D. Since ancient times Georgia has been subjected to numerous empires, 
serving as a bridge between the Muslim and Christian World. Its modern day population, with 
its highly diversified ethnicities, is a product of this history. Russia‟s presence in the Caucasus 
region had dramatic effects on the geopolitical arrangement of modern day Georgia, through 
both the Tsarist and Soviet era. The territorial division of present day Georgia was formed by 
the contours of Soviet Russia. Within Soviet Georgia, the autonomous entities of South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara, produced a complex administrative network tied to the Soviet 
umbrella. When the U.S.S.R. ultimately dissolved, this chain of command was absolved, 
which in turn fuelled administrative conflicts in the early nineties.  
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The emergence of the modern Georgian state clashed with the interests of its autonomous 
entities. Aspiring to a unified nation, the leaders of Georgia attempted to integrate its regions 
and ethnicities under one banner. After Gamsakhurdia‟s failed policies in the early nineties, 
the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia froze solid; a state which crystallized under the 
auspices of a Russian led peacekeeping force. Georgia‟s western aspirations, which began 
with Shevardnadze and was intensified under Saakashvili, shifted its policies away from 
Moscow, resulting in a gradually deteriorating relationship between the two nations. As 
Georgia crept closer to NATO membership, its territorial disputes came to the forefront once 
again. In 2008, Georgia‟s failed attempt to integrate South Ossetia by military means 
exacerbated its relations to its breakaway regions and Russia. The crisis also revealed an 
international contention between Russia and NATO, with roots from past events in the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In its aftermath the parties promoted divergent narratives as to why 
the war came to be. These narratives attest to the deceptive nature of the war, which in turn 
caused tremendous confusion in the international press coverage during August 2008.   
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Chapter 4: News Framing Analysis 
 
This chapter will address the field of framing and its subfield news framing analysis. Overall 
the aim of this study is to examine the framing in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the 
2008 War. This entails identifying frames in news texts. The study of the impact of media 
frames on society is an equally important field, but outside the scope of this thesis. 
Specifically, this section will examine framing as an integral part of news production. First, 
the role of mass media in military conflicts is scrutinized. Second, this section defines the 
often enigmatic term framing, and how it relates to news production. Third, the focus will be 
on the prominent approaches to news framing analysis. These approaches are used to design a 
research model for analyzing the Norwegian print-press coverage. Finally, the research 
sample, coding process and method of analysis will be presented.  
 
This study will employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative research in its analyses. 
The historical assessment in chapter three will serve as the theoretical foundation for the 
analyses. The quantitative research will involve a systematic reading of selected newspapers. 
The results of the quantitative research will provide an overview of publication dates, genres 
and use of sources in the print-press coverage. Subsequently, the qualitative research will 
determine different frames present in individual news articles.  
 
Media power 
In the Age of Information the public is subject to a myriad of information almost infinite in its 
reach and nearly impossible to conceive for any individual person. As a result the mass media 
has assumed the role of mediator, systematically selecting and presenting matters of 
importance to the public. In modern society the mass media largely determines which matters 
should be considered significant and worth debating in the public sphere. Accordingly, the 
mass media is considered a significant force of power in modern society, a power that if 
governed correctly, could yield tremendous benefits. The potential power of media as an 
instrument of warfare has had a long history. In recent times however the mass media has 
become an integral part of modern warfare.  
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From the Balkan Wars and the Gulf War to the War on Terror, the media has been operated as 
a power to win the hearts and minds of the public.
199
  As a result the relationship between the 
mass media and public opinion has been reinforced, and today every major political or 
military conflict has a media factor. By withholding, distributing or misrepresenting 
information, modern warfare is today directed to shed favorable light on one party of a 
conflict while simultaneously portraying its adversaries as villainous.
200
 Consequently, a 
common sentiment has evolved, claiming that the first victim of war is truth.  
 
In this increasingly treacherous environment the role of media in warfare has, in recent years, 
become an increasingly important field of study. Academics within this field examine the 
most important aspects of information warfare such as: the influence of governments on 
media output, the role of powerful media corporations on forming public opinion, the role of 
journalists in conveying information and framing news in different levels of news production. 
These studies challenge the assumption that media presents an impartial and balanced view of 
reality. According to Denis McQuail, the mass media, above all else, is subject to the 
influence of governments and institutions with interests in forming public opinion. He 
continues stating: “They (the media) are subjects to formal and informal control by the very 
institutions (including their own) that have an interest in shaping public perception of 
reality”.201  
 
Interesting here is the statement “perception of reality” which according to McQuail is an 
artificial construct, granted that a complete picture of reality is inconceivable. Subsequently 
what is presented in the form of news stories is a fragment, or selection of reality, all 
depending on the source of information. McQuail concludes that this “reality will always be 
to some extent selected and constructed and there will be certain biases”.202 
 
Framing in the production of news 
The discussion about this “perceived reality” raises important questions; how is this perceived 
reality constructed? A news story is influenced by several actors, both inside and outside the 
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media. These actors can be found across different levels of the information trajectory. An 
information trajectory refers to the way in which information is transferred from the source of 
information to the public. In between the source and the public, the information passes 
through several channels or levels before reaching its destination. These levels can usually be 
divided into six different categories; the event; the actors involved; the official channel of 
information; the news media corporation; the journalist; and finally the public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1: Information trajectory from source origin to public reception.
203
 
 
As shown in illustration 1, the information is processed through several levels before reaching 
the public. First is the event taking place at one point in time in a certain location either in 
physical of artificial space. Second are the actors involved; these might be parties of a conflict 
or individuals. These actors will promote certain aspects of the event in regards to their own 
perspective, while excluding others. The third level includes the official channels of 
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information, speaking on behalf of the parties involved through for example a media brief or 
an official political statement. Fourth, the news corporations receive their information from 
either the official channels or individual actors. The news corporations decide which news 
stories are worth communicating to the public. This is a selective procedure, often subject to a 
range of factors; the political alignment of news corporations; the political interests of 
national governments; the institutions in which the news corporations are operating in; and the 
production and distribution of the news item as a commodity. Fifth, the production of the 
news text itself is conducted by journalists in individual newspapers. The journalist has to 
consider the interest of the newspaper he/she is writing for, the national political climate in 
which his story is published and the interest of his readers.
204
 Finally the news story is 
published and read by the general public, apprehending their version of the „reality‟ and in 
turn stimulating public debate.  
  
Crucial to the process of reality perception is the framing of information; meaning to highlight 
certain aspects of an event whilst excluding others.
205
 According to scholars, this framing 
process can take place on any of the above mentioned levels of the information trajectory, but 
not necessarily all of them.
206
 This brings about tremendous challenges for any scholar 
attempting to pinpoint the origin of a certain frame. 
 
Furthermore these frames are oftentimes, consciously or unconsciously, adopted by 
journalists who are unfamiliar with the process of framing.
207
 This is important because it is 
pivotal for the success or failure of a particular spin or frame of an event. Thus, news stories 
presented to the public are the product of several sub-processes of framing across different 
levels of the information trajectory. The challenge for news writers is that framing is, by 
default, so imbedded in journalistic practices that journalists are oftentimes unaware of the 
phenomenon.
208
 According to Van Gorp this holds especially true in matters where 
preexisting knowledge is severely limited.
209
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In relation to the Russia-Georgian War, many news reporters covering the war had limited 
knowledge about South Ossetia prior to the conflict.
210
 With a lack of preexisting knowledge 
of the conflict and its parties, news reporters are more likely to adopt existing frames in their 
reports. Previous studies have shown that this was a critical issue in the news covering of the 
2008 War, which sometimes resulted in journalists adopting preexisting frames in their 
reports.
211
 To what extent this was evident in the Norwegian news coverage of the war is a 
point of interest in the following research. The following section will introduce the focal point 
of this study, namely news framing analysis. 
 
News framing analysis 
Framing studies is important because the studies analyze how the aforementioned „perception 
of reality‟ manifests across different information levels, and ultimately forms debates among 
the public.
212
 The purpose of this study is to analyze the framing in the Norwegian media‟s 
print-press coverage of the Russia-Georgian War. As such it will be limited to analyzing the 
framing present in news texts, regardless of framing in other tiers of the information 
trajectory. Specifically, this involves a textual analysis of individual news articles in order to 
identify frames in the text. In addition, this thesis will compare the differences in framing 
across four Norwegian newspapers. 
 
An important distinction in news framing analysis is between the „what‟ and the „how‟ of 
frames.
213
 Researchers analyzing the „what‟ of frames are concerned with how discourse 
elements in a news story are combined in such a way as to promote a certain frame.
214
 The 
„how‟ portion examines the way frames are promoted by certain agents in order to achieve a 
predefined goal. In addition the „how‟ involves examining the way in which frames are 
processed by individuals to form public opinion. In this study the focus will be on the „what‟ 
of frames rather than the „how‟. Although interesting in its own merit, the „how‟ of frames is 
outside the purview of this study. This thesis will be based on the basic concept of framing as 
provided by Entman (1993): 
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Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described.
215
 
 
Entman‟s definition is a frequently employed concept, one that serves as the basis for several 
news framing analyses.
216
 According to Entman, the function of framing is to clearly define 
issues. A point of interest in this regard is the “in such a way” portion of the definition. As 
Stephen D. Reese points out, this is ultimately the question of where frames reside, either 
“(…) in a text, culture or the cognition of the perceiver?”217 For the purpose of this thesis, the 
aim is to analyze the frames present in the text itself.  
 
Reese (2010) accentuates the necessity to clearly define how researchers establish that a frame 
exists. In order to achieve this goal the researcher must identify framing devices, which are 
“…specific linguistic structures such as metaphors, visual icons, and catchphrases that 
communicate frames” and reasoning devices, which are defined as problem definitions and 
moral evaluations.
218
 The advantage of a news framing analysis focusing on the „what‟ of 
frames is that it contextualizes frames in relations to social, historical or cultural themes.
219
 
This thesis will specifically contextualize frames in relations to historical themes. These will 
be based upon the findings in the previous chapter assessing the historical relationship 
between Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
 
Sources and genres 
Salience can also be achieved by including viewpoints from one side of a conflict whilst 
excluding others. Kosichi (1993) points out the importance of direct and indirect citations in 
news stories; “…by including quotes from one side of a conflict and excluding others the 
journalist makes one view more salient”.220 In addition the absence of certain sources also 
influences the framing of a news story.
221
 Thus the use of in-text sources is a decisive factor 
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in the framing of a particular news story. Dimitrova (2008) supports this view arguing that 
news media are highly dependent on both military and governmental sources, especially 
during wartime.
222
 Accordingly a good framing analysis should incorporate source analysis as 
an integral part of its study. As such this thesis will critically examine the presence and 
frequency of in-text sources in the print-press coverage of the Russia-Georgian War. These 
sources will be categorized according to national origin and source class. The national origin 
will include four categories; namely Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian or Abkhazian sources 
and other nationalities. Source class will categorize in-text sources according to the agents‟ 
background. In addition to examining the frame and use of in-text sources, this thesis will 
arrange the articles by genre.  
 
Extracting and categorizing frames 
In addition to determining sources and genres, the next step is to extract frames found in the 
samples. Entman‟s subcategories - problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and treatment recommendation - will serve as the basis for the frames in this study.  As 
previously mentioned framing and reasoning devices can be used to identify frames in a text.  
These frames will in turn be aggregated under various frame categories. The complex process 
of designing frame categories brings about numerous challenges. According to Valkenburg 
(2000), there are two ways to go about quantitative framing analysis; either through inductive 
or deductive approaches. An inductive approach involves systematically examining a sample 
of the data in order to identity different frames apparent in the text. The strength of such an 
approach is that it uncovers a large number of frames apparent in textual units. A deductive 
approach on the other hand bases itself on a system of predefined frames that are expected to 
be present in the units of study. Valkenburg (2000) notes that the deductive approach is not 
only easily replicated, but is also particularly useful when comparing framing across different 
media sources. Considering that the main focus of this thesis is to detect frames across several 
Norwegian newspapers, the deductive approach is most applicable.  
 
The deductive approach nonetheless raises some important questions that need to be 
addressed. By using predefined frames the analyzer risks overlooking certain frames that may 
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appear during the process of analysis.
223
 Thus, carefully considering the predefined frames is 
a necessity prior to the analysis. According to Valkenburg (2000) the predefined frames 
should be broad enough to cover the expected frames present in the sample, but at the same 
time avoid reaching too wide and result in triviality. These frames should in turn be arranged 
in categories containing clusters of frame functions as defined by Entman (1993). Considering 
that this thesis builds upon a study of history, the frame categories were partly based on the 
historical findings in chapter three. Accordingly, each frame category was designed to 
encompass frame functions supporting the war aims of the parties involved.  
 
Designing frame categories 
In 2005 Rune Ottosen published a study concerning the Norwegian media‟s coverage of the 
War in Afghanistan. The article employs frame categories in order to analyze the media 
coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the war. Ottosen‟s study employs five frame 
categories with the following descriptions - U.S. hatred, analyzes the September 11 attacks as 
an inevitable outcome of U.S. engagements abroad – U.S. critical, regards the battle against 
terrorism as important, but believes it should be conducted by an international coalition 
instead of a U.S./NATO operation – U.S. friendly, argues that the U.S. has every right to 
defend its own citizens, the war in Afghanistan is means to that end - Norwegian Angle, 
discerns the consequences for Norway in relation to the War on Terror - Neutral, presents 
basic description of events, battle formations and military engagements.
224
 This thesis will 
follow Ottosen‟s blueprint in its design of frame categories. 
 
Overall, the purpose of this study is to analyze how the Russia-Georgian War was framed by 
four Norwegian newspapers. Underlying this rationale is the aim to unveil to what extent the 
Norwegian print-press favored one side of the conflict over another, and if so which one? 
Thus two predefined frame categories were established; the Russian Supportive category and 
Georgian Supportive category. The frame functions in each category were further defined 
using a taxonomy table as presented in Appendix 1.
225
 Under each category predefined frame 
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functions were specified according to Entman‟s concept of framing, including problem 
definition, causal representation and treatment recommendation/moral evaluation.  
 
The „Russian Supportive‟ category includes frame functions supporting the Russian 
involvement in the war and its political perspective of the conflict. Frame functions allocated 
to this category were designed on the basis of press releases from The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Russia during August 2008.
226
 These press releases reflect Russian official 
viewpoints on the developments of the 2008 War. These viewpoints were contextualized 
according to Entman‟s concepts of problem definition, causal representation and treatment 
recommendation/moral evaluation. Frame functions within this category regard the Georgian 
attack on South Ossetia as a violation of international law.  In their view, Russian 
peacekeepers and citizens as well as South Ossetian civilians were being slaughtered in South 
Ossetia by Georgian military forces, thus forcing Moscow to intervene on behalf of 
humanitarian necessity. Accordingly, these frame functions will be used in the qualitative 
analysis to identify similar frames in the news text. If a frame in the news text mirrors 
viewpoints originating from the Russian press releases, that frame is allocated to the Russian 
Supportive category. 
 
Opposing this view is the „Georgian Supportive‟ category regarding the Russian involvement 
as a violation of international law. Frame functions within this category were designed on the 
basis of press releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia during August 2008.
227
 
Similar to the Russian press-releases, these reflect the national political viewpoints on the 
developments of the 2008 War. Frame functions within this category consider South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as an integral part of Georgian sovereignty, thus legitimizing Georgia‟s military 
engagement within its own territory. Furthermore Russia is seen as the main aggressor, either 
by placing the Russian offensive within a historical context of oppression against Georgia, or 
by claiming that Russia had long standing plans to subdue the Georgian state. Frame functions 
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in tandem with viewpoints from the Georgian press releases, are designated to the Georgian 
Supportive category.  
 
Unique to the Norwegian print-press coverage was an increasing concern with Norwegian 
security in regards to the 2008 War. Georgia is a nation similar to Norway in terms of 
population, army size and geographical proximity to Russia. Accordingly, many journalists 
and politicians linked the 2008 War to Norway‟s national security arrangements vis-à-vis 
Russia. This stimulated a debate concerning the future relations between Norway and Russia. 
As such a third framing category was defined as the „Norwegian Angle‟ including all frame 
functions juxtaposing the Russia-Georgian War to Norwegian security. Frame functions 
within this category were extracted from the news texts and specified according to Entman‟s 
definitions. 
 
In addition a number of scholars discussed the crisis in the South Caucasus as part of an 
international dispute. These debates raised questions concerning NATO-Russia relations; the 
call for an international response to the crisis; international economic ramifications; and the 
future of the European Union. All frames including one or several of these debates were 
designated to a „NATO Perspective‟ category. This category incorporates frames emphasizing 
the international dimension of the conflict. These frames contextualize the conflict as part of 
international politics. Furthermore they regard the Russia-Georgian War as a local 
manifestation of a much larger dispute in international relations. Examples of frame functions 
included in this category are Cold War frames regarding Russian operations in Georgia as an 
imminent threat to European security.  
 
Lastly, the remaining frame functions were bundled together under a fifth category: Neutral. 
Frame functions allocated to this category does not designate responsibility for the war itself. 
Instead these frame functions are concerned with the „human face‟ of the war. This entails 
reports on human suffering, refugees, personal recollections of events and humanitarian aid. 
Furthermore the frame functions in the „Neutral‟ category focus on the detrimental outcomes 
of war and the loss of life, property and livelihood. 
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Coding of articles 
Based on the aforementioned categories, the articles in four Norwegian news papers will be 
analyzed.
228
 The articles will be coded using the data analysis software QDA Miner. This 
application is used to digitally analyze large collections of documents and texts. For the 
purpose of this thesis the application will be employed in the quantitative analysis. The coding 
procedure entails categorizing all articles published during August 2008 according to source 
origin, source class, publication date and genre. After coding each individual news article 
QDA Miner can statistically display results, providing a visual representation of findings. 
Among its features is also the ability to quickly search through the sample data for key words 
and/or phrases in order to measure frequency of publication. Thus if a key word or phrase is 
frequently used across different newspapers, it may indicate a predominance of certain 
frames. In relation to the Norwegian print press coverage of the 2008 War, preliminary 
searches confirmed frequent use of terms such as ”Cold War” or ”Berlin Wall” or ”East 
versus West” or ”East and West” or ”Russia versus the West” or ”Russia and the West” or 
”the West” (Norwegian: ”Kald krig” or ”Berlinmuren” or ”Øst mot Vest” or ”Øst og Vest” or 
”Russland mot vesten” or ”Russland og Vesten” or ”Vesten”). These results may indicate a 
presence of Cold War frames in the sample data.  
 
Validating results 
An inevitable issue when doing news framing analysis is subjectivity and its unavoidable 
effect on research results.
229
 Researchers analyzing news frames may find it particularly 
challenging to identify frames that have become an integral part of society. These „culturally 
imbedded frames‟ are according to Van Gorp (2010) “rooted in common cultural themes” and 
actively projected in all manners of communication “both popular and informative”, 
especially in journalism.
230
 As a result, researchers that share the same culture as the 
journalists producing the news may find it increasingly difficult to identify certain frames. 
Ideally then, the researcher should be entirely independent from the culture in which the news 
is produced. To overcome this issue academics have employed different strategies to avoid 
subjectivity and authenticate results. Some studies utilize researchers who are independent 
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from the culture under scrutiny.
231
 Other studies train independent coders to assign frames to 
predefined frame categories designed by the researchers.
232
 Subsequently these studies 
performed validation tests to measure result disparity between testers.  
 
For the purpose of this study one single tester will conduct the research. Since the researcher 
is native to Norway, a culturally independent analysis is impossible. The analysis will 
however be guided by predefined frame categories with clearly defined frame functions under 
each category.
233
 This method is transparent and thus easily repeatable for validation 
purposes. The details of each frame category can be accessed in appendix 1. Furthermore the 
digital coding of each news item will be made available for future verification. Based on the 
limited resources available for this project, any additional validation tests by independent 
testers was unattainable. As a result further research is required to verify the results of this 
study. 
 
Data collection procedure 
The print-press coverage of Norwegian newspapers was accessed through the ATEKST 
database. ATEKST is a digital media database used to access news items posted in Norwegian 
print media. As mentioned earlier the news coverage of this event is substantial. Therefore the 
data collection was limited to coverage posted in August 2008. The data was collected by 
searching for key words such as “Georgia” and “Russia” (Norwegian: “Georgia” and 
“Russland”) posted in the selected newspapers between 1 August and 31 August 2008. The 
search yielded a total of 286 news items. 
 
Data sample 
The print-press data was collected from four Norwegian newspapers; namely Aftenposten, 
Dagbladet, Klassekampen and Dag og Tid. These were selected on the basis of representing 
various political alignments and perspectives. Accordingly the analysis will contrast the 
frames and viewpoint present in the articles between the newspapers. The purpose of this 
                                                 
231
 See C.C.Maslog, S.T. Lee & H.S.Kim, ’Framing Analysis of a conflict: How Newspapers in Five Asian Countries 
Covered the Iraq War’, Asian Journal of Communication, vol. 16, issue 1 (2006), 19-39. 
232
 See Dmitrova & Strömback, 2008. 
233
 See Appendix 1: Taxonomy Table for Frame Categories 
63 
 
analysis is to illuminate the differences in the newspapers‟ coverage of the Russia-Georgian 
War. 
 
Aftenposten is Norway‟s largest morning newspaper and is oriented towards liberal 
conservatives. It is a national circulated daily newspaper owned by Schibsted, one of three 
major media corporations in Norway. The newspaper was the second most circulated 
newspaper with 247 556 copies per edition in 2008. Aftenposten is considered to be Norway‟s 
most influential newspapers. Previous studies have concluded that Aftenposten traditionally is 
oriented towards the United States in its coverage of international news such as the War in 
Afghanistan and the War in Iraq.
234
  
 
Dagbladet was Norway‟s second largest tabloid newspaper in 2008, surpassed only by VG. In 
terms of daily circulation it was the fourth largest newspaper in Norway with 123 383 copies 
per edition sold in 2008.
235
 It is a daily circulated national newspaper, renowned for its radical 
views on politics. Politically Dagbladet has been liberal oriented in its news reporting.
236
 
 
Klassekampen is a daily circulated national news paper. In 2008 the newspaper printed 12 106 
copies per edition.
237
 In terms of political alignment the news paper is left wing and radical 
oriented, specializing in politics, economy and culture.
238
 Klassekampen is owned by a 
number of companies including Fagforbundet, Industri Energi as well as Norwegian 
publishing houses such as Pax and Oktober, both of which represent socialist inclinations. 
 
Dag og Tid is a weekly newspaper circulated regionally in Oslo, Norway. It is the only 
independent newspaper in the sample and prides itself with representing a wide array of 
political perspectives in its articles and editorials. Thus it provides an interesting sample to 
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examine conflicting views in comparison to the more mainstream media represented by 
Aftenposten and Dagbladet. Dag og Tid printed 7 233 copies per edition in 2008.
239
 
 
As mentioned earlier the data collection yielded a total of 286 articles. Considering that the 
newspapers differ in size, rate of publication and area of circulation the search presented a 
discrepancy regarding the amount of articles per source. The search generated the following 
results; Aftenposten published 131 articles; Dagbladet published 79 articles; Klassekampen 
published 65 articles and Dag og Tid published 11 articles dealing with the Russia-Georgian 
War during August 2008. Although expected, this discrepancy raises some complications for 
the analysis. When the units of comparison are non-symmetrical the researcher risks 
misinterpreting results and can potentially draw faulty conclusions.
240
 To overcome this issue, 
this study will analyze the data using percentage based statistics.  
 
Quantitative research 
Primarily, the quantitative research sets out to examine the general war coverage of the 
Norwegian print-press coverage during August 2008. This entails a systematic reading of all 
articles published during August in the sample newspapers. Each item will be coded 
according to in-text source, genres and publication dates. The results will be displayed using 
tables and percentage based statistics. In turn the findings will be contrasted across individual 
newspapers to accentuate differences and similarities. In the quantitative analysis, various 
research questions will guide the investigation to illuminate certain aspects of the Norwegian 
print-press coverage. Each research question will be addressed in detailed at the outset of 
chapter five.  
 
Qualitative research 
The primary objective of the qualitative research is to identify frames in news texts. This 
entails an in depth reading of articles in order to extract frames from news texts. Each frame 
will be extracted by assigning individual frame functions to segments of texts. In turn these 
frame functions are aggregated under predefined frame categories as presented in Appendix 1. 
An integral part of this study is to examine how different newspapers frame the same event, 
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from various perspectives. In pursuit of this goal the frames will be compared across the 
sample newspapers to examine differences and similarities in the framing of news. Similar to 
the quantitative analysis, individual research questions will guide the qualitative investigation.   
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Chapter 5: Research Analyses 
 
Overall, this thesis sets out to examine how the Norwegian print-press framed the Russia-
Georgian War. In pursuit of this goal, this study utilizes research questions in its analyses to 
answer the main research problem from various perspectives. This chapter will present the 
framing analyses of the sample newspapers. First, the design process behind the research 
questions will be addressed in detail. These questions were designed on the basis of studies 
outlined in earlier chapters of this thesis. Second, the quantitative analysis will be addressed, 
detailing publication rates, use of genres and use of sources in each newspaper. Third, the 
qualitative analysis will analyze the framing in news stories. An important part of this study is 
to contrast the coverage between different sources of print-press media. With this goal in 
mind, the qualitative analysis investigates how the newspapers differ in terms of coverage, 
selection of information and the framing of news. This involves a systematic reading of 
articles published on three dates during August 2008. The dates were selected to accentuate 
the difference in coverage and framing over time.  
 
Research questions 
Research questions provide the analyst with important tools for examining and interpreting 
texts. In contrast to research hypotheses, which focus on direct empirical evidence, research 
questions open up new avenues for textual research. Furthermore they are guided by the 
researcher‟s aim to uncover inferences and meanings in the text that may otherwise be 
overlooked by hypothetical approaches.
241
 In relation to the concept of framing, research 
questions focus on the interpretive meaning of texts. As a result, they stimulate discussions of 
observed phenomena, rather than absolute truths. According to Krippendorff (2004) the 
answers to research questions represent “truth claims that could be supported […] by 
plausible argumentation from related observations”.242 The research questions in the 
following analysis are designed in accordance with Krippendorff‟s rationale.  
 
A number of research questions were designed in relation to the Norwegian print-press 
coverage of the 2008 War. Specifically, these research questions were formed on the basis of 
studies addressed in the previous chapters of this thesis. The following research questions are 
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arranged thematically. First, research questions concerning the use of sources are addressed. 
Second, research questions examining coverage and framing are presented. Third, research 
questions investigating the use of history in news stories are detailed. The sources and genres 
questions will be addressed in the quantitative analysis, whereas questions concerning 
coverage, framing and employment of history will be addressed in the qualitative analysis. 
 
Sources 
In the coverage of international conflicts, the selection of sources and information is crucial to 
the framing of news.
243
 During the 2008 War both Russia and Georgia utilized press-releases 
to distribute information to the international media.
244
 With limited access to the battleground, 
the international media often turned to political leaders for their war reportage.
245
 As a result 
these press releases formed the basis of coverage in the initial stages of the war. Consequently 
the coverage in the international news press was highly dependent on state officials for their 
information. According to Dmitrova & Stromback (2008), this reliance is a critical issue in 
the coverage of international conflicts.
246
 In regards to the 2008 War a research question was 
formed to examine if this manifested itself in the Norwegian print-press coverage. 
 
Research question 1: (USE OF SOURCES) to what extent will the newspapers in the 
sample rely on politicians and military representatives in their coverage of the 2008 
War?  
 
Subsequently individual newspapers incorporated these press-releases to produce news 
stories. As an inevitable outcome the newspapers deviated in their selection of sources, from 
either Russian or Georgian intelligence. It is thus especially interesting to investigate to what 
extent the political alignment of newspapers affects this selective procedure. A research 
question was formed to investigate the differences between newspapers in terms of in-text 
sources: 
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Research question 2: (SOURCE DIFFERENCE) to what extent will the left-wing 
press encompass more Russian based sources than the liberal press? Conversely, to 
what extent will the liberal press incorporate more Georgian based sources than the 
left wing press? 
 
Coverage and framing 
In the initial stages of the war the world‟s gaze was focused elsewhere, either on the opening 
of the Olympic Games in Beijing or the Iraq War. As a result only limited attention was 
drawn to the impending conflict in the Caucasus. Over the next few days however, the 2008 
War spiraled into an international conflict, bringing about news coverage from across the 
globe. Accordingly more information was made available for the media to utilize in their 
reports. Expectedly this development will affect the Norwegian print-press coverage as well. 
A research question was formed to examine to what extent this phenomenon influenced the 
coverage and framing of news during August 2008.   
 
Research question 3: (SHIFTS IN COVERAGE AND FRAMING OVER TIME) how 
will the coverage and framing in the Norwegian print-press develop over the course of 
August 2008? Will the print-press support Georgia in the initial stages of the conflict, 
while assuming a more critical view over time? 
 
In order to examine coverage and framing over time, the qualitative analysis will sample three 
dates in August 2008. The coverage and framing is compared and contrasted across these 
dates to determine if a shift occurs. According to De Waal (2010), the Russian engagement in 
South Ossetia received much more publicity in the international press, compared to the 
Georgian attack days in advance.
247
 This was due to the international condemnation of the 
Russian offensive. This manifested itself in the media coverage as well. With limited access 
to the conflict zones inside South Ossetia, the first television images reaching the international 
news scene witnessed the Russian invasion of Gori.
248
 Accordingly many Western journalists 
concluded that Russia was invading Georgia, while excluding the Georgian incursion from 
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their news stories.
249
 In regards to the Norwegian print-press coverage a research question 
was formed, investigating to what extent De Waal‟s contention holds true.  
 
Research question 4: (MEDIA BIAS) will the Russian invasion of Georgia receive 
more attention in the Norwegian print-press coverage than the Georgian attack on 
South Ossetia during August 2008?  
 
Ottosen (2005) in particular has criticized the Norwegian print-press for endorsing American 
perspectives in its coverage of international conflicts. 
250
 Previous studies have shown that the 
American press was highly critical of Russia‟s engagements in Georgia throughout the war.251 
As such a research question was formed, examine if the Norwegian print-press followed the 
same direction:   
 
Research Question 5: (POLITICAL ALIGNMENT) to what extent will the Norwegian 
print-press align with the American press in its coverage of the 2008 War? Will the 
independent and left-wing press be more critical towards Georgia than the tabloid and 
liberal press? 
 
The international press generally sympathized with Georgia during August 2008. Over the 
course of August however, several newspapers criticized the Georgian government for the 
outbreak of war. Considering that the newspapers under scrutiny represent different political 
alignments, a divergence in coverage and framing is expected.  
 
History and news 
An integral part of this study is the historical background of the 2008 War. As shown in 
previous chapters, the conflicting parties employed history in different ways to legitimize 
their own engagements in the war. References to the past were used to legitimize actions of 
the present, as the adversaries clashed together on the battlefield. This also affected the print-
press coverage of the war, as journalists and scholars asked questions as to why war had 
erupted in the Caucasus on August 7.  In the print-press, history was employed to 
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contextualize the conflict in an attempt to point out where things had gone wrong. Given 
limited time, journalists published stories disclosing the historical background of the conflict 
in the Caucasus.  As history remains a narrative, it is all the more interesting to investigate 
which narratives were employed in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the 2008 War. 
Accordingly the following research question was formed: 
 
Research question 6: (EMPLOYING HISTORY) how was history employed by the 
Norwegian print-press in their coverage of the 2008 War? 
 
The answer to this research question will be obtained through systematic reading of news 
stories disclosing the historical background of the conflict. The information presented in 
specific news stories is compared to the findings of the historical chapter in this thesis.  
 
As a long standing member of NATO, Norway‟s allegiance to the Euro-Atlantic Alliance is 
unquestionable. Throughout the Cold War, Norway found itself within a bipolarized world, 
sharing borders with one of the two superpowers. The culture produced by the Cold War 
deeply affected national identity, and penetrated nearly every facet of public life.
252
 Although 
the Cold War ended in 1991, many of its cultural aspects endured. It was not surprising then 
that the television images of old Russian tanks entering Gori stimulated debates of a new Cold 
War era in the international press.
253
 In relation to the Norwegian press, the Cold War may 
represent what Van Gorp (2010) refers to as culturally imbedded frames, which are ready-to-
use frame packages “rooted in common cultural themes”.254 Over time, these frames evolve 
into commonly accepted notions which are used unconsciously by journalists. Based on its 
historical relationship to Soviet Russia as an adversary, this Cold War mentality may still 
persist among Norwegian journalists. A research question was thus formed, examining to 
what extent Cold War frames were used in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the Russia-
Georgia War. 
 
Research question 7: (DOMINANT FRAME) to what extent are bipolar concepts and 
Cold War frames used in the Norwegian print-press coverage during August 2008?  
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Bipolar concepts denote terms used actively throughout the Cold War. Examples of these may 
be Russia versus the West or East versus West. By employing these terms in news stories 
concerning the Russia-Georgian War, journalists connote worldviews originating from the 
Cold War. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
Overall, the four newspapers in the sample published 286 news items between August 1 and 
August 31 regarding the 2008 War. Klassekampen published its first story on August 5, 
reporting on mounting tension between South Ossetia and Georgia. Aftenposten and 
Dagbladet soon followed on August 6 and 7, reporting on the Georgian bombardment of 
Tskhinvali and the introduction of Georgian troops into South Ossetia. Dag og Tid published 
its first story on August 15, mainly disclosing the Russian counter offensive to the Georgian 
advance. Important to note here is that Dag og Tid is a weekly newspaper published on 
Fridays. The Russia-Georgian War broke out around midnight on Thursday August 7. As a 
result the first news stories in Dag og Tid were published a week later. 
 
 
Graph 1: Dates and frequency of publications in daily newspapers during August 2008 
 
The majority of news stories were published between August 9 and August 23 as illustrated in 
Graph 1.Excluded from Graph 1 is Dag og Tid based on its weekly publication. Important to 
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note is that Dagbladet and Aftenposten are published Monday through Sunday, whereas 
Klassekampen has no Sunday edition. This partly explains the decrease in coverage on August 
17, 24 and 31. Noteworthy is the divergence on August 23 and 28, where Dagbladet‟s 
coverage is entirely absent, in contrast to the considerable coverage in both Aftenposten and 
Klassekampen on the same day.  
 
An important aspect of the 2008 War was its limited duration; the war lasted less than a week. 
This brought about numerous challenges for the media reporting on the war, trying to catch up 
with the events on the ground. The limited access to the battleground in the initial stages of 
the war further complicated the situation. Thus it is not surprising that the majority of the 
news coverage occurred in the aftermath of the war itself. The highest rate of publication 
occurred between August 9 and August 16, amounting for 137 news stories or approximately 
47.9% of total coverage.  
 
The upsurge in coverage coincidentally occurred at the same time as Russian military forces 
engaged in South Ossetia on August 9. Over the next days, Russian tanks entered the town of 
Gori and continued deep into Georgia, occupying areas in both Western and Central Georgia. 
Based on the findings in Graph 1, the Russian incursion received considerable more attention 
in the Norwegian print-press than the Georgian attack days in advance. These findings 
indicate that the Norwegian print-press followed the trend in the international press coverage 
as presented in research question 4.
255
 The Georgian bombardment of Tskhinvali on August 7 
has been regarded as the culmination of mounting tension between Georgia and South 
Ossetia.
256
 The first reports of exchanges between South Ossetian separatists and Georgian 
forces appeared as early as August 1.
257
 Nevertheless, these events received only limited 
attention in the sample newspapers.  
 
In terms of genres, the newspapers encompassed a considerable amount of news articles and 
features/reports. Aftenposten contained more opinion editorials (13) than any of the other 
newspapers. As shown in Table 1, all the newspapers included a high degree of commentaries 
(3 in Dag og Tid, 10 in Klassekampen, 10 in Dagbladet and 13 in Aftenposten). The majority 
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of commentaries (23 of 36) occurred after the ceasefire agreement on August 12. 
Klassekampen contained more fact sheets (18) than all the other newspapers.  
 
 
  
      Dag og Tid 
 
Klassekampen           Dagbladet 
 
Aftenposten 
  
                 n            %         n                %                     n           %           n          % 
Brief 
 
2 18,18  5 7,69  15 18,99  25 19,08  
Commentary 
 
3 27,27  10 15,38  10 12,66  13 9,92  
Editorial 
 
2 18,18  3 4,62  4 5,06  9 6,87  
Fact Sheet 
   
18 27,69  10 12,66  1 0,76  
Feature/report 
 
1 9,09  11 16,92  10 12,66  22 16,79  
Interview 
 
2 18,18  2 3,08  3 3,80  3 2,29  
News 
 
1 9,09  13 20,00  25 31,65  45 34,35  
Op-Ed 
   
3 4,62  2 2,53  13 9,92  
          
          Total 
 
11 100,00  65 100,00  79 100,00  131 100,00  
          Table 1: Use of genres in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the 2008 War in August 2008 (per 
cent) 
 
 
Graph 2: In-text sources by national origin in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the 2008 War in 
August 2008 (per cent)  
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Graph 3: Sources by class in the Norwegian print-press coverage of the 2008 War in August 2008 
(per cent) 
 
As illustrated by Graph 2, the use of in-text sources varied between the different newspapers. 
Noteworthy is the discrepancy between Klassekampen and Aftenposten. Klassekampen 
incorporates a substantial amount of Russian sources compared to Aftenposten (32.4% vs. 
17.2%). Conversely Aftenposten contains more Georgian sources than Klassekampen (29% 
vs. 23%). These findings indicate that the political alignment of newspapers can indeed affect 
its selection of sources, as contested in research question 2.
258
 Based on this analysis alone, 
the deviation is quite considerable. To what extent this is a product of conscious decisions by 
journalists or editors remains unknown. Regardless, Aftenposten has been criticized in the past 
for aligning with American perspectives in its coverage of international news. As mentioned 
earlier the American print-press was supportive of Georgia in its initial coverage of the war.
259
 
Thus the substantial amount of Georgian based sources in Aftenposten can indicate a 
continuation of its affirmation of American perspectives.  
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Klassekampen and Dagbladet are congruent in their use of both Russian and Georgian sources 
(32.4% and 31.4% Russian sources and 23.5% and 23% Georgian sources, respectively). This 
is surprising considering the newspapers‟ difference in political inclination. As such it is 
interesting to investigate to what extent these newspapers differ in their framing of the 2008 
War. Granted that there is a correlation between source origin and framing of news, the 
coverage in Klassekampen and Dagbladet should be analogous. This contention will be 
addressed specifically in the qualitative analysis. Dagbladet contains more Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian sources than the other newspapers (16.7%). The vast majority of in-text 
sources originated from other nationalities (78.6% in Dag og Tid; 34.4% in Klassekampen; 
28.4% in Dagbladet and 44.8% in Aftenposten). These findings indicate that the Norwegian 
print-press were highly dependent on sources outside the conflict zones in their coverage of 
the 2008 War.  
 
Furthermore the sources were categorized according to source class. As illustrated in Graph 3, 
the vast majority of sources originated from either other media (36.8 % in Dag og Tid; 37.3% 
in Klassekampen; 24.1% in Dagbladet; 18.0% in Aftenposten) or politicians/military 
representatives (36.8% in Dag og Tid; 46.5% in Klassekampen; 47.4% in Dagbladet and 
48.2% in Aftenposten). In regards to research question 1 these findings indicate that the 
Norwegian print-press had limited access to independent sources inside the conflict zone.
260
 
As a result they were dependent on information from other media or government officials in 
their war coverage. These findings are in tandem with Dimitrova and Strömback‟s (2008) 
argument concerning the news media‟s high dependency on military and governmental 
sources during wartime.
261
 In the 2008 War, the clash between Georgian, South Ossetian and 
Russian forces produced a perilous war zone surrounding Tskhinvali, further endangering 
journalists attempting to cover the war first hand. Similar to war zones in the past, this 
restricted the available source material for news reporters.
262
 As a result the news media 
turned to military leaders and politicians for updated information. To what extent this reliance 
affects the framing in the individual newspapers will be addressed in the qualitative analysis.  
                                                 
260
 See research question 1: (USE OF SOURCES) to what extent will the newspapers in the sample rely on 
politicians and military representatives in their coverage of the 2008?  
261
 Dmitrova & Strömback, 2008, 207 
262
 S.A. Nohrstedt & R.Ottosen, ’Studying the Media Gulf War’, in S.A.Nohrstedt & R.Ottosen (eds), Journalism 
and the New World Order Vol1: Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization, (Goteborg, Nordicom, 
2000), 16 
77 
 
Qualitative analysis 
The qualitative analysis was conducted in order to identify frames in news stories covering 
the 2008 War. Individual frames were determined using Entman‟s definition of frame 
functions; problem definition, causal interpretation, treatment recommendation and/or moral 
evaluation.
263
 These frame functions were contextualized according to the 2008 War using a 
coding scheme presented in the taxonomy table in appendix 1.
264
 The process of determining 
frame functions is further detailed in chapter four. Groups of frame functions were allocated 
to the following categories; the Russian Supportive category; the Georgian Supportive 
category, the NATO Perspective category; the Norwegian Angle category; and the Neutral 
Category. Based on this coding scheme news stories published on key dates were analyzed. 
With respect to the limited length of this thesis, the following section will present the findings 
of the qualitative research. The elaborate process of assigning frame functions to segments of 
news texts is demonstrated in Appendix 3. 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how the war coverage developed over August 
2008 in the sample newspapers. In pursuit of this goal the qualitative analysis will examine 
the coverage on various dates. Specifically, the outbreak of the war on August 7
th
 and 8
th
 was 
analyzed. Considering that news stories are generally published the next day, the date of 
analysis was August 8
th
 and 9
th
. The two following weekends, August 15 and August 22, were 
included to investigate the development in coverage and framing over time. The qualitative 
analysis will compare and contrast the news stories over these three dates in an attempt to 
unveil possible shifts in coverage. These shifts may involve selection of information or the 
framing of news. Throughout this section the research questions, as presented at the outset of 
this chapter, will guide the investigations.  
 
Research Question 5: (POLITICAL ALIGNMENT) to what extent will the liberal print-press 
align with the American press in its coverage of the 2008 War? Will the left-wing press be 
more critical towards Georgia than the liberal press? 
 
There seems to be a consensus among the sample newspapers in regards to Saakashvili being 
the primary cause for the outbreak of war.  His decision to engage in South Ossetia is 
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described as irrational, reckless or unilateral at various points by all the newspapers. This 
criticism was most evident in Dagbladet, which blamed Saakashvili for the war as early as 
August 9. Aftenposten remained highly critical of the Russian response throughout August, 
but held both Saakashvili and the U.S. responsible for the outbreak in their coverage on 
August 22. Klassekampen does not explicitly blame Saakashvili, but includes several citations 
from Russian state officials blaming the Georgian government for the war. In Dag og Tid, 
Saakashvili and the U.S. is held partly accountable for the outbreak of the war. Frames 
describing Saakashvili and his government as reckless and unilateral were promoted by 
Russia during August 2008.
265
 The frequent deployment in the Norwegian print-press affirms 
the success of this Russian Supportive frame.
266
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the American print-press aligned closely with the Georgian position in 
their initial coverage of the war, while assuming a critical stance towards Russia from day 
one.
267
 There is a divergence between the left-wing and liberal press in their coverage of 
Georgia‟s engagement in South Ossetia. Klassekampen remains critical of the U.S. and 
NATO‟s involvement in Georgia throughout the month of August. As mentioned in the 
quantitative analysis there is a predominance of Russian based sources in Klassekampen‟s 
coverage. Furthermore the qualitative analysis revealed a majority of Russian Supportive 
frames across the dates of analysis.  
 
Conversely, Aftenposten included more Georgian based sources in its coverage of the war. In 
its initial coverage Aftenposten focused on the Russian incursion in South Ossetia and its 
detrimental effects on the Georgian people. Although Saakashvili is held responsible for the 
outbreak of war, the Russian counter offensive is criticized. Reports of Russian forces 
violating ceasefire agreements and damaging Georgian civilian infrastructure are evident 
throughout Aftenposten‟s coverage.  
 
Together these findings indicate that the coverage in Klassekampen incorporated considerably 
more Russian Supportive frames than Aftenposten. Accordingly Klassekampen assumed a 
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more critical stance towards Georgia in its war coverage. Moreover the coverage in 
Aftenposten aligned closer with the American coverage than Klassekampen.
268
 This is 
especially evident in Aftenposten‟s editorials, which state that only Washington may restore 
peace in the Caucasus. Furthermore the coverage in Aftenposten was accompanied by a 
substantial coverage of the U.S. presidential election between John McCain and Barack 
Obama, which is much less prominent in Klassekampen. During its coverage of the 2008 War, 
Aftenposten used the Washington Post as a source in its news production, which can further 
explain its concurrence with the American press.
269
 
  
Research question 3: (SHIFTS IN COVERAGE AND FRAMING OVER TIME) how will the 
coverage and framing in the Norwegian Print Press develop over the course of August 2008? 
Will the print-press support Georgia in the initial stages of the conflict, while assuming a 
more critical view over time? 
 
In the production of news, time is of the utmost importance, as journalists are limited by 
certain deadlines. This analysis examines the coverage in three daily newspapers and one 
weekly newspaper. In a daily newspaper, news stories are produced over the course of one 
day, reaching the printers by midnight. In a weekly newspaper this time frame is substantially 
longer. Considering the deceitful nature of the 2008 War, the aspect of time was 
imperative.
270
 As time passed, the true nature of the events on the ground was revealed. As a 
result, false accusations, misinformation and misconceptions did not withstand the test of 
time. By default this provided Dag og Tid with an edge compared to the other newspapers, as 
its stories were produced over the course of a week. 
 
This certainly factored into the Norwegian print-press coverage. In the initial coverage, 
several instances of false reports were allowed to enter the daily newspapers. One of these 
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was the South Ossetian genocide claim. During the outbreak of the war, the South Ossetian 
separatist government accused Georgia of genocidal acts against the civilian population in 
South Ossetia. The alleged death tolls ranged from one to two thousand civilian casualties. 
These death tolls were mirrored in both Aftenposten and Dagbladet on August 9.
271
 In the 
aftermath of the war, these death tolls were further investigated. As shown in chapter three, 
the factual number of civilian casualties was 162.
272
 These false claims were much less salient 
in Klassekampen and entirely absent from the coverage in Dag og Tid.  
 
Over the course of August, the newspapers gradually shifted their coverage of the war, some 
more than others. Noteworthy is the dramatic shift in Dagbladet from August 8/9 to August 
15. In its initial coverage Dagbladet assumed a critical stance towards Georgia‟s actions, 
aligning closely with frames in the Russian Supportive category. On August 15 however, the 
newspaper incorporated considerably more Georgian frames, while assuming a more critical 
view on the Russian invasion. Dagbladet‟s reliance on reports by correspondent Morten 
Strand seems a critical factor in this regard. On August 8 and 9, Strand was stationed in 
St.Petersburg, while on August 15 he was present in Tbilisi. These findings indicate the 
importance of source origin in the framing of news. On August 22, Dagbladet resumed its 
critical stance towards Saakashvili in regards to his handling of the conflict. The U.S. in 
particular is criticized for their complete disregard for Russia‟s „red lines‟ at the NATO 
Bucharest Summit.  
 
Klassekampen incorporated more Russian Supportive frames than Georgian Supportive 
frames across the dates of analysis, although less salient on August 22. Traditionally 
Klassekampen has been left-wing oriented, assuming a critical stance towards capitalism in 
general, and its main sponsor, the U.S., in particular.
273
 Thus the prevalence of Russian 
Supportive frames may be a product of its critical stance towards the U.S., and by extension 
Georgia, rather than its support for the Russian operation.
274
 At the same time, modern day 
Russia fuses Western-style capitalism with authoritarian state rule. Thus the country is not up 
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to the standards of a western democracy. This can partly explain the presence of several 
Georgian Supportive frames in Klassekampen, which criticizes the Russian involvement.  
 
On August 15 Klassekampen incorporates more NATO Perspective and Norwegian Angle 
frames. Klassekampen has later stated that the Norwegian press did little to scrutinize the U.S. 
presence in Georgia during August 2008.
275
 As a result Klassekampen prioritized an 
alternative route, focusing on the geopolitical relations between Russia and the U.S/NATO.
276
 
In contrast to Dagbladet, Klassekampen remained persistently critical towards the U.S. 
involvement in Georgia throughout August. Considering the congruence between 
Klassekampen and Dagbladet in their use of sources, this divergence is intriguing. 
Specifically, this deviation shows that the correlation between source origin and framing of 
news is not absolute. Although source origin can affect the process of framing, it remains one 
of many factors.  
 
Aftenposten includes the most Georgian frames compared to the other newspapers in the 
sample. Its reliance on reports by freelance journalist Ragnar Skre on August 8/9 and August 
15 seems to be an important factor in this regard. During the 2008 War, Skre was stationed in 
Tbilisi, thus mainly covering the war from a Georgian standpoint. By August 22, Aftenposten 
assumes a more critical stance towards Georgia and the U.S. in regards to the outbreak of war. 
In addition, Aftenposten incorporates a considerable amount of Norwegian Angle frames 
throughout August. The frequency of these frames indicates an increasing concern with 
Norwegian Security in the public sphere following the Russian invasion of Georgia.  
 
This debate is also evident in Dag og Tid which includes a considerable amount of Norwegian 
Angle frames in its war coverage. The newspaper remained highly critical of the U.S. 
presence in Georgia throughout their news stories. Dag og Tid utilized the least amount of 
Georgian and Russian frames on August 15. The absence of these frames is presumptively an 
outcome of the considerable amount of expert sources in their news stories. In contrast to the 
other newspapers in the sample, Dag og Tid has no correspondents abroad. Consequently it is 
dependent on alternative sources in its coverage of international news.
277
 In regards to the 
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2008 War, academic sources were advised to comment on the complex nature of the conflict 
in the Caucasus.
278
 As a result the coverage was less reliant on the mainstream newsfeed, 
which caused fewer frames to penetrate its news stories.  
 
Research question 6: (EMPLOYING HISTORY) how was history employed by the 
Norwegian print-press in their coverage of the 2008 War? 
 
The 2008 War was infamous for its conflicting narratives, with each party promoting 
diverging reasons as to why the war came to be. Some of these narratives have been contested 
to this day, as is evident in the historical chapter of this thesis. Inevitably this caused different 
versions of history to manifest in the media as well. In the Norwegian print-press the 
historical background of the crisis was presented in various ways. Some newspapers, like 
Dagbladet and Aftenposten, incorporated historical assessments as part of its news stories. 
Dag og Tid on the other hand published specific articles designated to the historical 
dimension of the crisis. Fact sheets were used extensively in Dagbladet, Aftenposten and 
Klassekampen to inform readers on the historical context of the crisis. The following section 
investigates how, and to what extent, history was employed in the sample newspapers. 
Debates and arguments in the press releases are juxtaposed to the findings of chapter three for 
verification purposes. 
 
History in Klassekampen 
The historical aspects of the 2008 War were extensively covered in Klassekampen over the 
course of August. The majority of these historical segments were assessed in elaborate reports 
by journalist Peter M. Johansen, often accompanied by fact sheets including dates and 
annotations. In regards to the origins of the conflict, Klassekampen remained highly critical of 
the U.S. and NATO involvement in Georgia. As previously mentioned, the newspaper 
incorporated several frames from the Russian Supportive and the NATO Perspective category 
in its coverage of the war. These frames criticize the military buildup in Georgia throughout 
the late nineties and early 20s. NATO in particular is criticized for its policies in the post-Cold 
War era. Its projected expansion into Georgia and the Ukraine is regarded as the last piece of 
a containment puzzle against the Russian Federation.  
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The U.S. presence in Georgia is further criticized in a news story on August 9. Klassekampen 
states that Tbilisi has been a CIA headquarter ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated.
279
 
Furthermore Klassekampen states that the U.S. was behind the Rose Revolution in 2003, a 
claim that has been largely disputed by Western scholars.
280
 As stated in chapter three, the 
claim that American NGOs was the engine behind the Rose Revolution originated in 
Moscow. Certainly, the U.S. was a large contributor to the Georgian economy in the late 
nineties and the early twenties, but limited evidence suggests that American NGOs brought 
about the revolution itself. On the contrary Saakashvili and the Georgian people are mainly 
credited for the toppling of Shevardnadze‟s government.  
 
The criticism of Saakashvili persisted throughout Klassekampen‟s coverage. In particular, his 
integration of the breakaway region Adjara was, according to Klassekampen, achieved by 
military means.
281
 This claim is disputed by the academic literature assessed in this thesis. 
Although the crisis of 2004 produced considerable political tension, Adjara was integrated 
under Georgian sovereignty by peaceful means.
282
 In addition the integration of Adjara was 
fundamentally different from the situation in South Ossetia. There existed no “ethno-linguistic 
difference” between Adjarans and Georgians, and Adjara had never attempted secession from 
Georgia in the past.
283
  
 
The discussion concerning Kosovo was a focal point in Klassekampen‟s coverage. The 
Kosovo analogy is interesting, since it was purposely designed by Russian intelligence.
284
 In 
the wake of the 2008 War, Russia legitimized its incursion in Georgia based on the precedent 
set by NATO‟s operations in Serbia in 1999. As mentioned in chapter three, the operation 
involved an extensive aerial bombardment of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. NATO‟s „humanitarian 
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operation‟ has been criticized for ignoring both Russian objections and the agreed upon 
principles in the Charter of Paris and the UN.
285
 Similar to Kosovo, the UN Security Council 
failed to reach an agreement regarding the conflict in Georgia. Subsequently, Russia deployed 
the Kosovo analogy as a pretext for its intervention in Georgia. This pretext is mirrored in 
Klassekampen‟s coverage of the war. In an editorial on August 20, Klassekampen states that 
the recognition of Kosovo has set a new precedent for the principles of sovereignty.
286
 
Moreover the recognition of Kosovo ignored the sovereignty of Serbia. As such these 
principles are, according to Klassekampen, applicable in the cases of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.   
 
In a second story, Klassekampen discerns NATO‟s condemnation of Russia‟s involvement in 
Georgia. Both the U.S. and NATO are criticized for assuming a moral high ground vis-à-vis 
Russia. Klassekampen points to the U.S. and NATO‟s disregard for international law in the 
case of Serbia in 1999, the operation in Afghanistan in 2001, the War in Iraq in 2003 and the 
recognition of Kosovo in 2008. Considering these infringements, Klassekampen has 
effectively ruled the current criticism against Russia groundless.
287
  
 
One of the central questions of the legitimacy of the Russian operation was whether or not the 
people of South Ossetia constituted Russian citizens. At the outset of the war, President 
Medvedev proclaimed Russia‟s right to protect its own citizens, wherever they might be.288 
On August 9, Klassekampen mentioned that not counting Georgian citizens, ninety percent of 
the 70 000 people in South Ossetia holds Russian passports. Although implied, there is no 
mention of whether or not these people are considered as Russian citizens. According to 
Russia, the population of South Ossetia holding Russian passports constituted a Russian 
contingent inside South Ossetia. Allegedly, the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali involved mass 
killings of the South Ossetian civilian population.  In turn these atrocities legitimized the 
Russian military response. This narrative is mirrored in a fact sheet in Klassekampen on 
August 22. According to Klassekampen, Georgia initiated a military attack on the „Russian-
friendly region‟ of South Ossetia on August 7. The next day, Russia responded militarily in 
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the aid and protection of Russian citizens in the region.
289
 As indicated in chapter three, the 
Georgian constitution does not allow dual citizenship, thus ruling the Russian 
„passportification‟ of South Ossetia illegitimate. The quarrel over citizenship produced 
conflicting narratives between Georgia and Russia, which further influenced the press 
coverage. In this particular case Klassekampen endorses a Russian perspective, by defining 
the South Ossetians as Russian citizens.    
 
History in Aftenposten 
Similar to Klassekampen, the debates concerning Kosovo were also prominent in Aftenposten. 
In a news story on August 16, the Russian invasion of Georgia is regarded as the product of 
long standing grievances between Russia and the West. Aftenposten states that the 1999 
NATO operation in Serbia, together with the recognition of Kosovo in 2008, left deep 
grievances in Moscow. By referencing Kosovo and painting Saakashvili as a present day 
Slobodan Milosevic, the current crisis is considered a Russian retaliation. In contrast to 
Klassekampen however, the Kosovo precedent is here ruled illegitimate.
290
 Aftenposten points 
to the incomparable nature of Kosovo and Georgia, stating that NATO only opted for a 
military solution in Serbia once every diplomatic possibility was depleted. By falsely 
paralleling Kosovo, Russia has now proven its complete disregard for international 
boundaries. Throughout this story, Aftenposten assumes a critical stance towards Russia‟s 
policies, with no mention of the detrimental outcomes of the 1999 NATO operation for Serbs 
and Kosovars alike.  
 
The legitimacy of the Kosovo precedent is also addressed in an editorial on August 20. 
According to Aftenposten the Russian incursion in Georgia has demonstrated its sphere of 
influence in the Caucasus. By referencing Kosovo, Russia has responded to the NATO 
operation in Serbia and the international recognition of Kosovo. In contrast to the story on 
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August 16, this editorial endorses the Russian perspective by supporting the Kosovo 
parallel.
291
  
 
The ethnic dimension of the 2008 War is assessed throughout Aftenposten‟s coverage. As 
mentioned earlier, the debate over citizenship was one of the central questions in the conflict. 
Aftenposten points to the illegal distribution of Russian passports to South Ossetians in the 
post-Cold War era. Although 90 percent of South Ossetians holds Russian passports, they are 
considered, by Aftenposten, to be Georgian citizens.
292
 These segments support the Georgian 
perspective. The Russian „passportification‟ of South Ossetia is also addressed in a 
commentary on August 12, stating that Russia granted passports to the South Ossetian people 
in order to legitimize a military invasion of the region.
293
 
 
In another story, Aftenposten points to the ethnic friendship between South Ossetians and 
Georgians. These segments are in contrast with the claims of deep ethnic disputes between the 
minorities of Georgia, as promoted by the separatists and Russia at the outset of the war. 
Moreover, Aftenposten claims that Ossetians are not native Georgians, but are of Iranian 
descent, tracing back some 400 years. Abkhazia is further described as the historical cradle of 
the Georgian nation.
294
 Presumptively this is a reference to the Egrisi Kingdom, which was 
established between the 7
th
 and 6
th
 century B.C. These segments are congruent with the 
findings in the historical chapter of this thesis.
 295
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The historical origins of the crisis are further examined in an editorial on August 13. 
According to Aftenposten the „unnecessary war‟ in the Caucasus is a product of old historical 
grievances under the banner of „uncivilized leaders‟.296 Both the Georgian and Russian 
leadership are criticized for their „middle age mentality‟ by resorting to violence in the case of 
South Ossetia.
297
 Furthermore the political climate in the Caucasus is paralleled to the Balkan 
and Middle East regions. According to Aftenposten these regions are infamous for 
disregarding notions of unity and collaboration. The current crisis is thus the outcome of the 
parties‟ relentless pursuit of national agendas, resulting in further bloodshed.  
 
History in Dagbladet 
The historical segments in Dagbladet were presented in different ways. Similar to 
Klassekampen and Aftenposten, historical information was often included in fact sheets. These 
fact sheets supplemented various news stories concerning recent developments in the 2008 
War. Commentaries were used to provide a historical background for the conflict. Overall the 
Caucasus is described as an exceptionally volatile region, where several violent encounters 
have occurred in the past. In a news story on August 14, the Caucasus is referred to as an unlit 
powder keg.
298
 Based on the complex mixture of ethnicities, the region is considered to be 
especially prone to hostilities. There seems to be a consensus between Aftenposten and 
Dagbladet in this regard.  
 
Dagbladet oscillates in its assessment of the autonomous status of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. All too often these entities are dealt with as two sides of the same coin. In a fact 
sheet on August 8, both regions have reportedly accomplished de facto independence from 
Georgia in the „bloody wars‟ of 1992.299 On August 10, Dagbladet states that South Ossetia 
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and Abkhazia fought a „bloody liberation war‟ against Georgia in 1991 and 1992.300 These 
segments are in contrast to the historical findings in this thesis, which differentiates between 
two distinct conflicts in the 1990s. The South Ossetian conflict occurred from 1991 to 1992, 
whereas the Abkhaz War took place between 1992 and 1994. The tendency to treat these 
separate conflicts as one was not limited to the Norwegian print-press or Dagbladet however. 
As Asmus (2010) points out, this phenomenon was quite common in Western discourses.
301
 
Nevertheless it is an indication of the limited knowledge of the Caucasus region among 
Norwegian journalists writing on the 2008 War.  
 
These deficiencies were also present in a commentary on August 15, detailing the historical 
background for the Russia-Georgian relationship. This commentary assesses the origins of the 
Georgian nation as well as the Russian presence in Georgia during the last two centuries. 
Given the limited length of this commentary certain sections are rather brief, resulting in 
rudimental analyses of complex affairs. In addition, some historical inaccuracies occur 
throughout the commentary; the Rose Revolution is assigned to 2005 rather than 2003; the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union is assigned to 1990 rather than 1991; Abkhazia is described as 
the only autonomous entity of the Georgian SSR, with no mention of South Ossetia or Adjara.  
The current crisis is regarded as the outcome of NATO‟s disregard for Russia‟s historical 
sphere of influence. The projected expansion of the coalition is described as out-of-area in 
Russia’s arena.302  
 
Indeed the historical presence of Russia in the South Caucasus is beyond question. However 
the arguments concerning spheres of influence were rendered obsolete by the Charter of Paris 
in 1990, of which Soviet Russia was a signee.
303
 According to the document, the sovereignty 
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and territorial integrity of nations should not be contested by the signatories. Nevertheless the 
arguments of Russia‟s historical sphere of influence in the South Caucasus region were 
prevalent in Dagbladet throughout its coverage. On August 13, an expert commentary 
assesses the historical significance of Georgia under Russian rule. This commentary states 
that Russia‟s engagement in Georgia is part of traditional Russian politics, rather than a 
reemergence of the Cold War.
304
 Accordingly Russia has confirmed its role as an 
authoritarian state, in which actions speak louder than words.
305
 Dagbladet promotes a 
dangerous notion here; by claiming that Russia has a free pass within its historical sphere of 
influence, somehow absolved from the constraints of international law.  
 
Dagbladet‟s most extensive story on the history of the Caucasus was published on August 24. 
The story is a translated segment from British author and historian Simon Sebag Montefiore. 
Throughout this commentary, Montefiore assesses the historical presence of Russia in the 
Caucasus region, from the late 18
th
 century to the present. Personal recollections of meeting 
with Georgian presidents are tied in with discussions of the breakaway regions. Montefiore 
criticizes the past leaders of Georgia by describing Gamsakhurdia‟s presidency as “idiotic and 
insane” and Shevardnadze‟s as “autocratic”.306 He concludes his commentary by describing 
the Russian incursion in Georgia as “a dangerous tribute to the reckless use of force in the 
international community”.307 As such, he urges the West to condemn Russia‟s actions in 
unison. 
 
History in Dag og Tid 
In contrast to the other newspapers the historical dimension was assessed in designated news 
articles in Dag og Tid. These stories were often based on expert sources, which provide added 
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depth in the historical assessments.
308
 In an expert commentary on August 15, Dag og Tid 
assesses the intricate relationship between Russia and Georgia during the Soviet era. 
According to the commentary, the ethnic dimension of the conflict is an artificial construct. 
The author supports this argument by pointing to the shared culture between South Ossetians 
and Georgians under Soviet rule.
309
 Matsaberidze (2012) supports this argument, stating that 
the notion of ethnic disputes between South Ossetians and Georgians was intentionally 
promoted by Russia to exacerbate the conflict.
310
 
 
Dag og Tid states that the current conflict is the product of Georgian nationalist policies in the 
post-Soviet era. Moreover Gamsakhurdia is described as an incompetent leader, responsible 
for causing the South Ossetian War and driving a wedge between Georgia and its national 
minorities. These sections are in agreement with many Western scholars, who discredit 
Gamsakhurdia for his failed attempt to bring about national unity in Georgia in the early 
nineties.
311
 Furthermore Dag og Tid claims that Saakashvili was driven by a similar national 
agenda in his plead to integrate South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara under Georgian 
sovereignty. The Georgian attack on South Ossetia is paralleled to the Croatian attack on the 
Serbian enclave Republica Srpska Krajina. In contrast to the Croatian incursion, the author 
says, the Russians were determined to protect “their own” in South Ossetia. Using “their 
own” in this context is an indication that the author regards South Ossetians as Russian 
citizens.
312
 On the other hand the author renders the Russian invasion of Georgia as invalid, 
which cannot be justified under any pretenses. The author concludes the commentary by 
stating that Russia may win on the ground, but will eventually lose the propaganda war that 
follows, having permanently damaged its relations to the West. 
 
In another story the historical background between Georgia and Russia is examined. This 
report assesses the shared history between the two countries tracing back over two hundred 
years. Dag og Tid credits Tsarist Russia for aiding Georgia against the Ottoman Empire in the 
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19
th
 century.
313
 The Tsarist annexation of Georgia has been source to an extensive historical 
debate. As mentioned in chapter three, there is a divergence between Russian and Georgian 
perspectives in this regard. In Russian literature, the Tsarist expansion into the South 
Caucasus is regarded as a „humanitarian mission‟, in the aid of the Georgian nation against 
the Ottoman Empire.
314
 Conversely, many Georgian historians point to the negative outcomes 
of the Tsarist rule, particularly with regards to the abolition of the Georgian church and 
denationalization.
315
 In this paragraph, Dag og Tid promotes the Russian narrative.  
 
In the same story Dag og Tid states that the Georgian nation suffered immensely under Soviet 
rule, enduring cases of terror, corruption and large scale killings of native Georgians. 
Attention is drawn to Georgia‟s brutal strive for independence against the Soviet yoke. These 
sections paint a grievous picture of the Russian presence in Georgia. Under the subheading 
Gas and Blood, the two breakaway regions are addressed in detail. The author points to the 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of native Georgians following the wars in the early 
nineties. Furthermore the viability of the peacekeeping force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is 
criticized by describing it as “…a Russian led so-called peacekeeping force”.316 Overall this 
report assumes a critical stance towards Russia‟s historical presence in Georgia. The historical 
segments in this report paints a Goliath versus David image of the Russia-Georgian 
relationship.  
 
Research question 7: (DOMINANT FRAME) to what extent are bipolar concepts and Cold 
War frames used in the Norwegian print-press coverage during August 2008? 
 
Overall, the four newspapers under scrutiny incorporated a substantial amount of bipolar 
concepts in their coverage of the 2008 War. Most evident was Dagbladet‟s coverage on 
August 8
th
 and 9
th
, which included several references to the Cold War. Aftenposten also 
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included bipolar concepts across the dates of analysis, especially on August 8 and August 22. 
In addition Aftenposten included several stories paralleling the Russian incursion of Georgia 
to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Coincidentally the Russian invasion of 
Georgia occurred 40 years after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The U.S. in particular 
promoted this reference to condemn the Russian military engagement.
317
 In Aftenposten, 
elaborate articles were designated to the Czechoslovakia parallel.
318
   
 
Although less dominant, the Cold War frames also occurred in Klassekampen and Dag og Tid 
over the course of August. In addition to the qualitative analysis, a keyword search was 
utilized to quantify the use of Cold War references in the sample newspapers.
319
 The search 
yielded a total of 184 cases of Cold War references and/or bipolar concepts across the 
newspapers. The majority of these terms occurred in Aftenposten and Dagbladet, amounting 
for 57 and 63 hits respectively. Klassekampen employed the terms 50 times, whereas Dag og 
Tid used the terms 14 times. In combination with the results of the qualitative analysis, these 
findings indicate a prevalence of Cold War frames in the Norwegian print-press‟ coverage of 
the 2008 War.  
 
As stated earlier, the use of bipolar concepts or Cold War references connotes worldviews 
originating from the Cold War. The frequent deployment of these concepts in the Norwegian 
print-press coverage indicates a persistence of Cold War rhetoric in regards to Russia. 
Arguably these findings align with Van Gorp‟s notion of culturally imbedded frames.320 In the 
production of news stories, journalists attempt to find the balance between interpreting 
sources and informing the public. By using concepts inherently known by its readers, the 
journalist can easily communicate new stories to the public.
321
 In the context of the 2008 War, 
the Cold War provided journalists with a ready-to-use concept. Whether these concepts were 
used deliberately or unintentionally by the sample newspapers is outside the purview of this 
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318
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analysis. Nevertheless, the prominence of Cold War frames in the Norwegian print-press 
coverage indicates that history is indeed inseparable from the construction of social reality. In 
the pursuit of making sense of the present, we often turn to the past.  
 
In addition the substantial amount of Norwegian Angle frames can indicate the persistence of 
Cold War thinking in the Norwegian print-press. As Russian tanks entered Georgian territory, 
the Norwegian print-press raised debates concerning Norway‟s National Security. Although 
refuted by some newspapers, this debate called for a reassessment of Russia as a potential 
military threat to Norway. These debates are indicative of the Norwegian print-press‟ posture 
towards its neighbor in the north. Based on its historical relationship to Soviet Russia, this 
Cold War mentality may have caused journalists to regard Russia as a potential adversary to 
Norway. It is the proposal of this analysis, that this preconception influenced the way in 
which the Norwegian print-press framed Russia‟s engagement in Georgia. These findings are 
the result of a qualitative study however, and needs to be verified by future analysts before 
any wide conclusions may be drawn. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Theme and research problem 
This thesis has examined how the Russia-Georgian War was framed in the Norwegian print-
press in August 2008. During the war, the parties promoted diverging narratives as to why the 
conflict materialized. This produced an information war, which in turn caused misinformation 
and false claims to manifest in the news. Accordingly, part of this study was to investigate to 
what extent the information war affected the coverage in Norwegian print-press. Moreover, 
this thesis examined how the war was portrayed by various newspapers in August 2008. In 
pursuit of this goal this study has analyzed four Norwegian newspapers, namely Aftenposten, 
Klassekampen, Dag og Tid and Dagbladet. Each newspaper was selected to represent 
different political alignments within the Norwegian print-press, thus covering a wide range of 
perspectives. Additionally, this study has examined the correlation between political 
inclination and the framing of news. 
 
Methodology 
To examine the coverage, this thesis has employing framing analysis as an approach to news 
discourse. The approach was pertinent to the research problem, as it investigates how frames 
shape news coverage of events. As such, the approach identified frames from the conflicting 
parties, as well as other frames which are prominent in the news. Moreover, the approach was 
used to examine historical aspects of the coverage. Throughout August 2008, the parties 
employed history to legitimize their war aims. To make qualified assessments of these claims, 
this study has addressed the historical background of the 2008 War. The purpose of this 
section was to examine the origins of the conflict, and to determine how the events of the past 
shape the debates in 2008.  
 
Against this historical backdrop a research model was designed to analyze the coverage in the 
Norwegian print-press. To provide an overview of the coverage, the model categorized news 
articles according to genre, publication date, source class and source origin. Subsequently, the 
framing in the news texts was analyzed over three dates in August 2008. These dates were 
selected to examine how coverage and framing developed over time. Through a systematic 
approach, with predefined frame categories, the frames in individual articles were determined. 
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The investigation was further guided by research questions, designed to compare coverage 
across the sample newspapers and to answer the main research problem from various 
viewpoints. 
 
Research results 
The findings of this study reveal flaws in the initial reports of the Norwegian print-press 
during August 2008. Throughout their coverage, several media frames entered the 
newspapers. This caused some newspapers to align closer with one side of the conflict than 
the others, by mirroring arguments from the parties involved. Furthermore, this study has 
shown that Norwegian journalist had only limited knowledge of the conflict they were writing 
on. In the coverage of the Russia-Georgian War, a conflict most treacherous, these 
deficiencies were amplified. Specifically, this caused erroneous claims, false information and 
historical inaccuracies to manifest in the news texts.  
 
The quantitative analysis examined the use of sources in the sample newspapers. In the 
absence of independent sources from the conflict zones, the Norwegian print-press sought 
different paths to form news texts. An extensive use of both political and military sources was 
mutual in all newspapers under scrutiny. Moreover they employed a considerable amount of 
reports from the international media. The reliance on these sources explains why deficiencies 
in the international press, also penetrated Norwegian newspapers. These findings can also 
explain the congruence between the Norwegian print-press and the international press, both in 
terms of coverage and framing.  
 
There are however, differences between the newspapers in this regard. The sample 
newspapers were selected on the basis of representing various political alignments. An 
integral part of this study was to investigate the correlation between the political inclination of 
media institutions and the framing of news. As shown in this study, political inclination 
influenced the way in which Norwegian newspapers framed the Russia-Georgian War. This 
phenomenon produced a divergence in coverage between the newspapers.  
 
In Aftenposten, Russia was criticized for its disproportionate response to the Georgian 
incursion of South Ossetia. As shown in the qualitative analysis, Aftenposten employed a 
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majority of Georgian Supportive frames across the dates of analysis, which further indicates 
its critical stance towards Russia. Conversely Klassekampen, assumes a critical view towards 
both Georgia and the U.S. Moreover, Klassekampen scrutinized NATO‟s role in the conflict 
within a historical context of policies vis-à-vis Russia. This criticism produced a majority of 
Russian Supportive frames in Klassekampen.  
 
The coverage in the newspapers was not however constant, but evolved over the course of 
August. As shown in this study, the aspect of time is imperative in the coverage of military 
conflicts. Over the course of August, the Norwegian press shifted their coverage of the 
Russia-Georgian War. This phenomenon was most evident in Dagbladet, which oscillates in 
both framing and coverage across the dates of analysis. Klassekampen remained critical of 
both Georgia and NATO throughout its coverage. Initially, Aftenposten assumed a critical 
stance towards Russia, but over the course of August the newspaper holds Georgia 
responsible for the outbreak of war. Dag og Tid employed a substantial amount of expert 
sources to substitute its lack of correspondents. This also affects its news coverage, which 
provides a wider context for the conflict in the Caucasus. Moreover, Dag og Tid had an 
advantage compared to the daily newspapers, as its stories were published over the course of a 
week. As a result, fewer frames were identified in Dag og Tid than the other newspapers. 
 
An interesting aspect of the Norwegian print press coverage was the high frequency of 
Norwegian Angle frames - which scrutinized the national security arrangement of Norway 
vis-à-vis Russia. The analysis in this study revealed a prevalence of these frames across all the 
sample newspapers. Some newspapers in the sample, like Dag og Tid and Klassekampen, 
refuted these concerns. Regardless, the prominence of these frames is indicative of the 
Norwegian media‟s posture towards Russia. Moreover, the analyses revealed a frequent 
deployment of bipolar concepts in sample newspapers. Specifically, these concepts connote 
worldviews originating from the Cold War. The findings of this study suggest that this Cold 
War outlook influenced the way in which the Norwegian print press framed Russia‟s military 
operations in Georgia.  
 
The Kosovo analogy was reflected in the Norwegian print-press on several occasions. As 
mentioned in chapter three, the analogy was deployed by the Russian Federation throughout 
August 2008. First, the analogy was used to legitimize Russia‟s military engagements in 
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South Ossetia on the basis of humanitarian intervention. According to Russia, a Georgian 
genocide of the people of South Ossetia legitimized the Russian military intervention. As 
shown in this study the alleged genocide never took place. Second, the analogy was utilized as 
a legal framework to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Moscow 
claimed that the recognition of Kosovo, in April 2008, set a precedent for other autonomous 
regions to freely declare their own independence.  
 
As discussed in chapter three, the deployment of the Kosovo parallel was ruled invalid by the 
E.U. report. Although there is a resemblance between the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 
the differences far outweigh the similarities. On the basis of these findings, the Kosovo 
analogy should be regarded as a rhetorical instrument used to shed a more favorable light on 
Russian military engagement in Georgia. Nevertheless, these analogies entered several news 
articles in the Norwegian print-press. Klassekampen, in particular, regards the Kosovo 
analogy to be directly applicable to the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Aftenposten on 
the other hand points to the incomparable nature between South Ossetia and Kosovo.  
 
Review of methodology 
An important part of this thesis was to assess the capacity of news framing analysis to 
examine framing and historical themes in the news. The strength of the approach lies in 
comparing news coverage across various media sources. As shown in this study, the 
predefined categories proved useful tools for contrasting coverage between different 
newspapers. As such, divergences are easily detectable for the analyst, thus serving as 
springboards for further discussion. In this regard, the approach has been successful. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed differences in the way history was employed in the sample 
newspapers. 
 
However, the framing analysis method also has certain weaknesses. One of these is 
subjectivity, and its unavoidable effect on research results.
322
 Although the approach is 
sufficient to identifying frames in news texts, it is largely guided by the lens of the analyst. In 
this study, the frames and categories were determined prior to the research. However, the 
extraction of individual frames from news texts is ultimately decided by the researcher. As 
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such, the findings of framing studies should be validated by independent coders. Furthermore, 
the results of these analyses should be regarded as indications of trends, rather than absolute 
truths. In this study the method was supplemented by specific research questions, which 
stimulated discussion of the findings in a wider context. This was useful, as it directed the 
analysis towards answering the main research problem. As such, news framing analysis 
should be combined with other approaches that investigate news discourse. 
 
In this study the approach proved quite labor intensive, for a number of reasons. First the 
process of designing suitable categories and frame functions for the analysis requires a high 
degree of knowledge about the subject matter. As such, an elaborate historical background 
was a necessity. Without it, the quality of the analyses would deteriorate. Second, some of the 
news stories under scrutiny employed history as part of their discourses. Thus to authenticate 
these assessments, necessitates a thorough understanding of the historical dimension of the 
2008 War.  
 
Third, the process of extracting frame functions from news texts requires in-depth reading of 
individual articles. Even though this study employed a systematic research model in its 
analyses, the coding of individual articles proved to be challenging. Lastly, the extensive 
coding process of categorizing a large collection of articles according to genre, source class, 
source origin, and publication date is a meticulous exercise. Many of these issues may have 
been alleviated through the use of designated coders, which were unavailable for this project. 
Nevertheless, the approach proved a suitable method for analyzing news coverage from a 
historical perspective. 
 
The role of the media in modern warfare 
In other major military conflicts the media has been used as an instrument of modern warfare 
to shed favorable light on the actions of individual parties. The aim of this study was to 
investigate to what extent the media was subject to the will of political interests in 2008. The 
Russia-Georgian War was no exception. Throughout August 2008, the parties involved 
promoted conflicting reasons behind the outbreak of war. Previous studies have confirmed 
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that this affected the coverage in international news media to a great extent.
323
 The findings of 
this study profess a similar trend in the Norwegian print-press coverage. 
 
This thesis has scrutinized the accumulation of knowledge in modern society. As part of this 
process, the media has assumed the role of inter-mediator between the source of information 
and the public. As such the media holds significant power in its selection, coverage and 
framing of news. Thus, the professional conduct of journalists provides an important subject 
of study for scholars interested in the construction of social reality. Journalistic practices are 
vastly different from academic practices, in the acquisition and processing of sources to 
produce texts. At its outset, this thesis posed the question of how journalistic practices 
affected the assessment of complex military conflicts, such as the Russia-Georgian War. 
 
The historical assessments in this thesis are a testament to the complex nature of the Russia-
Georgian War. Even through extensive research and investigation, many aspects of the 2008 
War remain enigmatic. By default this brings about tremendous challenges for any writer 
trying to dissect the intricate relationship between the actors of the war. This study has 
underlined the critical importance of source material in the assessment of international 
conflicts.  
 
In the Norwegian print-press, the homogenous composition of source material greatly affected 
the news coverage of the Russia-Georgian War. Similar to conflicts in the past, the reliance on 
military and political sources was substantial during August 2008. In this regard, the findings 
of this study confirm the assertions of others - the media are highly susceptible to media 
frames during wartime. 
324
 Studies that scrutinize the role of the media in military conflicts 
can contribute to increased awareness of this phenomenon. Today these studies are 
imperative, as they recognize information as a source of political power. Only by embracing 
this reality can the media limit the effects of framing on news coverage. The challenge for 
journalists lies in finding the balance between informing the public and granting a voice to the 
parties of a conflict. 
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Future studies 
The framing analysis model in this study, is but one of many approaches which can examine 
the influence of information wars on media output. As such the results of this study will not 
necessarily be analogous to other methods of analysis. Nevertheless, the approach is 
applicable for future studies investigating framing in the news. Many of the themes addressed 
in this thesis are broad enough to stimulate projects of their own. The correlation between 
political alignment and framing of news is an interesting subject for future research. In this 
study, the analysis was based on four Norwegian newspapers. Thus, an analysis of the 
coverage in other Norwegian newspapers would supplement the assessments in this study. 
Furthermore, this thesis has analyzed news coverage from an academic perspective, outside 
the media. As such, a study from the newspapers‟ point of view would provide an in-depth 
look at the process of framing from inside the news.
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Frame function Frame function in the print-press releases Coding 
category 
Problem 
definition 
Georgia bombardment of Tskhinvali Russian 
Supportive 
Category 
Georgian genocide of South Ossetian/Russian civilians 
Georgia kills Russian peacekeepers 
Georgia invades South Ossetia 
Georgian military forces committing war crimes 
South Ossetians defined as Russian citizens 
Georgian attack on South Ossetian civilians 
Georgia violating ceasefire agreement 
Georgia violating international law 
Causal 
interpretation 
Saakashvili is reckless and/or brutal 
Georgian government untrustworthy, unhealthy ambitions  
Diplomatic suicide by Saakashvili to attack South Ossetia 
Russia protecting South Ossetia/Russian citizens 
South Ossetia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence (described as 
Russian zone, backyard, region, arena) 
Georgia long planned attack on South Ossetia 
Israel, NATO or the U.S. supported the Georgian war effort, forcing 
Russia to intervene 
Kosovo precedent legitimizes  S.O. and Abkhazia to secede from 
Georgia 
Treatment 
recommendation 
and/or moral 
evaluation 
Georgia must withdraw its forces 
Georgia must stop the violence 
Russia will secure the peace 
Problem 
definition 
South Ossetian separatists bombarding Georgian villages  Georgian 
Supportive 
Category 
Russia attacking Georgia 
Russia invading Georgia 
Russia destroying Georgian military infrastructure (army bases, 
military facilities, military factories etc.) 
Russia destroying Georgian civilian infrastructure (villages, ports, 
hospitals, houses etc.) 
Russian peacekeepers attacking Georgian troops 
Killing of Georgian civilians 
Russia cyber attack on Georgia 
Russian forces violating ceasefire agreement 
Russian or separatist forces killing/pillaging Georgian villages 
Russian or separatist forces violating international law 
Russia violating ceasefire agreement 
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Causal 
interpretation 
Russia encouraging separatists to revolt against Georgia 
Putin/Medvedev is reckless/barbaric/authoritarian  
2008 War as part of a long history of Russian oppression against 
Georgia 
Viability of the Russian peacekeeping operation in question 
Russia attacks a smaller, weaker nation (Goliath vs. David) 
Russia supplying separatists with weapons 
Russian passportization of South Ossetians in violation with the 
Georgian constitution 
Russia aiming to weaken the Georgian state 
Russian attempting to thwart Georgia’s NATO membership 
Russian aiming to destroy the Georgian state 
Russia aiming to remove the Saakashvili government 
Russia long planned military actions against Georgia 
Treatment 
recommendation 
and/or moral 
evaluation 
Russia must withdraw its forces 
Russia must stop the violence 
Problem 
definition 
The war is a conflict between Russia and the West NATO/EU 
Perspective 
Category 
Cold War references and/or bipolar concepts (communism vs. 
liberal democracies, Russia vs. the West, East vs. West) 
Georgia as an American puppet, proxy state  
Resurgent Russia threatening Europe 
International economic ramifications of the war 
Casual 
interpretation 
International responsibility for the conflict 
Bucharest Summit as a pretext to the war 
Kosovo precedent is not applicable to S.O. and Abkhazia 
U.S. partly responsible for the war (financial aid, arms supply, 
military training etc.) 
Russian invasion of Georgia as a response to NATO’s policies 
NATO partly responsible for the war (financial aid, arms supply, 
military training, promising Georgia membership etc.) 
Treatment 
recommendation 
and/or moral 
evaluation 
NATO must reconsider its expansionist policies into former Soviet 
states 
International negotiations are required to restore peace in Georgia 
NATO-Russia relations permanently damaged as a result of the war 
Problem 
definition 
Russia invading a neighboring sovereign country Norwegian 
Angle 
Category 
Russia willing to use force in pursuit of national interest 
Russia ignoring international law in pursuit of national/economic 
interest 
Russia-Georgian War relevant to Russia-Norwegian relations in the 
Barents Sea  
Norwegian Army is incapable to secure Norwegian borders in the 
Barents Sea 
Cyber attack on Georgia is a threat to Norwegian National Security 
Causal 
interpretation 
Economic interests as a cause (oil/gas/fish/other) 
Paralleling Georgia to Norway (population size, army size, 
geographical proximity to Russia) 
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Georgia was provoking Russia by pursuing policies in conflict with 
Moscow 
Ignoring Russia’s wishes will result in violence 
Treatment 
recommendation 
and/or moral 
evaluation 
Norway-Russia diplomacy is the solution (bilateral agreements, 
negotiations etc.) 
Increasing Norwegian security measures is the correct response to 
the war (increase army, increase awareness, improve defense 
systems) 
Norway should not increase its army size 
Russia-Georgian War has no relevance for Norway 
Problem 
definition 
Humanitarian crisis Neutral 
Category Victims of war (casualties, infrastructure, livelihoods) 
Invisible effects of war (trauma, fear, psychological damage) 
Causal 
interpretation 
Both Russia and Georgia are equally responsible for the war 
The conflict is a result of a gradually deteriorating relationship 
between Russia and Georgia 
Treatment 
recommendation 
All parties must withdraw their troops 
All parties must stop the violence 
War is not the solution, problem solving by peaceful means 
Humanitarian organizations must attend the wounded 
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Appendix 3: Extraction of frame functions 
 
Dagbladet’s coverage of the 2008 War 
 
August 8/9 
Dagbladet published eight news items over these two days dealing with the 2008 War, 
consisting of four news stories, one interview, one brief, one editorial and a fact sheet. The 
news stories were mainly based on reports by Norwegian correspondent Morten Strand, 
stationed in St. Petersburg Russia at the time. His reports rely heavily on Russian media 
sources and statements from Russian policy officials, which further affect the news stories. 
The initial story on August 8, War in the Caucasus (Norwegian: Krig i Kaukasus), is 
presented with the subheading “Crisis between East and West”, a title which bipolarizes the 
conflict within a Cold War framework. Several references are made throughout the text 
connoting Cold War concepts such as “Russia versus the West” and the Berlin Wall. As 
mentioned in research question 7, the incorporation of Cold War concepts connotes 
worldviews originating from the Cold War era.
326
 In turn these culturally charged terms can 
affect the readers understanding of an important event or conflict.  
 
Further on the story articulates that the pro-American Georgia had initiated a war against 
South Ossetia by shelling the capital Tskhinvali, killing 21 South Ossetians in the process.
327
 
As a result South Ossetians are now forced to flee from their homes to their northern neighbor 
Russia. The article claims that South Ossetia achieved de facto sovereignty from Georgia 
following the South Ossetian War in 1992, a claim that has been source of much controversy 
in academic literature.
328
 In another story, under the heading Waiting for the invasion 
(Norwegian: Venter på invasjon), South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity is cited; claiming 
that the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali was the result of a long planned military operation.
329
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President Saakashvili is cited towards the end of the story claiming that the volatile situation 
in South Ossetia is a product of Russian aggression.
330
  
 
The next day‟s coverage features a story detailing the Russian intervention in South Ossetia. 
In the story They are waiting for battle (Norwegian: De venter på slaget), refugees in 
Tskhinvali are interviewed, detailing their hardships as a result of the war. Furthermore the 
story reports on 1400 South Ossetian casualties. These death tolls are allegedly based on 
reports submitted by South Ossetian families.  According to the news text this “ethnic 
cleansing” was operated by Georgians in retaliation for the expulsion of ethnic Georgians 
from South Ossetia during the war in 1992. Again the news story is based on Strand‟s reports, 
incorporating a substantial amount of Russian sources. The story concludes that Russia has 
every right to intervene in South Ossetia in protection of Russian citizen and peacekeepers, 
despite the fact that the Georgian constitution rules South Ossetia as an integral part of its 
national sovereignty.
331
 Limited space is designated to Georgian perspectives which are by 
and large refuted. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergej Lavrov is later cited, stating that 
Georgian troops are executing Russian civilians and peacekeepers if captured.
332
 This article 
includes several frames from the Russian Supportive category, based on the considerable 
amount of Russian perspectives throughout the text.   
 
On the same day an editorial with the title Larger than itself (Norwegian: Større enn seg selv) 
was published contextualizing the conflict within international politics. Similar to the news 
stories, the editorial repeatedly incorporates bipolar concepts such as “Russia and the West”. 
In addition the future economic prospects of the Caucasus are considered as a pretext for the 
Russian intervention in Georgia. The West, reportedly, provoked a Russian intervention by 
attempting to imbed Georgia in the Euro-Atlantic Alliances.
333
 Dagbladet clearly states that 
President Saakashvili is solely to blame for the outbreak of war in the Caucasus, describing 
his actions as reckless and unilateral. Frames describing Saakashvili as reckless or irrational 
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are designated to the Russian Supportive category.
334
 In effect the war in the Caucasus has 
thwarted any prospects for Georgia joining the EU or NATO, and deteriorated relations 
between Russia and the West. By and large this editorial views the 2008 War as the fallout of 
disputes in international politics, thus framing the war within the NATO Perspective category.  
 
August 15 
Dagbladet published 6 news items on August 15, consisting of one report, one commentary, 
one news article, one brief and two fact sheets. The first story called Here David recites: 
found the neighbor with his head sawed off (Norwegian: Her forteller David: Fant naboen 
med avskåret hode) reports on Georgian refugees outside Tbilisi. News correspondent Morten 
Strand reports from a refugee camp near Kaheti, where refugees from Georgian villages have 
sought refuge from the Russian invasion of Georgia. David Tafiskvili, a refugee from 
Thviavi, reports on executions of native Georgians on August 13 by Cossach and Ossetian 
militia. A considerable amount of this report is dedicated to descriptions of the brutality of the 
murders, as well as widespread killing and pillaging of Georgian villagers.
335
 Dagbladet 
reports on Russian military forces remaining in the conflict areas on August 14, in clear 
violation of the ceasefire agreement signed on August 12.
 336
 Although Tafiskvili holds the 
Ossetians primarily responsible for these atrocities, the Russian forces are described as 
passive bystanders, allowing the separatists to freely rampage Georgian villages. Reports on 
ceasefire violations and human rights violations by Russian or separatist forces are assigned to 
the Georgian Supportive category.
337
 
 
A second story Sending Rice as courier (Norwegian: Lar Rice bli kurer) details a diplomatic 
meeting between President of France Nicolas Sarkozy and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza 
Rice concerning the Russia-Georgian War. Sarkozy‟s initiation of the ceasefire agreement is 
described as a diplomatic triumph. Rice is reportedly heading for Georgia the following day, 
carrying documents that will enhance the ceasefire agreement already in place. The rest of this 
news article addresses the role of the U.S. in the outbreak of the war. Secretary of Defense 
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Robert Gates is cited claiming that the war may have deteriorated Russian-American 
relations. The next paragraphs, based on reports from the International Herald Tribune, claim 
that the U.S. repeatedly warned Georgia not to engage militarily in South Ossetia prior to the 
August 2008 War. Frames holding the U.S. partly responsible for the outbreak of the 2008 
War are assigned to the NATO Perspective category.
338
 In the initial stages of the war, the 
U.S. was held partly responsible for the Georgian attack, based on its close relationship as 
well as economic contribution to Georgia. In particular, the paragraphs in this news article 
present the U.S. response to this criticism. Asmus (2010) concludes in his study that the U.S. 
explicitly informed Georgia it would not receive any U.S. support in the case of a military 
operation in South Ossetia.
339
 However, it can be argued that without the U.S. military 
contributions to Georgia (i.e. the supply of military armaments and training of the Georgian 
army), the August 2008 War may have been avoided.  
 
The final story in Dagbladet on August 15 is a commentary by Andreas Hompland detailing 
the historical background for the Russia-Georgian relationship. Hompland assesses the origins 
of the Georgian nation as well as the Russian presence in Georgia during the last two 
centuries. Given the limited length of this commentary certain sections are rather brief, 
resulting in rudimental analyses of complex affairs. In addition some historical inaccuracies 
occur throughout the commentary; the Rose Revolution is assigned to 2005 rather than 2003; 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union is assigned to 1990 rather than 1991; Abkhazia is 
described as the only autonomous entity of the Georgian SSR, with no mention of South 
Ossetia or Adjara. Hompland describes Georgia as part of Russia‟s backyard and buffer zone. 
He further criticizes NATO for expanding into Russia‟s sphere of influence, describing it as 
out-of-area in Russia’s arena.340 Hompland concludes his commentary by describing 
President Saakashvili as a classic Caucasian warrior.
341
 Overall this commentary assumes a 
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critical stance towards both NATO and Georgia. By holding NATO and Saakashvili largely 
responsible for the outbreak of the war, this commentary incorporates frames from both the 
Russian Supportive and the NATO Perspective category.  
August 22 
On August 22, Dagbladet featured a commentary discerning the geopolitical implications of 
the 2008 War. Under the heading Bush’s final defeat (Norwegian: Bushs siste tap), the 2008 
War is regarded as the outcome of failed U.S. policies in Georgia.
342
 The journalist claims 
that Russia desires to mitigate its losses after the Cold War. Consequently it was not 
surprising that the war had dire ramifications when „the Georgian mouse‟ engaged „the 
Russian bear‟ on August 8, took aim and fired.343 The mouse versus bear metaphor is used 
several times during this commentary, connoting the power disparity between Russia and 
Georgia.
344
 Furthermore, the metaphor implies that Georgia engaged Russia when attacking 
South Ossetia. Saakashvili is held responsible for instigating the Russian response. A 
considerable amount of the commentary discerns Russian perspectives on the conflict. The 
Bush administration‟s disregard for Russian „red lines‟ is regarded as a pretext to the war. The 
journalists states that by recognizing the independence of Kosovo and promising NATO 
membership for the Ukraine and Georgia, the U.S. completely ignored Moscow‟s 
objections.
345
 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are further defined as Russia‟s backyard.346 
 
In the following paragraphs the Georgian attack on South Ossetia is compared with a Serbian 
blitz on Kosovo‟s civilian population. This comparison is controversial, as it insinuates that 
the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali was aimed at the civilian population.
347
  The remaining 
sections of the commentary criticize the U.S. and Saakashvili for their handling of the 
conflict. Speculations are made whether Georgia had received mixed signals from the U.S. 
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administration in regards to a military solution in South Ossetia.
348
 Saakashvili is further 
described as confrontational and anti-Russian in essence. 
 
Klassekampen’s Coverage of the 2008 War 
 
August 8/9 
Klassekampen‟s coverage was limited to a single news story between August 8 and 9. In the 
news story Has reached the capital (Norwegian: Har inntatt hovedstaden), journalist Peter M. 
Johansen writes on the introduction of Russian troops into South Ossetia on August 8. The 
news article reports on 150 Russian armored vehicles crossing the North Ossetian border, 
heading south for Tskhinvali. Georgian President Saakashvili is cited, stating that this is a 
clear violation of the national territory of sovereign Georgia, pointing out that two Russian air 
fighters have been shot down over Georgian airspace. Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs is 
furthermore cited claiming that Russian Su-24s bombarded targets in the Gori and Kareli 
regions inside Georgian territory.
349
 In the main body, the article incorporates both South 
Ossetian and Russian perspectives. Leader of the Russian Peacekeeping Force in South 
Ossetia Marat Kulakhmetov reports on the “total destruction” of Tshkinvali caused by 
Georgian artillery, claiming that the Russian headquarters was demolished during the 
attack.
350
 Next, South Ossetian representative Dmitrij Medoljev accuses Tbilisi for ethnic 
cleansing of South Ossetians.
351
 In contrast to Dagbladet the death tolls are not mentioned in 
this paragraph. Saakashvili states, in the following section, that the military operations in 
South Ossetia will continue until order is restored in the region, only then may negotiations 
resume.  
 
Towards the end of the article different perspectives are considered. Putin is cited blaming the 
Georgian leadership for the outbreak of war, killing Russian peacekeepers in the process. 
Johansen points out that there are conflicting views in terms of designating responsibility for 
the war. The U.S. rules South Ossetia as the main aggressor, whereas diplomats in Tbilisi are 
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more cautious in their assessment. Johansen mentions that fighting erupted as early as August 
1 in South Ossetia, with both Georgian and South Ossetian forces involved in the exchange. 
Further on the news article explains the conflict from both Georgian and Russian 
perspectives. According to Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia is engaging militarily to thwart 
any international presence in the region. Conversely Moscow suspects Tbilisi to take up arms 
in order to force an international intervention in South Ossetia. President of South Ossetia, 
Eduard Kokoitij is cited declaring the end goal to be international recognition of his republic, 
paralleling his region to that of Kosovo. The Kosovo parallel is interesting, since it was a 
purposely design of Russian intelligence.
352
 As mentioned in chapter three, the Kosovo 
parallel was deployed to legitimate the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from 
Georgia. The international recognition of Kosovo at the NATO Bucharest summit in April 
2008 completely ignored Russian objections. It landed a critical blow to Russia-NATO 
relations, leaving deep grievances among many in Moscow. Johansen does not comment on 
the legitimacy of the Kosovo precedent. 
 
Johansen mentions that not counting Georgian citizens, ninety percent of the 70 000 people in 
South Ossetia holds Russian passports. Although implied, there is no mention of whether or 
not these people are considered as Russian citizens. The last paragraphs of this news article 
address the international dimension of the conflict. The UN Security Council reportedly failed 
to reach an agreement on the conflict in South Ossetia. Several paragraphs are designated to 
Russian citations, claiming that NATO must reconsider granting Georgia membership in its 
coalition.
353
 According to Moscow NATO expansion eastwards is regarded as a containment 
of the Russian Federation. Johansen states in the last paragraph that Tbilisi has been a CIA 
headquarter ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated. Furthermore he states that the U.S. was 
behind the Rose Revolution in 2003, a claim that has been disputed by Western scholars.
354
 
As mentioned in chapter three, the claim that American NGOs was the driving force behind 
the Rose Revolution originated in Moscow. Certainly, the U.S. was a large contributor to the 
Georgian economy in the late nineties and the early twenties, but limited evidence suggests 
that American NGOs brought about the revolution itself. On the contrary Saakashvili and the 
Georgian people are mainly credited for the toppling of Shevardnadze‟s government.  
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Overall Klassekampen‟s coverage on August 8 and 9 incorporates several frames from both 
the Georgian and Russian Supportive category. In the introduction of the article, frames in the 
Georgian Supportive category are most salient. Immediately after reporting on the Russian 
military incursion, the Georgian leadership is cited, promoting their views on the conflict. 
Following this section the article turns progressively towards Russian perspectives. Claims of 
ethnic cleansing, the Kosovo parallel, killing of Russian peacekeepers and South Ossetians 
with Russian passports are all included. Although Johansen explicitly points to the confusing 
nature of the conflict, the predominance of Russian frames tells a different story. In all 
Klassekampen‟s coverage on August 8 and 9 included 6 frames in the Georgian Supportive 
category and 8 frames in the Russian Supportive category.  
 
August 15 
Klassekampen published 3 news items on August 15; one fact sheet, one editorial and one 
feature/report. The editorial under the heading Dark clouds (Norwegian: Mørke skyer) 
discusses the Russia-Georgian War in relation to Norwegian National Security. Throughout 
this editorial the future prospects of Norway‟s economic security in regards to Russia are 
considered.
355
 The call for a national army capable of protecting Norway‟s economic sphere is 
brought to the forefront. Russia is described as an emerging energy colossus expected to 
challenge Norway‟s economic spheres in the Barents Sea. The editor criticizes high ranked 
politicians and military representatives who neglect the need for a strong national defense. 
Klassekampen states that the future economic security of Norway is at risk without a strong 
national army, and that the current debate is too shortsighted. 
 
The most extensive news story in this edition of Klassekampen is a report named The U.S. is 
in place (Norwegian: USA er på plass). Journalist Peter M. Johansen reports on U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice‟s visit to Tbilisi on August 15 carrying “a briefcase full of 
warnings to Russia”. Rice is early on cited saying “This is not 1968”, referring to the Soviet 
invasion of the Czech Republic.
356
 The initial sections of the report incorporate numerous 
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Russian citations, questioning the U.S. and NATO support of Georgia. Russian NATO-
ambassador Dmitrij Rogozin is cited accusing the U.S. and NATO for consenting to Georgian 
military operations in South Ossetia. Johansen accompanies this paragraph by speculating if 
the U.S.-Georgian military exercise Immediate Response was the final preparation for the war. 
Frames claiming the Georgian attack on South Ossetia as a long planned military operation 
are designated to the Russian Supportive category.
357
 A considerable amount of this report 
details the Georgian military buildup since 1999. NATO has delivered a substantial amount of 
battle tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, artillery weapon systems and drones to Georgia.  
The report is dominated by Russian-based sources (5 out of 11 in-text sources), which also is 
reflected in the news text by its critical stance towards NATO‟s involvement in Georgia.358 In 
its final sections the report scrutinizes the arms trade between Israel and Georgia. Johansen 
elaborates on Israel‟s critical stance towards Moscow and its economic interests in Georgia 
through the BTC pipeline. Overall this report incorporates four frames from the Russian 
Supportive category, four frames from the NATO Perspective category and one frame from 
the Georgian Supportive category. 
 
August 22 
Klasskampen‟s coverage on August 22 discloses Russia‟s freeze of all military cooperation 
with NATO countries until further notice. According to the journalist the action is a response 
to NATO‟s decision to temporary suspend the NATO-Russian Council. Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov is cited stating that NATO must reconsider its priorities vis-à-vis 
Russia. He continues stating that if NATO chooses to support the Saakashvili regime over 
Russia, it will send a clear message to Moscow. This article assumes no clear inclination in 
terms of framing. The article is accompanied by a fact sheet, describing the origins of the 
conflict. According to Klassekampen, Georgia initiated a military attack on the Russian-
friendly region of South Ossetia on August 7. The next day, Russia responded militarily in the 
aid of Russian citizens in the region.
359
 This is an example of a Russian Supportive frame. 
According to Russia, the population of South Ossetia holding Russian passports constituted a 
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Russian contingent inside South Ossetia. Allegedly, the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali 
involved mass killing of the South Ossetian civilian population. According to Moscow, these 
atrocities legitimized the Russian military response.
360
 As mentioned in chapter three, the 
Georgian constitution does not allow dual citizenship, thus ruling the Russian 
„passportization‟ of South Ossetia as illegitimate. The quarrel over citizenship produces 
conflicting narratives between Georgia and Russia, which further influenced the press 
coverage. In this particular case Klassekampen endorses the Russian perspective, by defining 
the South Ossetians as Russian citizens.    
 
Aftenposten’s Coverage of the 2008 War 
 
August 8/9 
Aftenposten published 7 news items over August 8 and 9, including three briefs, three news 
stories and one commentary. On August 8, two briefs detail the Georgian attack on targets 
inside South Ossetia and a Georgian ceasefire proposition put forward by President 
Saakashvili. Both briefs are short and limited to disclosing immediate news updates on the 
conflict in the Caucasus. As such, these news items contain no clear inclination in terms of 
framing.  On August 9 however the conflict in the Caucasus reached the front page, 
proclaiming 1400 casualties. In contrast to Dagbladet, the bulletin states that the death toll is 
the outcome of clashes between Russian and Georgian forces. This is a noteworthy detail 
considering that the death toll originated from the South Ossetian government, claiming it was 
the outcome of ethnic cleansing by Georgian armed forces. The main story Fear and 
uncertainty in Georgia (Norwegian: Frykt og uvisshet i Georgia), is written by freelance 
journalist Ragnar Skre reporting out of Tbilisi Georgia. Aftenposten states that Skre lives in 
the conflict area, despite the hostilities taking place in Tskhinvali, nearly 70 miles from the 
Georgian capital. Skre‟s reports are used several times throughout Aftenposten‟s coverage of 
the war. In this news story, Skre reports on Georgian villagers suffering from the Russian 
aerial bombardment.
361
 Attention is drawn to the tragic outcomes of the Russian attack on 
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Georgian soil, causing widespread fear and suffering among the local population. Skre also 
mentions support for the Georgian war effort among the people of Gori. 
 
In another news story The Russians captured the capital (Norwegian: Russerne tok 
hovedstaden) journalist Torill Nordeng reports on the Russian assault incursion on Tskhinvali. 
In the lead paragraph Aftenposten states that “Russia has assumed control of the South 
Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, which may lead Georgia and the entire Caucasus into large scale 
war”. Using the term Caucasus here is misleading as it remains unclear whether the author 
implies that Armenia and Azerbaijan is somehow involved in the conflict in South Ossetia. In 
the first paragraph, the news text reports on a large scale Russian artillery and aerial assault on 
the capital Tskhinvali.
362
 In the following paragraph, civilian death tolls are specified, without 
any mention of the Georgian bombardment on August 7
th
 and 8
th
. Perhaps unintentionally, 
this arrangement of information holds the Russian attack responsible for the loss of human 
lives.   
 
Another point of interest is that Aftenposten was published in two editions on August 9. All 
articles remained unaltered in both editions, except for Nordeng‟s news story. In the first 
edition, the death tolls counted over 1000 civilian casualties, based on a statement by South 
Ossetian Nationalities Minister Teimuraz Kasaev. In the second edition this number was 
increased to 1400 casualties, referring to the same source. Kasaev‟s statement originated from 
an interview by telephone conducted by Russian news agency RIA Novosti. His original 
statement referred to over 1000 civilian losses caused by the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali 
between August 7
th
 and 8
th
, prior to the Russian involvement.
 363
 In Nordeng‟s article the 
same death tolls are employed in an article disclosing the Russian bombardment of the capital 
on August 9. It remains unclear as to why Aftenposten decided to alter the death tolls from its 
first to its second edition.  
 
The headlines of these articles were also altered. In the first edition the title proclaimed The 
Russians captured the capital (Norwegian: Russerne tok hovedstaden), whereas the second 
edition uses the headline Over 1400 killed in battle (Norwegian: Over 1400 drept i 
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kampene).This divergence is particularly interesting in regards to the general war coverage of 
the 2008 War. It is a striking example of how conflicting information was processed by the 
media over the course of the war, and in this case over the course of a day. Additionally, the 
second edition article extends the first article by 8 paragraphs. In particular, these paragraphs 
add statements from South Ossetian and Russian sources. This also affects the framing of the 
article. The first edition article predominantly blames Russia for the loss of human lives. 
However, this is altered in the second edition by incorporating South Ossetian and Russian 
perspectives. In particular, the second edition adds a controversial statement from South 
Ossetian representative Irina Gaglojeva, who describes Georgian engagements in Tskhinvali 
as a fascist occupation.
364
 In contrast to the article in the first edition, the second edition 
article mentions the Georgian bombardment prior to the Russian engagement, and its 
detrimental effects on the capital‟s infrastructure.365 As a result the second article integrates 
several frames in the Russian Supportive category.  
 
Lastly a commentary called The knot in the Caucasus (Norwegian: Knuten i Kaukasus) was 
published on August 9.  Foreign news editor Kjell Dragnes presents his take on the conflict. 
In this commentary Dragnes contextualizes the current crisis as part of international politics. 
He claims that only Moscow and Washington can solve this conflict. Similar to the coverage 
in Dagbladet, this commentary places the conflict in a Cold War framework, with its two 
major players being the U.S. and Russia. A substantial amount of the text deals with NATO 
expansion into former Soviet states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Dragnes holds the 
Bucharest Summit as a decisive factor for the current South Ossetian crisis, claiming that the 
U.S. provoked Russia by promising future membership for the Ukraine and Georgia.
366
 
According to Dragnes, Saakashvili‟s “reckless decision” to invade South Ossetia proves that 
he has a fundamental lack of understanding of how democracies operate.
367
 Dragnes 
concludes that only through negotiations between Washington and Moscow can peace be 
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restored in the Caucasus.
368
 This commentary incorporates frames almost exclusively from 
the NATO Perspective category.  
 
August 15 
On August 15 Aftenposten published 7 news items detailing the 2008 War, consisting of three 
feature/reports, two news stories, one brief and one opinion editorial. Aftenposten‟s first story 
is a report discussing the dispute between the U.S and Russia over the conflict in the 
Caucasus. Under the heading Feeble threats against the Russians (Norwegian: Tamme trusler 
mot Russerne) Norwegian correspondent John Hultgren reports on U.S. threats against 
Moscow in response to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Hultgren states that neither the U.S. 
nor the EU has leverage to force Russia‟s hand in Georgia. Russia has assumed a position of 
undisputed power in international politics as a large scale supplier of energy to Europe.  
 
The report parallels the threats from the U.S. to the rhetoric of the Cold War, referring to the 
Berlin Airlift in 1948.
369
 Russian military forces are, according to the news text, still present 
on Georgian territory, in violation with the ceasefire agreement.
370
 Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergej Lavrov is cited, stating that Georgia‟s territorial integrity is non-existent. In the last 
paragraphs Russian military forces are reported to still be present in Gori as well as destroying 
infrastructure in Poti on August 14.
371
 Humanitarian organizations inform that over 23 000 
people are forced to flee in Georgia as a result of the war.
372
 Overall this report includes three 
frames from the Georgian Supportive category, two frames from the NATO Perspective 
category, one frame from the Russian Supportive category and one frame from the Neutral 
category.  
 
In another story Proclaims Vengeance (Norwegian: Varsler Hevn) freelance journalist Ragnar 
Skre details incoming reports on murder and rape from areas controlled by Russian and 
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Ossetian forces.
373
 Skre elaborates that bands of Russian soldiers are forcing Georgian 
civilians to flee their homes south of Tskhinvali. Feelings of sorrow and anger are on the rise 
among Georgian people. Skre details news of unidentified warriors raping and killing 
civilians around Gori, which in turn fuels thoughts of vengeance in Georgia. This news story 
incorporates frames exclusively from the Georgian Supportive category.  
 
A third report titled The Battle over Caspian Oil (Norwegian: Kampen om Kaspi-oljen) 
addresses the economic ramifications of the 2008 War. Central to this report is the western 
economic reliance on Russian energy. Aftenposten states that the BTC pipeline, which 
transports large quantities of Caspian Oil to European markets, is a central aspect of the 
quarrel over Georgia. The BTC pipeline represents an alternative energy route for Europe, 
reducing its dependency on Russian energy. Bipolar concepts such as “Russia versus the 
West” and “Russia‟s relations to the West” are used repeatedly throughout the report. 
Although the 2008 War is mentioned, the main body of the report is dedicated to discussions 
of international economic policies.
374
 In all this report includes two frames from the NATO 
Perspective category. 
 
The remaining news stories details the 2008 War in regards to Norwegian security. In the 
news article May disable regjeringen.no (Norwegian: Kan lamme regjeringen.no), a cyber 
attack on Georgia is tied to Norwegian national security.
375
 During the outbreak of the 2008 
War several Georgian governmental sites were disabled. As part of modern warfare a cyber 
attack can severely cripple computer based defense systems. Throughout this article Norway‟s 
current internet defense systems are examined in the case of a cyber attack on Norway. The 
final news story on this day is a report assessing Russia as a potential threat to Norwegian 
national security.  Under the title Fears Russian military power (Norwegian: Frykter russisk 
militærmakt) Norwegian defense politicians are discussing the plausibility of a military 
encounter with Russia.
376
 Various viewpoints are presented throughout the report; Signe Øye 
is cited claiming that a Russian attack on a NATO member is highly unlikely; Jan Petterson 
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views the 2008 War as a sign that Russia is willing to use military force in pursuit of national 
interests; Norwegian Defense Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen supports the call for 
modernizing the Norwegian Army, but regards the 2008 War to be of little relevance to 
Norway‟s national security. These news stories incorporate a total of six frames from the 
Norwegian Angle category. 
 
August 22  
Similar to the other newspapers, Aftenposten coverage on August 22 discerns the Russian 
freeze of military cooperation with NATO.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is cited 
prompting NATO to make a choice between Russia and Georgia. Two news stories reports on 
the economic ramifications of the recent development between Russia and the West.
377
 
According to these reports the NATO-Russia dispute has produced a climate of geopolitical 
uncertainty. As a result Russia‟s role as a reliable energy supplier is debated, causing an 
upsurge in the price of oil. In another story Georgia‟s future prospects as a NATO member are 
considered. U.S. NATO Ambassador Kurt Volker states that he still anticipates NATO 
membership for Georgia in the future. Georgia must, according to Volker, be held partly 
responsible for the outbreak of the war. Volker admits that the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali 
was the necessary pretext for a long prepared Russian military response.
378
 Volker concludes 
that only through an international presence inside South Ossetia may peace be restored in the 
Caucasus.
379
 
 
In another story the Russian military withdrawal from Georgia is examined. Russian military 
officials are quoted saying that Russian forces are withdrawing to the buffer zone surrounding 
South Ossetia in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. Saakashvili is cited stating that 
there exists no evidence of a Russian withdrawal. The final news story is an editorial with the 
heading Cold between East and West (Norwegian: Kjølig øst-vest). Bipolar concepts are used 
throughout the editorial in its discussion of NATO-Russia relations.
380
 Aftenposten holds both 
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Russia and Georgia responsible for the tragic war in the Caucasus.
381
 The leaders of each 
country are criticized for using military force to solve political issues. Saakashvili in 
particular is described as unwise. The victims of war are regrettably the people, which are 
used as pawns in a political game.
382
 Russia‟s international reputation is declining as a result 
of its military engagement in Georgia. Russia is suffering economically as a result.
383
 
Aftenposten concludes that Russia and the West are interdependent on each other. As such the 
resumption of the NATO-Russia Alliance is paramount.  
 
Dag og Tid’s Coverage of the 2008 War 
 
August 15 
As mentioned earlier Dag og Tid‟s first news stories on the August 2008 War occurred on 
August 15. By then, the war had already passed its critical stages, halted only by the ceasefire 
agreement on August 12. In its weekly edition on August 15, Dag og Tid published 6 news 
items detailing the Russia-Georgian War, consisting of one news story, one feature/report, one 
interview, one commentary, one editorial and one brief. A considerable amount of space in 
the international news section is dedicated to the conflict in the Caucasus, covering 5 out of 
32 pages on this day. These news stories encompass a substantial amount of expert sources 
compared to the coverage in the other newspapers in the sample. An increasing concern with 
Norwegian national security surfaced in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia. This 
stimulated a debate among journalists and politicians, reassessing the Norwegian security 
arrangement vis-à-vis Russia. In an editorial titled No relevance for Norway (Norwegian: 
Ingen relevans for Noreg) editor Svein Gjerdåker presents his take on the Russia-Georgian 
War. Responding to an opinion editorial by former Prime Minister of Norway Kåre Willoch, 
Gjerdåker states that the Russian incursion in Georgia poses no threat to Norwegian Security. 
384Willoch claims Norway‟s defense policy is overly naïve in regards to its Russian neighbor. 
Gjerdåker on the other hand, regards a Russian attack on a NATO country to be highly 
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unlikely, stating that the main concern for the Norwegian Defense Department should be 
protecting Norway‟s economic sphere in the Barents Sea. Gjerdåker‟s editorial incorporates 
exclusively frames from the Norwegian Angle category.  
 
Gjerdåker‟s viewpoints are further elaborated in an expert interview with Professor Iver B. 
Neumann. In this interview, Neumann regards the Russian incursion in South Ossetia as a 
clear demonstration of Russia‟s sphere of influence.385 According to Neumann, Norway is 
outside this Russian sphere. Norway‟s main concern should thus be to secure its sovereignty 
in the Barents Sea, and maintain its bilateral arrangements with Russia. Neumann credits 
Germany and France for opposing Georgian NATO membership during the NATO Bucharest 
Summit. Furthermore he states that if Georgia was granted NATO membership, the conflict in 
the Caucasus would have had tragic outcomes for the coalition. Neumann holds the U.S. 
partly responsible for the current conflict by spreading liberal democracies into former Soviet 
states.
386
 When questioned if the U.S. took part in the military operation in South Ossetia, 
Neumann responds with affirmation.
387
 This interview incorporates one frame from the 
Russian Supportive category, one frame from the NATO Perspective category and three 
frames from the Norwegian Angle category.  
 
In an expert commentary The War between Russia and Georgia does not revolve around 
ethnic hatred (Norwegian: Krigen mellom Russland og Georgia handla ikkje om etnisk hat), 
Professor Pål Kolstø assesses the intricate relationship between Russia and Georgia during the 
Soviet era. According to Kolstø the ethnic dimension of the conflict is an artificial construct. 
Kolstø backs up this argument by pointing to the shared culture between South Ossetians and 
Georgians under Soviet rule. According to Kolstø the current conflict is the product of 
Georgian nationalist policies in the post-Soviet era. Gamsakhurdia is described as an 
incompetent leader, responsible for causing the South Ossetian War and driving a wedge 
between Georgia and its national minorities. Similar to Kolstø, many Western scholars 
discredit Gamsakhurdia for his failed attempt to bring about national unity in Georgia in the 
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early nineties.
388
 Kolstø claims that Saakashvili was driven by a similar national agenda in his 
plead to integrate South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara under Georgian sovereignty. He 
criticizes Saakashvili for sending Georgian troops to Iraq as a trade-off for American support 
in case of a military encounter with Russia. Furthermore Kolstø parallels the Georgian attack 
on South Ossetia to the Croatian attack on the Serbian enclave Republica Srpska Krajina. In 
contrast to the Croatian incursion, Kolstø says, the Russians were determined to protect “their 
own” in South Ossetia. Using “their own” in this context is an indication that Kolstø regards 
South Ossetians as Russian citizens.
389
 On the other hand he condemns the Russian invasion 
of Georgia, which under no pretenses can be justified.
390
 He further on questions the viability 
of the Russian/South Ossetian genocide claim. Kolstø concludes the commentary by stating 
that Russia may win on the ground, but will eventually lose the propaganda war that follows, 
having permanently damaged its relations to the West. 
 
In another story called Hurtful neighborliness (Norwegian: Smertfull naboskap) the historical 
background between Georgia and Russia is examined. Written by journalist Per Anders 
Todal, this report assesses the shared history between the two countries tracing back over two 
hundred years. Tsarist Russia is credited for aiding Georgia against the Ottoman Empire in the 
19
th
 century. According to Todal, the Georgian nation suffered immensely under Soviet rule, 
enduring cases of terror, corruption and large scale killings of native Georgians. Todal 
furthermore points to Georgia‟s brutal strive for independence against the Soviet yoke. These 
sections of the report paint a grievous picture of the Russian presence in Georgia.
391
 Under the 
subheading Gas and Blood, the two breakaway regions are addressed in detail. Todal points to 
the expulsion of hundred thousands of native Georgians following the wars in the early 
nineties. He further questions the viability of the peacekeeping force in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia by describing it as “…a Russian led so-called peacekeeping force”.392 Overall this 
report assumes a critical stance on the Russian presence in Georgia. The historical section of 
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this report paints a David versus Goliath image of the Georgia-Russian relationship, thus 
incorporating several frames from the Georgian Supportive category.  
 
The final story in Dag og Tid on August 15 is a news article named The wings of the U.S.A. 
do not cover Georgia (Norwegian: Vengene til USA dekkjer ikkje Georgia). This article 
assumes a critical angle towards the U.S. in regards to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia. 
Dag og Tid holds the U.S. partly responsible for Saakashvili‟s imprudent decision to attack 
Tskhinvali.
393
 As a result Georgia is now facing the fatal consequences of its liberal 
democratic transformation, initiated by Saakashivili in collaboration with the Bush 
administration. Saakashvili is further criticized for injudiciously believing the U.S. would 
save Georgia once fighting erupted in South Ossetia. Frames describing Saakashvili as a 
reckless or irresponsible leader shed favorable light on the Russian engagement.
394
  
 
August 22 
Dag og Tid featured four news items on August 22 concerning the 2008 War. In its editorial 
the future prospects of Georgia are discussed. Dag og Tid states that it is unwise to imbed 
Georgia under the coalition considering its detrimental outcome for NATO-Russia relations. 
Dag og Tid encourages the West to pursue other means to support Georgia than NATO 
membership. Georgia‟s strategic and historical importance to Russia is considered a critical 
factor in the current conflict. As such NATO expansion into Georgia will exacerbate relations 
between Russia and the West.
395
  
 
In a commentary Norwegian right-wing politician Erna Solberg responds to Dag og Tid’s 
editorial published on August 15, dismissing her call for an increase in the Norwegian 
military. Solberg states that Russia‟s unannounced war aim is to remove or weaken the 
Saakashvili government.
396
 Furthermore Solberg argues that the Russian invasion of Georgia 
is relevant to Norwegian security.
397
 Georgia pursued policies in conflict with Moscow by its 
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Western aspirations, thus instigating a Russian response. Solberg states that Norway‟s 
economic sphere in the Barents Sea is highly contested by Russia.
398
 Accordingly Norway 
must be prepared to secure its sovereignty vis-à-vis Russia. Solberg argues that the current 
state of the Norwegian military is not sufficient to the task.
399
 
 
Dag og Tid also featured an expert interview on August 22, discussing the 2008 War in 
regards to the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Georgia, led many political analysts to 
debate whether or not a new Cold War was at hand. In this interview, Dag og Tid, questions 
Professor Øyvind Østerud of the viability of these claims.  Bipolar concepts and Cold War 
references are frequently used throughout this interview, especially by the interviewer.
400
 
Østerud largely dismisses the claims of a new Cold War era, pointing to the incomparable 
nature of the current crisis.  
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